Gancyaco files his income tax return for the year 1949. Respondent issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the properties of Gancayco for the satisfaction of his deficiency income tax liability, and accordingly, the municipal treasurer issued a notice of sale of said property at public auction. Gancayco filed a petition to cancel the sale and direct that the same be re-advertised at a future date
ISSUE: Whether the sum of PhP 16,860.31 is due from Gancayco as deficiency income tax for 1949 hinges on the validity of his claim for deduction:
a) farming expense PhP 27,459
b) representation expenses PhP 8,933.45
HELD:
a)Farming Expenses - no evidence has been presnted as to the nature of the said farming expenses other than the care statement of petitioner that they were spent for the development and cultivation of his property.
No specification has been made as to the actual amount spent for purchase of tools, equipment or materials or the amount spent for improvement.
b) Representation expense
PhP 22, 820 is allowed
PhP 8,993.45 is disallowed because of the absence of recipt, invoices or vouchers of the expenditures in question, petitioner could not sspecify the items constituting the same when or on whom or on what they were incurred.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Sunday, August 28, 2016
PLDT VS. CIR
Petitioner PLDT claiming that it terminated in 1995 the employment of several rank and file, supervisory and executive employees dues to redundancy. In compliance with labor law requirements, it paid those separated employees separation pay and other benefits, and that as employer and withholding agent, it deducted from the separation pay withholding taxes which was remitted to BIR.
Petitioner filed with BIR a claim of tax credit or refund invoking sec. 28(b)(7)(B) of NIRC which excluded from gross income any amount received by an official or employee or by his heirs from the employer as a consequence of separation of such official or employee from service of the employer due to death, sickness or other physical ability or for any cause beyond the control of the said official or employer.
CTA denied PLDT claim on the ground that it failed to sufficiently prove that the terminated employees received separation pay and that taxes were withheld therefrom or remitted to the BIR.
ISSUE: WON the withholding taxes, which petitioner remitted to the BIR, should be refunded for having been erroneously withheld and paid to the later?
HELD:
PLDT failed to establish that the redundant employees actually received separation ay and it withheld taxes therefrom and remitted the same to the BIR.
A taxpayer must do two (2) things to be able to be able to successfully make a claim for the tax refund:
1. Declare the income payment it received as part of its gross income.
2. Establish the fact of withholding.
On this score, the relevant revenue regulations provides as follows:
Sec. 10. Claims for tax credit or refund - claims for tax credit or refund of income tax deducted and withheld on income payments shall be given due course only when it is shown on the return that the income payment received was declared as part of the gross income and the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payer to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld therefrom.
Petitioner filed with BIR a claim of tax credit or refund invoking sec. 28(b)(7)(B) of NIRC which excluded from gross income any amount received by an official or employee or by his heirs from the employer as a consequence of separation of such official or employee from service of the employer due to death, sickness or other physical ability or for any cause beyond the control of the said official or employer.
CTA denied PLDT claim on the ground that it failed to sufficiently prove that the terminated employees received separation pay and that taxes were withheld therefrom or remitted to the BIR.
ISSUE: WON the withholding taxes, which petitioner remitted to the BIR, should be refunded for having been erroneously withheld and paid to the later?
HELD:
PLDT failed to establish that the redundant employees actually received separation ay and it withheld taxes therefrom and remitted the same to the BIR.
A taxpayer must do two (2) things to be able to be able to successfully make a claim for the tax refund:
1. Declare the income payment it received as part of its gross income.
2. Establish the fact of withholding.
On this score, the relevant revenue regulations provides as follows:
Sec. 10. Claims for tax credit or refund - claims for tax credit or refund of income tax deducted and withheld on income payments shall be given due course only when it is shown on the return that the income payment received was declared as part of the gross income and the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payer to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld therefrom.
Saturday, August 27, 2016
Friday, August 26, 2016
HENDERSON VS. CIR
The spouses Arthur Henderson and Marie Henderson filed with BIR returns of annual net income for the years 1948-1952. Henderson's received notice of assessment from BIR, subsequently, paid the assessment. BIR reassessed the taxpayers income for the year 1948-1952 and demanded payment of the deficiency taxes.
In the assessments, BIR considered as part of their taxable income the taxpayers-husband allowances for rental, residential expenses, subsistence, water, electricity and telephone; bonus paid to him; withholding tax and entrance fee to Marikina Gun and Country Club paid by his employer for his account; and travelling allowance of his wife.
Taxpayer claim that taxpayer-husband allowances for the rental and utilities did not receive the money but that they lived in the said apartment furnished and paid by his employer for its convenience. As to the entrance fee to the Marikina Gun and Country Club paid by his employer and should not be considered as part of their income as with the wife-taxpayer travelling allowance.
ISSUE: WON the allowance for rental of the apartment furnished by the husband-taxpayers employer-corporation, including utilities and the allowance for travel expenses given by his employer-corporation to his wife in 1952 part of the taxable income?
HELD:
Bills for rentals and utilities were paid directly by the employer-corporation to the creditors. CTA held that taxpayers are entitled only to ratable value of the allowance in question, and the reasonable amount they would have spend for house rentals and utilities such as light, water, telephone should be the amount subject to tax and the excess considered as expense of the corporation.
The taxpayer claim is supported by evidence. Loberiza ( Head of Accounting department of the American Int'l underwriters...) testified that rentals, utilities, water, phone, and electric bills of executive of the corporation were entered in the books of account as 'subsistence allowance and expenses; that there was a separate account for salaries and wages of employees.
The manager's residential expenses in 1948 should be treated as rentals for apartments and utilities and should not form part of the ratable value subject to tax.
In the assessments, BIR considered as part of their taxable income the taxpayers-husband allowances for rental, residential expenses, subsistence, water, electricity and telephone; bonus paid to him; withholding tax and entrance fee to Marikina Gun and Country Club paid by his employer for his account; and travelling allowance of his wife.
Taxpayer claim that taxpayer-husband allowances for the rental and utilities did not receive the money but that they lived in the said apartment furnished and paid by his employer for its convenience. As to the entrance fee to the Marikina Gun and Country Club paid by his employer and should not be considered as part of their income as with the wife-taxpayer travelling allowance.
ISSUE: WON the allowance for rental of the apartment furnished by the husband-taxpayers employer-corporation, including utilities and the allowance for travel expenses given by his employer-corporation to his wife in 1952 part of the taxable income?
HELD:
Bills for rentals and utilities were paid directly by the employer-corporation to the creditors. CTA held that taxpayers are entitled only to ratable value of the allowance in question, and the reasonable amount they would have spend for house rentals and utilities such as light, water, telephone should be the amount subject to tax and the excess considered as expense of the corporation.
The taxpayer claim is supported by evidence. Loberiza ( Head of Accounting department of the American Int'l underwriters...) testified that rentals, utilities, water, phone, and electric bills of executive of the corporation were entered in the books of account as 'subsistence allowance and expenses; that there was a separate account for salaries and wages of employees.
The manager's residential expenses in 1948 should be treated as rentals for apartments and utilities and should not form part of the ratable value subject to tax.
Wednesday, August 24, 2016
CESAR SULIT VS. CA G.R NO. 119247, FEB. 17, 1997
Iluminada Cayco executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over lot in favor of Cesar Sulit to secure a loan of PhP 4 Million. Upon petitioner's failure to pay, Sulit caused the foreclosure of the mortgage. hence, in a public auction the lot was sold to the mortgagee, with a winning bid of PhP 7Million. He then petitioned the court for the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor, the same was granted. Later, Iluminada filed a petition to set aside the auction sale and to deter the issuance of the writ of possession contending that the surplus proceeds of the sale was not paid by Sulit. The same was denied. On appeal the CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: WON purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession over the mortgaged property despite his failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale of the mortgagor?
WON mere inadequacy of price would invalidate the sale or the person entitled thereto?
HELD:
The law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession and no discretion appears to be left to the court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding and it cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of "unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." As it was held in Barican vs. IAC, the obligation of the court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if it was no longer the judgment debtor who was in possession of the property.
As to the second issue, the mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale, unless shocking to the conscience, is insufficient to set aside a sale. this is because no disadvantage is caused to the mortgagor. On the contrary, a mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because he possesses the right of redemption. When there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the judgement debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem, and thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the auction sale.
The case at bar is quite the reverse, in the sense that instead of an inadequacy in price, there is due in favor of private respondent, as mortgagor, a surplus from the proceeds of the sale equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt, which excess is indisputably a substantial amount. Nevertheless, equitable considerations demand that a writ of possession should also not issue in this case pursuant to the provision of the Rules of Court particularly on the disposition of the proceeds of the sale.
Where there is a balance or residue after payment of the mortgage, the same shall be paid to the mortgagor. The better rule is that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
ISSUE: WON purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession over the mortgaged property despite his failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale of the mortgagor?
WON mere inadequacy of price would invalidate the sale or the person entitled thereto?
HELD:
The law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession and no discretion appears to be left to the court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding and it cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of "unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." As it was held in Barican vs. IAC, the obligation of the court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if it was no longer the judgment debtor who was in possession of the property.
As to the second issue, the mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale, unless shocking to the conscience, is insufficient to set aside a sale. this is because no disadvantage is caused to the mortgagor. On the contrary, a mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because he possesses the right of redemption. When there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the judgement debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem, and thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the auction sale.
The case at bar is quite the reverse, in the sense that instead of an inadequacy in price, there is due in favor of private respondent, as mortgagor, a surplus from the proceeds of the sale equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt, which excess is indisputably a substantial amount. Nevertheless, equitable considerations demand that a writ of possession should also not issue in this case pursuant to the provision of the Rules of Court particularly on the disposition of the proceeds of the sale.
Where there is a balance or residue after payment of the mortgage, the same shall be paid to the mortgagor. The better rule is that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
Sunday, August 21, 2016
Filipinas Marble Corportaion vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 180
In its desire to develop the full potentials of its mining claims and deposits, Filipinas Marbles Corporation (FMC) applied and was granted a loan in the amount of $5,000,000 by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on the conditions that the management contract will be handled by Bancom System Control and the DBP. and the loan shall be secured by a final mortgage on the assets of petitioner with a total approved vale of PhP 48,630,756. The chattel mortgage was not registered pursuant to Article 2125 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON the non-registration of the mortgage will nullify the contract between the parties, considering that a mortgage contract is an accessory contract?
HELD:
The SC have to say this, we agree with the petitioner that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract, and, thus its validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it. We, however, reject the petitioner's argument that since the chattel mortgage involved was not registered, the same is null and void. Article 2125 of the Civil Code clearly provides that non-registration of the mortgage does not affect the immediate parties. The petitioner cannot invoke the mentioned provision to nullify the mortgage (chattel).
ISSUE: WON the non-registration of the mortgage will nullify the contract between the parties, considering that a mortgage contract is an accessory contract?
HELD:
The SC have to say this, we agree with the petitioner that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract, and, thus its validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it. We, however, reject the petitioner's argument that since the chattel mortgage involved was not registered, the same is null and void. Article 2125 of the Civil Code clearly provides that non-registration of the mortgage does not affect the immediate parties. The petitioner cannot invoke the mentioned provision to nullify the mortgage (chattel).
Friday, August 19, 2016
Jose B. Tiongco vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 82782 August 5, 1992
Alicia Arnaldo mortgaged to the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) three (3) lots to secure the loan amounting to PhP 290,000. Upon default, the mortgaged was foreclosed and said lots were sold at public auction, with Tiongco as the highest bidder. When the property was not redeemed, Tiongco requested PVB for the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy, having been unheeded, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition to require PVB to surrender such document. PVB denied the allegations in the petition, averred that it was not served with a notice of the auction sale, it then set up the defense that the sale of the property was irregular and that the right of petitioner over the property as a purchaser may be respected only upon the release of the mortgage and that the property was sold for a scandalously low amount and thus, it is shocking to the corresponds to the delinquent taxes to be recovered; considering that there is a subsisting mortgage obligation of PhP 290,000 plus interest, annotated on the title, the auction sale was the product of an illicit machination and actionable collusion between city officials and the purchaser.
ISSUE: WON inadequancy of price would invalidate the sale?
HELD:
It is well-settled that "while in ordinary sales for reasons of equity a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the court to interfere, such does not follow when the law gives to the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption."
Then too, petitioner purchased the property fully cognizant of the risk that he could eventually lose it in a foreclosure sale conducted to satisfy the mortgage, unless he was prepared to pay PhP 290,000 more, with interest due them, as well as the other charges and penalties which the contract of mortgage or the promissory note secured by it has stipulated, without any hope of seeking reimbursement from the mortgagor.
ISSUE: WON inadequancy of price would invalidate the sale?
HELD:
It is well-settled that "while in ordinary sales for reasons of equity a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the court to interfere, such does not follow when the law gives to the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption."
Then too, petitioner purchased the property fully cognizant of the risk that he could eventually lose it in a foreclosure sale conducted to satisfy the mortgage, unless he was prepared to pay PhP 290,000 more, with interest due them, as well as the other charges and penalties which the contract of mortgage or the promissory note secured by it has stipulated, without any hope of seeking reimbursement from the mortgagor.
Wednesday, August 17, 2016
Republic Act No. 876
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE
THE MAKING OF ARBITRATION AND SUBMISSION AGREEMENTS, TO PROVIDE FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS AND THE PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION IN CIVIL
CONTROVERSIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be
known as "The Arbitration Law."
Section 2. Persons and matters
subject to arbitration. - Two or more persons or parties may
submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing
between them at the time of the submission and which may be the subject of an
action, or the parties to any contract may in such contract agree to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such submission or
contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law for the revocation of any contract.
Such
submission or contract may include question arising out of valuations,
appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral, incidental,
precedent or subsequent to any issue between the parties.
A
controversy cannot be arbitrated where one of the parties to the controversy is
an infant, or a person judicially declared to be incompetent, unless the
appropriate court having jurisdiction approve a petition for permission to
submit such controversy to arbitration made by the general guardian or guardian
ad litem of the infant or of the incompetent.
But
where a person capable of entering into a submission or contract has knowingly
entered into the same with a person incapable of so doing, the objection on the
ground of incapacity can be taken only in behalf of the person so
incapacitated.
Section 3. Controversies or
cases not subject to the provisions of this Act. - This Act shall not
apply to controversies and to cases which are subject to the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations or which have been submitted to it as
provided by Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and three, as amended.
Section 4. Form of arbitration agreement. - A contract to
arbitrate a controversy thereafter arising between the parties, as well as a
submission to arbitrate an existing controversy shall be in writing and
subscribed by the party sought to be charged, or by his lawful agent.
The
making of a contract or submission for arbitration described in section two
hereof, providing for arbitration of any controversy, shall be deemed a consent
of the parties to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where any of the parties resides, to enforce such contract or
submission.
Section 5. Preliminary
procedure. - An arbitration
shall be instituted by:
(a)
In the case of a contract to arbitrate future controversies by the service by
either party upon the other of a demand for arbitration in accordance with the
contract. Such demand shall be set forth the nature of the controversy, the
amount involved, if any, and the relief sought, together with a true copy of
the contract providing for arbitration. The demand shall be served upon any
party either in person or by registered mail. In the event that the contract
between the parties provides for the appointment of a single arbitrator, the
demand shall be set forth a specific time within which the parties shall agree
upon such arbitrator. If the contract between the parties provides for the
appointment of three arbitrators, one to be selected by each party, the demand
shall name the arbitrator appointed by the party making the demand; and shall
require that the party upon whom the demand is made shall within fifteen days
after receipt thereof advise in writing the party making such demand of the
name of the person appointed by the second party; such notice shall require
that the two arbitrators so appointed must agree upon the third arbitrator
within ten days from the date of such notice.
(b)
In the event that one party defaults in answering the demand, the aggrieved
party may file with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction over the parties, a copy of the demand for arbitration under the
contract to arbitrate, with a notice that the original demand was sent by
registered mail or delivered in person to the party against whom the claim is
asserted. Such demand shall set forth the nature of the controversy, the amount
involved, if any, and the relief sought, and shall be accompanied by a true
copy of the contract providing for arbitration.
(c)
In the case of the submission of an existing controversy by the filing with the
Clerk of the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction, of the submission
agreement, setting forth the nature of the controversy, and the amount
involved, if any. Such submission may be filed by any party and shall be duly
executed by both parties.
(d)
In the event that one party neglects, fails or refuses to arbitrate under a
submission agreement, the aggrieved party shall follow the procedure prescribed
in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this section.
Section 6. Hearing by court. - A party
aggrieved by the failure, neglect or refusal of another to perform under an
agreement in writing providing for arbitration may petition the court for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement. Five days notice in writing of the hearing of such application
shall be served either personally or by registered mail upon the party in
default. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement or such failure to comply therewith is not in issue,
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. If the making of the agreement or
default be in issue the court shall proceed to summarily hear such issue. If
the finding be that no agreement in writing providing for arbitration was made,
or that there is no default in the proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall
be dismissed. If the finding be that a written provision for arbitration was
made and there is a default in proceeding thereunder, an order shall be made
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance
with the terms thereof.
The
court shall decide all motions, petitions or applications filed under the
provisions of this Act, within ten days after such motions, petitions, or
applications have been heard by it.
Section 7. Stay of civil
action. -
If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue arising out of an agreement
providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or
proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or
proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement: Provided, That the applicant, for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
Section 8. Appointment of
arbitrators. - If, in the contract for arbitration or in the
submission described in section two, provision is made for a method of naming
or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators, such method shall be followed; but
if no method be provided therein the Court of First Instance shall designate an
arbitrator or arbitrators.
The
Court of First Instance shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators, as the case
may be, in the following instances:
(a)
If the parties to the contract or submission are unable to agree upon a single
arbitrator; or
(b)
If an arbitrator appointed by the parties is unwilling or unable to serve, and
his successor has not been appointed in the manner in which he was appointed;
or
(c)
If either party to the contract fails or refuses to name his arbitrator within
fifteen days after receipt of the demand for arbitration; or
(d)
If the arbitrators appointed by each party to the contract, or appointed by one
party to the contract and by the proper Court, shall fail to agree upon or to
select the third arbitrator.
(e)
The court shall, in its discretion appoint one or three arbitrators, according
to the importance of the controversy involved in any of the preceding cases in
which the agreement is silent as to the number of arbitrators.
(f)
Arbitrators appointed under this section shall either accept or decline their
appointments within seven days of the receipt of their appointments. In case of
declination or the failure of an arbitrator or arbitrators to duly accept their
appointments the parties or the court, as the case may be, shall proceed to
appoint a substitute or substitutes for the arbitrator or arbitrators who
decline or failed to accept his or their appointments.
Section 9. Appointment
of additional arbitrators. - Where a submission or contract
provides that two or more arbitrators therein designated or to be thereafter
appointed by the parties, may select or appoint a person as an additional
arbitrator, the selection or appointment must be in writing. Such additional
arbitrator must sit with the original arbitrators upon the hearing.
Section 10. Qualifications of arbitrators. - Any person
appointed to serve as an arbitrator must be of legal age, in full-enjoyment of
his civil rights and know how to read and write. No person appointed to served
as an arbitrator shall be related by blood or marriage within the sixth degree
to either party to the controversy. No person shall serve as an arbitrator in
any proceeding if he has or has had financial, fiduciary or other interest in
the controversy or cause to be decided or in the result of the proceeding, or
has any personal bias, which might prejudice the right of any party to a fair
and impartial award.
No
party shall select as an arbitrator any person to act as his champion or to
advocate his cause.
If,
after appointment but before or during hearing, a person appointed to serve as
an arbitrator shall discover any circumstances likely to create a presumption
of bias, or which he believes might disqualify him as an impartial arbitrator,
the arbitrator shall immediately disclose such information to the parties.
Thereafter the parties may agree in writing:
(a)
to waive the presumptive disqualifying circumstances; or
(b)
to declare the office of such arbitrator vacant. Any such vacancy shall be
filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made.
Section 11. Challenge of arbitrators. - The arbitrators may
be challenged only for the reasons mentioned in the preceding section which may
have arisen after the arbitration agreement or were unknown at the time of
arbitration.
The
challenge shall be made before them.
If
they do not yield to the challenge, the challenging party may renew the
challenge before the Court of First Instance of the province or city in which
the challenged arbitrator, or, any of them, if there be more than one, resides.
While the challenging incident is discussed before the court, the hearing or
arbitration shall be suspended, and it shall be continued immediately after the
court has delivered an order on the challenging incident.
Section 12. Procedure by
arbitrators. -
Subject to the terms of the submission or contract, if any are specified
therein, are arbitrators selected as prescribed herein must, within five days
after appointment if the parties to the controversy reside within the same city
or province, or within fifteen days after appointment if the parties reside in
different provinces, set a time and place for the hearing of the matters
submitted to them, and must cause notice thereof to be given to each of the
parties. The hearing can be postponed or adjourned by the arbitrators only by
agreement of the parties; otherwise, adjournment may be ordered by the
arbitrators upon their own motion only at the hearing and for good and
sufficient cause. No adjournment shall extend the hearing beyond the day fixed
in the submission or contract for rendering the award, unless the time so fixed
is extended by the written agreement of the parties to the submission or
contract or their attorneys, or unless the parties have continued with the
arbitration without objection to such adjournment.
The
hearing may proceed in the absence of any party who, after due notice, fails to
be present at such hearing or fails to obtain an adjournment thereof. An award
shall not be made solely on the default of a party. The arbitrators shall
require the other party to submit such evidence as they may require for making
an award.
No
one other than a party to said arbitration, or a person in the regular employ
of such party duly authorized in writing by said party, or a practicing
attorney-at-law, shall be permitted by the arbitrators to represent before him
or them any party to the arbitration. Any party desiring to be represented by
counsel shall notify the other party or parties of such intention at least five
days prior to the hearing.
The
arbitrators shall arrange for the taking of a stenographic record of the
testimony when such a record is requested by one or more parties, and when
payment of the cost thereof is assumed by such party or parties.
Persons
having a direct interest in the controversy which is the subject of arbitration
shall have the right to attend any hearing; but the attendance of any other
person shall be at the discretion of the arbitrators.
Section 13. Oath of arbitrators. - Before hearing
any testimony, arbitrators must be sworn, by any officer authorized by law to
administer an oath, faithfully and fairly to hear and examine the matters in
controversy and to make a just award according to the best of their ability and
understanding. Arbitrators shall have the power to administer the oaths to all
witnesses requiring them to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth in
any testimony which they may give in any arbitration hearing. This oath shall
be required of every witness before any of his testimony is heard.
Section 14. Subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum. -
Arbitrators shall have the power to require any person to attend a hearing as a
witness. They shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and documents when the
relevancy of the testimony and the materiality thereof has been demonstrated to
the arbitrators. Arbitrators may also require the retirement of any witness
during the testimony of any other witness. All of the arbitrators appointed in
any controversy must attend all the hearings in that matter and hear all the
allegations and proofs of the parties; but an award by the majority of them is
valid unless the concurrence of all of them is expressly required in the
submission or contract to arbitrate. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall have
the power at any time, before rendering the award, without prejudice to the
rights of any party to petition the court to take measures to safeguard and/or
conserve any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration.
Section 15. Hearing by
arbitrators. - Arbitrators may, at the commencement of the hearing,
ask both parties for brief statements of the issues in controversy and/or an
agreed statement of facts. Thereafter the parties may offer such evidence as
they desire, and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrators
shall require or deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the
dispute. The arbitrators shall be the sole judge of the relevancy and
materiality of the evidence offered or produced, and shall not be bound to
conform to the Rules of Court pertaining to evidence. Arbitrators shall receive
as exhibits in evidence any document which the parties may wish to submit and
the exhibits shall be properly identified at the time of submission. All exhibits
shall remain in the custody of the Clerk of Court during the course of the
arbitration and shall be returned to the parties at the time the award is made.
The arbitrators may make an ocular inspection of any matter or premises which
are in dispute, but such inspection shall be made only in the presence of all
parties to the arbitration, unless any party who shall have received notice
thereof fails to appear, in which event such inspection shall be made in the
absence of such party.
Section 16. Briefs. - At the close
of the hearings, the arbitrators shall specifically inquire of all parties
whether they have any further proof or witnesses to present; upon the receipt
of a negative reply from all parties, the arbitrators shall declare the hearing
closed unless the parties have signified an intention to file briefs. Then the
hearing shall be closed by the arbitrations after the receipt of briefs and/or
reply briefs. Definite time limit for the filing of such briefs must be fixed
by the arbitrators at the close of the hearing. Briefs may filed by the parties
within fifteen days after the close of the oral hearings; the reply briefs, if
any, shall be filed within five days following such fifteen-day period.
Section 17. Reopening of hearing. - The hearing
may be reopened by the arbitrators on their own motion or upon the request of
any party, upon good cause, shown at any time before the award is rendered.
When hearings are thus reopened the effective date for the closing of the
hearings shall be the date of the closing of the reopened hearing.
Section 18. Proceeding in lieu of
hearing. -
The parties to a submission or contract to arbitrate may, by written agreement,
submit their dispute to arbitration by other than oral hearing. The parties may
submit an agreed statement of facts. They may also submit their respective
contentions to the duly appointed arbitrators in writing; this shall include a
statement of facts, together with all documentary proof. Parties may also
submit a written argument. Each party shall provide all other parties to the
dispute with a copy of all statements and documents submitted to the
arbitrators. Each party shall have an opportunity to reply in writing to any
other party's statements and proofs; but if such party fails to do so within
seven days after receipt of such statements and proofs, he shall be deemed to
have waived his right to reply. Upon the delivery to the arbitrators of all
statements and documents, together with any reply statements, the arbitrators
shall declare the proceedings in lieu of hearing closed.
Section 19. Time for rendering
award. -
Unless the parties shall have stipulated by written agreement the time within
which the arbitrators must render their award, the written award of the
arbitrators shall be rendered within thirty days after the closing of the
hearings or if the oral hearings shall have been waived, within thirty days
after the arbitrators shall have declared such proceedings in lieu of hearing
closed. This period may be extended by mutual consent of the parties.
Section 20. Form and contents of
award. -
The award must be made in writing and signed and acknowledged by a majority of
the arbitrators, if more than one; and by the sole arbitrator, if there is only
one. Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the award. The arbitrators in
their award may grant any remedy or relief which they deem just and equitable
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, which shall include, but
not be limited to, the specific performance of a contract.
In
the event that the parties to an arbitration have, during the course of such
arbitration, settled their dispute, they may request of the arbitrators that
such settlement be embodied in an award which shall be signed by the
arbitrators. No arbitrator shall act as a mediator in any proceeding in which
he is acting as arbitrator; and all negotiations towards settlement of the
dispute must take place without the presence of the arbitrators.
The
arbitrators shall have the power to decide only those matters which have been
submitted to them. The terms of the award shall be confined to such disputes.
The
arbitrators shall have the power to assess in their award the expenses of any
party against another party, when such assessment shall be deemed necessary.
Section 21. Fees of arbitration. - The fees of the
arbitrators shall be fifty pesos per day unless the parties agree otherwise in
writing prior to the arbitration.
Section 22. Arbitration deemed a
special proceeding. - Arbitration under a contract or submission shall
be deemed a special proceeding, of which the court specified in the contract or
submission, or if none be specified, the Court of First Instance for the
province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or
in which the arbitration was held, shall have jurisdiction. Any application to
the court, or a judge thereof, hereunder shall be made in manner provided for
the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly
provided.
Section 23. Confirmation of award. - At any time within
one month after the award is made, any party to the controversy which was
arbitrated may apply to the court having jurisdiction, as provided in section
twenty-eight, for an order confirming the award; and thereupon the court must
grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected, as prescribed
herein. Notice of such motion must be served upon the adverse party or his
attorney as prescribed by law for the service of such notice upon an attorney
in action in the same court.
Section 24. Grounds for vacating
award. -
In any one of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the
award upon the petition of any party to the controversy when such party proves
affirmatively that in the arbitration proceedings:
(a)
The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; or
(b)
That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of
them; or
(c)
That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; that one or more of the arbitrators was
disqualified to act as such under section nine hereof, and wilfully refrained
from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or
(d)
That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them,
that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to
them was not made.
Where
an award is vacated, the court, in its discretion, may direct a new hearing
either before the same arbitrators or before a new arbitrator or arbitrators to
be chosen in the manner provided in the submission or contract for the
selection of the original arbitrator or arbitrators, and any provision limiting
the time in which the arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed
applicable to the new arbitration and to commence from the date of the court's
order.
Where
the court vacates an award, costs, not exceeding fifty pesos and disbursements
may be awarded to the prevailing party and the payment thereof may be enforced
in like manner as the payment of costs upon the motion in an action.
Section 25. Grounds for modifying
or correcting award. - In any one of the following cases, the court must
make an order modifying or correcting the award, upon the application of any
party to the controversy which was arbitrated:
(a)
Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in
the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; or
(b)
Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not
affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; or
(c)
Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy, and if it had been a commissioner's report, the defect could
have been amended or disregarded by the court.
The
order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof and
promote justice between the parties.
Section 26. Motion to vacate,
modify or correct award: when made. - Notice of a motion
to vacate, modify or correct the award must be served upon the adverse party or
his counsel within thirty days after award is filed or delivered, as prescribed
by law for the service upon an attorney in an action.
Section 27. Judgment. - Upon the
granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment may
be entered in conformity therewith in the court wherein said application was
filed. Costs of the application and the proceedings subsequent thereto may be
awarded by the court in its discretion. If awarded, the amount thereof must be
included in the judgment.
Section 28. Papers to accompany
motion to confirm, modify, correct, or vacate award. - The party moving
for an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award, shall at
the time that such motion is filed with the court for the entry of judgment
thereon also file the following papers with the Clerk of Court;
(a)
The submission, or contract to arbitrate; the appointment of the arbitrator or
arbitrators; and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to
make the award.
(b)
A verified of the award.
(c)
Each notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon the application to confirm,
modify, correct or vacate such award, and a copy of each of the court upon such
application.
The
judgment shall be docketed as if it were rendered in an action.
The
judgment so entered shall have the same force and effect in all respects, as,
and be subject to all the provisions relating to, a judgment in an action; and
it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in the court in which it is
entered.
Section 29. Appeals. - An appeal may be
taken from an order made in a proceeding under this Act, or from a judgment
entered upon an award through certiorari proceedings, but such appeals shall be
limited to questions of law. The proceedings upon such an appeal, including the
judgment thereon shall be governed by the Rules of Court in so far as they are
applicable.
Section 30. Death of party. - Where a party
dies after making a submission or a contract to arbitrate as prescribed in this
Act, the proceedings may be begun or continued upon the application of, or
notice to, his executor or administrator, or temporary administrator of his
estate. In any such case, the court may issue an order extending the time
within which notice of a motion to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award
must be served. Upon confirming an award, where a party has died since it was
filed or delivered, the court must enter judgment in the name of the original
party; and the proceedings thereupon are the same as where a party dies after a
verdict.
Section 31. Repealing clause. - The provisions of
chapters one and two, Title XIV, of the Civil Code shall remain in force. All
other laws and parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. If
any provision of this Act shall be held invalid the remainder that shall not be
affected thereby.
Section
32. Effectivity. - This Act shall
take effect six months after its approval.
Approved:
June 19, 1953
Sunday, August 14, 2016
ONG VS. IAC, 201 SCRA 543
Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., owner of Barge No. 601, pledged said vessel and tugboat to secure the Shipping Company's obligation to herein private respondent Solidbank in the amount of PhP 2,094,000. Both parties executed a document denominated as "Pledge Agreement".
Madrigal failed to pay its obligation to the Solidbank. When the latter was about to sell the pledge property, the same was no where to be found from its bodega. Meanwhile, on August 1, 1979, petitioner Honesto Ong bought one barge, the same barge which was the subject of the pledge from Santiago Ocampo.
Solidbank filed a complaint against Honesto Ong, et al. Petitioner contends that they are purchaser in good faith, and the contract of pledge by and between Solidbank and Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. was not recorded under Section 804 and 809 of the Tariff and Custom Code, hence, not binding on third person like the petitioners.
Private respondent argued that petitioner acted in bad faith, and that it complied with all the requirements necessary to bind third persons.
ISSUE: WON the contract of pledge entered into by and between Solidbank and Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. is binding to petitioner Ong?
HELD:
YES, it is binding on said petitioners. Article 2096 of the Civil Code requires that a pledge to take effect against third persons, it should be in a public instrument which must contain the description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledges. In the case at bar, all three requirements have been complied.
Madrigal failed to pay its obligation to the Solidbank. When the latter was about to sell the pledge property, the same was no where to be found from its bodega. Meanwhile, on August 1, 1979, petitioner Honesto Ong bought one barge, the same barge which was the subject of the pledge from Santiago Ocampo.
Solidbank filed a complaint against Honesto Ong, et al. Petitioner contends that they are purchaser in good faith, and the contract of pledge by and between Solidbank and Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. was not recorded under Section 804 and 809 of the Tariff and Custom Code, hence, not binding on third person like the petitioners.
Private respondent argued that petitioner acted in bad faith, and that it complied with all the requirements necessary to bind third persons.
ISSUE: WON the contract of pledge entered into by and between Solidbank and Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. is binding to petitioner Ong?
HELD:
YES, it is binding on said petitioners. Article 2096 of the Civil Code requires that a pledge to take effect against third persons, it should be in a public instrument which must contain the description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledges. In the case at bar, all three requirements have been complied.
Friday, August 12, 2016
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES UNDER THE RULES OF COURT:
a.
Attachment (Rule 57)
b.
Preliminary Injunction (Rule
58)
c.
Receivership (Rule 59)
d.
Replevin or delivery of private
property (Rule 60)
e.
Support Pendente Lite (Rule
61)
f.
Criminal Cases (Rule 127 – in
connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action)
OTHER PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
a.
Temporary Protection Order
[TPO] (RA 9262, Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children; Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
b.
Witness Protection Order [WPO]
(RA 6981; Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
c.
Inspection Order [IO] (AM
07-9-12, Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
d.
Production Order [PO] (AM
07-9-12, Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
e.
Administration of Common
Property (AM 02-11-12, Rule on
Provisional Orders)
f.
Inspection, Examination of
Accounts and Freeze Order (RA 9372, Human Security Act)
g.
Freeze Order under RA 9160 as
amended by RA 9194 (Anti-Money Laundering Act)
h.
Seizure and Sequestration of
Accounts and Assets (RA 9372, Human Security Act)
i.
Restriction of Travel (RA
9372, Human Security Act)
j.
Stay Order ( AM 00-8-10, Rules
of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation)
k.
Hold Departure Order (Criminal
cases under Circular 39-97 and Family cases under AM 02-11-12)
l.
Temporary visitation
rights (AM 02-11-12, Rule on Provisional
Orders )
m.
Guardian Ad Litem of Child (AM
02-1-19, Rule on Involuntary Commitment of Children)
n.
Temporary Custody of Child (AM
02-1-19 and AM 02-11-12)
o.
Spousal and Child Support (AM
02-11-12, Rule on Provisional Orders)
Wednesday, August 10, 2016
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Juliane Baier-nickel
Respondent Juliane Baier-nickle, a non-resident German citizen, is the President of JUBANITEX, a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing, marketing on wholesale only embroided textile products. The corporation appointed and engaged the service of respondent as commission agent. It was agreed that respondent will receive 10% sales commission on all sales actually concluded and collected through her efforts.
In 1995, respondent received the amount of PhP1,707,772.64 representing her sales commission income from which JUBANITEX withheld the corresponding 10% withholding tax amounting to PhP170,777.26 and remitted the same to the BIR. Respondent filed a claim to refund the amount PhP170,777.26 alleged to have been mistakenly withheld and remitted by JUBANITEX to the BIR. Respondent contended that her sales commission income is not taxable in the Philippines because the same was a compensation for her services rendered in Germany considered as income from source outside the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON respondent's sales commission income is taxable in the Philippines?
HELD:
YES. Commission received by respondent were actually her remuneration in the performance of her duties as President of JUBANITEX and not as a mere sales agent. The income derived by respondent is therefore an income taxable in the Philippines because JUBANITEX is a domestic corporation.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision of the NIRC, non-resident aliens, whether or not engaged in trade or business, are subject to Philippine income taxation on their income received from all sources within the Philippines.
Respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that her income was from sources outside the Philippines and exempt from the application of our income tax law.
In 1995, respondent received the amount of PhP1,707,772.64 representing her sales commission income from which JUBANITEX withheld the corresponding 10% withholding tax amounting to PhP170,777.26 and remitted the same to the BIR. Respondent filed a claim to refund the amount PhP170,777.26 alleged to have been mistakenly withheld and remitted by JUBANITEX to the BIR. Respondent contended that her sales commission income is not taxable in the Philippines because the same was a compensation for her services rendered in Germany considered as income from source outside the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON respondent's sales commission income is taxable in the Philippines?
HELD:
YES. Commission received by respondent were actually her remuneration in the performance of her duties as President of JUBANITEX and not as a mere sales agent. The income derived by respondent is therefore an income taxable in the Philippines because JUBANITEX is a domestic corporation.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision of the NIRC, non-resident aliens, whether or not engaged in trade or business, are subject to Philippine income taxation on their income received from all sources within the Philippines.
Respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that her income was from sources outside the Philippines and exempt from the application of our income tax law.
Monday, August 8, 2016
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
G.R. No. 169254
August 23, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent
DLFSUEA-NAFTEU has two opposing factions. The Aliazas faction filed a petition
for election of union officers in the Bureau of Labor Relations. They alleged
that there has been no election for respondent’s officers since 1992 in
supposed violation of the respondent union’s constitution and by-laws which provided
for an election of officers every three years. It would appear that the
respondent’s members repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the
previously elected officers led by Baylon R. Banez (Banez faction) and to defer
the elections to expedite the negotiations of the economic terms covering the
last two years of the 1995-2000 collective bargaining agreement.
Due
to the brewing conflict between the two factions, petitioner thru a letter to
the respondent informed the latter that the intra-union dispute between the incumbent
set of officers of the Union on one hand and a sizeable number of its members
on the other hand has reached serious levels. By virtue of the 19 March 2001
Decision and the 06 July 2001 Order of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), the hold-over authority of Union’s incumbent set of officers has been
considered extinguished and an election of new union officers, to be conducted
and supervised by the DOLE, has been directed to be held. Until the result of
this election [come] out and a declaration by the DOLE of the validly elected
officers is made, a void in the Union leadership exists.
In
light of these circumstances, the University has no other alternative but to
temporarily do the following:
1.
Establish a savings account for the Union where all the collected union dues
and agency fees will be deposited and held in trust; and
2.
Discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the
incumbent set of officers.
In
view of the foregoing decision of petitioner, respondent filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
August 21, 2001. It alleged that petitioner committed a violation of Article
248(a) and (g) of the Labor Code which provides:
Article 248. Unfair labor practices of
employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
(a) To
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization.
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise
interfere with the formation or administrator of any labor organization,
including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters.
Respondent
union asserted that the creation of escrow accounts was not an act of
neutrality as it was influenced by the Aliazas factions’s letter and was an act
of interference with the internal affairs of the union. Thus, petitioner’s
non-remittance of union dues and discontinuance of normal relations with it
constituted unfair labor practice.
Petitioner,
for its defense, denied the allegations of respondent and insisted that its
actions were motivated by good faith.
The Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice against petitioner
for lack of merit affirming
the need to conduct an election of the union’s officers. The labor arbiter, in
effect, upheld the validity of petitioner’s view that there was a void in the
leadership of respondent.
The Secretary
of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 263 of the
Labor Code as petitioner, an educational institution, was considered as
belonging to an industry indispensable to national interest.
The Secretary
of Labor issued a Decision, finding petitioner guilty of violating Article
248(g) in relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. The salient portion
thereof stated:
The
University is guilty of refusal to bargain amounting to an unfair labor
practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code. Indeed there was a requirement
on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement. Undoubtedly, both [petitioner] and [respondent] entered into a [CBA]
on [March 20, 2001. The term of the said CBA commenced on [June 1, 2000 and
with the expiration of the economic provisions on the third year, [respondent]
initiated negotiation by sending a letter dated March 15, 2003, together with
the CBA proposal. In reply to the letter of [respondent], [petitioner] in its
letter dated [March 20, 2003 refused.
Such an act
constituted an intentional avoidance of a duty imposed by law. There was
nothing in the [March 19, 2001 and July 6, 2001 orders] of Director Maraan and
Cacdac which restrained or enjoined compliance by the parties with their
obligations under the CBA and under the law. The issue of union leadership is
distinct and separate from the duty to bargain.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s refusal to
bargain amount to unfair labor practice under the Labor Code.
HELD: YES. Petitioner erred in
unilaterally suspending negotiations with respondent since the pendency of the
intra-union dispute was not a justifiable reason to do so.
The
continued refusal by the University to negotiate amounts to unfair labor
practice. The non-proclamation of the newly elected union officers cannot be
used as an excuse to fulfill the duty to bargain collectively.
Petitioner’s
reliance on the July 12, 2002 Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati, and the NLRC’s
affirmance thereof, is misplaced. The unfair labor practice complaint dismissed
by Labor Arbiter Pati questioned petitioner’s actions immediately after the
March 19, 2001 Decision of BLR Regional Director Maraan, finding that "the
reason for the hold-over of the previously elected union officers is already
extinguished." The present controversy involves petitioner’s actions
subsequent to (1) the clarification of said March 19, 2001 Maraan Decision by
BLR Director Cacdac who opined in a May 16, 2003 memorandum that the then
incumbent union officers (i.e., the BaƱez faction) continued to hold office
until their successors have been elected and qualified, and (2) the July 28,
2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 ruling that the very
same intra-union dispute (subject of several notices of strike) is insufficient
ground for the petitioner to suspend CBA negotiations with respondent union. We
take notice, too, that the aforesaid Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati has since
been set aside by the Court of Appeals and such reversal was upheld by this
Court’s Second Division in its Decision dated April 7, 2009 in G.R. No. 177283,
wherein petitioner was found liable for unfair labor practice.
Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its
defense that as early as November 2003 it had already released the escrowed
union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact
remains that from its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of
Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of
the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty to
collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason. At most, such
subsequent acts of compliance with the issuances in OS-AJ-0015-2003 and
OS-AJ-0033-2003 merely rendered moot and academic the Secretary of Labor’s
directives for petitioner to commence collective bargaining negotiations within
the period provided.
Friday, August 5, 2016
Spouses Cesar San Jose and Margarita Batongbakal vs. CA, spouses Marcos and Gloria de Guzman
Petitioner-spouses filed a complaint to annul the extra-judicial foreclosure sale conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan of the property covered by TCT no. T-159703 located in Duhat, Bocaue, Bulacan.
The land was mortgaged to private respondent spouses Marcos and Gloria de Guzman on April 14, 1972 as security for the payment of a loan of PhP 12,000. For allegedly failing to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, the private respondent extra-judicially foreclosed the said land and was sold at the sheriff's sale held on Nov. 25, 1975 with the respondent as purchasers thereof. Consequently, TCT no. T-159703 was cancelled and TCT No. T-30762(M) was issued in the name of respondent.
Petitioner spouses contend that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale was invalid or void for the following reasons:
1. The petitioner spouses were not notified of the extra-judicial foreclosure;
2. The sheriff's certificate of posting of notice was not presented;
3. There was no proof of that the newspaper in which the notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale was made as one of the general circulation; and
4. The property mentioned in the Notice of Sheriff's sale and in the minutes of auction sale was covered by TCT No. T-169705 not by TCT No.T-159703, the title to the mortgage property subject of the foreclosure sale.
The trial court and CA upheld the validity of the foreclosure saying that although the property to be sold pursuant to the foreclosure of mortgage was indeed covered by the TCT No. T-159703 and NOT by TCT No. T-169705, the technical description, however, in the notice was the actual and correct technical description of the property.
ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial foreclosure sale complied with the requirements of ACT No. 3135 which governs the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage?
HELD:
NO
In the Tambunting case, this Court stated that the failure to advertise a mortgage sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitute a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and transfer certificate of title of the property to be sold. This is substantial and fatal error which resulted in invalidating the entire notice. That the correct technical description appeared on the Notice of Sheriff's sale is to inform all interested parties of the date, time and place of the foreclosure sale of the real property subject thereof. Logically, this is not only requires that the correct date, time and place of the foreclosure sale appear in the notice but also that any and all interested parties be able to determine that what is about to be sold at the foreclosure sale is the real property in which they have interest. The extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale of the property of the petitioner spouses are null and void.
The land was mortgaged to private respondent spouses Marcos and Gloria de Guzman on April 14, 1972 as security for the payment of a loan of PhP 12,000. For allegedly failing to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, the private respondent extra-judicially foreclosed the said land and was sold at the sheriff's sale held on Nov. 25, 1975 with the respondent as purchasers thereof. Consequently, TCT no. T-159703 was cancelled and TCT No. T-30762(M) was issued in the name of respondent.
Petitioner spouses contend that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale was invalid or void for the following reasons:
1. The petitioner spouses were not notified of the extra-judicial foreclosure;
2. The sheriff's certificate of posting of notice was not presented;
3. There was no proof of that the newspaper in which the notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale was made as one of the general circulation; and
4. The property mentioned in the Notice of Sheriff's sale and in the minutes of auction sale was covered by TCT No. T-169705 not by TCT No.T-159703, the title to the mortgage property subject of the foreclosure sale.
The trial court and CA upheld the validity of the foreclosure saying that although the property to be sold pursuant to the foreclosure of mortgage was indeed covered by the TCT No. T-159703 and NOT by TCT No. T-169705, the technical description, however, in the notice was the actual and correct technical description of the property.
ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial foreclosure sale complied with the requirements of ACT No. 3135 which governs the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage?
HELD:
NO
In the Tambunting case, this Court stated that the failure to advertise a mortgage sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitute a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and transfer certificate of title of the property to be sold. This is substantial and fatal error which resulted in invalidating the entire notice. That the correct technical description appeared on the Notice of Sheriff's sale is to inform all interested parties of the date, time and place of the foreclosure sale of the real property subject thereof. Logically, this is not only requires that the correct date, time and place of the foreclosure sale appear in the notice but also that any and all interested parties be able to determine that what is about to be sold at the foreclosure sale is the real property in which they have interest. The extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale of the property of the petitioner spouses are null and void.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)