DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)

G.R. No. 169254               August 23, 2012

FACTS:

            Respondent DLFSUEA-NAFTEU has two opposing factions. The Aliazas faction filed a petition for election of union officers in the Bureau of Labor Relations. They alleged that there has been no election for respondent’s officers since 1992 in supposed violation of the respondent union’s constitution and by-laws which provided for an election of officers every three years. It would appear that the respondent’s members repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the previously elected officers led by Baylon R. Banez (Banez faction) and to defer the elections to expedite the negotiations of the economic terms covering the last two years of the 1995-2000 collective bargaining agreement.

           

Due to the brewing conflict between the two factions, petitioner thru a letter to the respondent informed the latter that the intra-union dispute between the incumbent set of officers of the Union on one hand and a sizeable number of its members on the other hand has reached serious levels. By virtue of the 19 March 2001 Decision and the 06 July 2001 Order of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the hold-over authority of Union’s incumbent set of officers has been considered extinguished and an election of new union officers, to be conducted and supervised by the DOLE, has been directed to be held. Until the result of this election [come] out and a declaration by the DOLE of the validly elected officers is made, a void in the Union leadership exists.

In light of these circumstances, the University has no other alternative but to temporarily do the following:

1. Establish a savings account for the Union where all the collected union dues and agency fees will be deposited and held in trust; and

2. Discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of officers.

            In view of the foregoing decision of petitioner, respondent filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 21, 2001. It alleged that petitioner committed a violation of Article 248(a) and (g) of the Labor Code which provides:

Article 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:

(a)   To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.

 (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administrator of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters.

Respondent union asserted that the creation of escrow accounts was not an act of neutrality as it was influenced by the Aliazas factions’s letter and was an act of interference with the internal affairs of the union. Thus, petitioner’s non-remittance of union dues and discontinuance of normal relations with it constituted unfair labor practice.

Petitioner, for its defense, denied the allegations of respondent and insisted that its actions were motivated by good faith.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice against petitioner for lack of merit affirming the need to conduct an election of the union’s officers. The labor arbiter, in effect, upheld the validity of petitioner’s view that there was a void in the leadership of respondent.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code as petitioner, an educational institution, was considered as belonging to an industry indispensable to national interest.

The Secretary of Labor issued a Decision, finding petitioner guilty of violating Article 248(g) in relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. The salient portion thereof stated:

The University is guilty of refusal to bargain amounting to an unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code. Indeed there was a requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, both [petitioner] and [respondent] entered into a [CBA] on [March 20, 2001. The term of the said CBA commenced on [June 1, 2000 and with the expiration of the economic provisions on the third year, [respondent] initiated negotiation by sending a letter dated March 15, 2003, together with the CBA proposal. In reply to the letter of [respondent], [petitioner] in its letter dated [March 20, 2003 refused.

Such an act constituted an intentional avoidance of a duty imposed by law. There was nothing in the [March 19, 2001 and July 6, 2001 orders] of Director Maraan and Cacdac which restrained or enjoined compliance by the parties with their obligations under the CBA and under the law. The issue of union leadership is distinct and separate from the duty to bargain.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s refusal to bargain amount to unfair labor practice under the Labor Code.

HELD: YES. Petitioner erred in unilaterally suspending negotiations with respondent since the pendency of the intra-union dispute was not a justifiable reason to do so. 

            The continued refusal by the University to negotiate amounts to unfair labor practice. The non-proclamation of the newly elected union officers cannot be used as an excuse to fulfill the duty to bargain collectively.

Petitioner’s reliance on the July 12, 2002 Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati, and the NLRC’s affirmance thereof, is misplaced. The unfair labor practice complaint dismissed by Labor Arbiter Pati questioned petitioner’s actions immediately after the March 19, 2001 Decision of BLR Regional Director Maraan, finding that "the reason for the hold-over of the previously elected union officers is already extinguished." The present controversy involves petitioner’s actions subsequent to (1) the clarification of said March 19, 2001 Maraan Decision by BLR Director Cacdac who opined in a May 16, 2003 memorandum that the then incumbent union officers (i.e., the Bañez faction) continued to hold office until their successors have been elected and qualified, and (2) the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 ruling that the very same intra-union dispute (subject of several notices of strike) is insufficient ground for the petitioner to suspend CBA negotiations with respondent union. We take notice, too, that the aforesaid Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati has since been set aside by the Court of Appeals and such reversal was upheld by this Court’s Second Division in its Decision dated April 7, 2009 in G.R. No. 177283, wherein petitioner was found liable for unfair labor practice.

Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already released the escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact remains that from its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty to collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason. At most, such subsequent acts of compliance with the issuances in OS-AJ-0015-2003 and OS-AJ-0033-2003 merely rendered moot and academic the Secretary of Labor’s directives for petitioner to commence collective bargaining negotiations within the period provided.

Fair Shipping vs. Medel

FAIR SHIPPING CORP., and/or KOHYU MARINE CO., LTD., Petitioners, 
vs.
JOSELITO T. MEDEL, Respondent.

 G.R. No. 177907               August 29, 2012

On OCT. 23, 1998, respondent Joselito T. Medel was hired by petitioner Fair Shipping Corp. for and in behalf of its foreign principal Kohyu Marine Co., LTD. as an able seaman of the vessel M/V Optima for 12 months. On Nov. 27, 1998, he began the performance of his duties. On March 1, 1999, the M/V Optima was docked at the Port of Vungtao in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. During emergency drills aboard the vessel, one of Medel’s co-workers lost control of the manual handle of a lifeboat, causing the same to turn uncontrollably and strike Medel in the forehead.

After a series of medical examinations, treatments and procedure, Medel claimed from petitioners the payment of permanent total disability benefits. Petitioners refused to grant his claim. Consequently, Medel filed a complaint against petitioners, for among others, disability benefits.

            The Labor Arbiter issued a decision in favor of Medel, holding that Medel is entitled to a disability benefits. It emphasized that Medel suffered injury that was sustained by him during the effectivity of his shipboard employment contract and while engaged in the performance of his contracted duties.

            The Court of Appeals cited the Court’s ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, the Court of Appeals stated that an award of permanent total disability benefits is proper when an employee is unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days. Since Medel’s accident rendered him incapable of performing his usual or customary work for more than 120 days, the Court of Appeals concluded that he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

HELD:

            Following the guidelines laid down in Vergara, it is evident that the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired in this case without a declaration of Medel’s fitness to work or the existence of his permanent disability determined.

            Accordingly, Medel’s temporary total disability should be deemed permanent and thus, he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

            The Supreme Court correlates the provision of the POEA SEC with the pertinent labor laws and rules, and cited the case of Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. It teaches that “For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.”

            A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.

Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association vs. Pilipinas Shell

Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 170007, April 7, 2014

Anticipation of the expiration on April 30, 2004 of the 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the petitioner and the respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, the parties started negotiations for a new CBA. After several meetings on the ground rules that would govern the negotiations and on political items, the parties started their discussion on the economic items on July 27, 2004,  their 31st meeting. The union proposed a 20% annual across-the-board basic salary increase for the next three years that would be covered by the new CBA. In lieu of the annual salary increases, the company made a counter-proposal to grant all covered employees a lump sum amount of P80,000.00 yearly for the three-year period of the new CBA. The union requested from the company a full details of its economic proposal, the company explained that the lump sum amount was based  on its affordability for the corporation the  then  current  salary  levels  of  the members of the union relative to the industry, and the then current total pay and benefits package of the employees. When  the  company  refused  to acknowledge any obligation to give further justification, the union rejected the  company’s  counter-proposal  and  maintained  its  proposal  for a  20% annual increase in basic pay for the next three years. After series of negotiation and meeting the company reiterated its reason of affordability in comparison with the then existing wage levels of allied industry and the then existing total pay and benefit package of the employees. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer, the union manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith. The company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help of a third party be sought. The union replied that they would formally answer the proposal of the company a day after the signing of the official minutes of the meeting.  On that same day, however, the union filed a Notice of Strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company.  The NCMB immediately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-mediation proceedings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Issue: WON the company is guilty of bargaining in bad faith?

Held:

The  duty  to  bargain  does  not  compel  any  party  to  accept  a proposal, or make any concession, as recognized by Article 252 of the Labor Code, as amended. The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; however, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement. Thus, the Company’s insistence on a bargaining position to the point of stalemate does not establish bad faith. The Company’s offer, a lump sum of Php88,000 per year, for each covered employee in lieu of a wage increase cannot, by itself, be taken as an act of bargaining in bad faith. The minutes of the meetings of the parties, show that they both exerted their best efforts, to try to resolve the issues at hand. Many of the proposed improvements or changes, were either resolved, or deferred for further discussion. It is only on the matter of the wage increase, that serious debates were registered. However, the totality of conduct of the Company as far as their bargaining stance with the Union is concerned, does not show that it was bargaining in bad faith.

Philasia Shipping Agency Corp vs. Andres G. Tomacruz

Philasia Shipping Agency Corporation and/or Intermodal Shipping, Inc.  vs. Andres G. Tomacruz, G.R. No. 181180, August 15, 2012

Andres G. Tomacruz (Tomacruz) was a seafarer, whose services were engaged by PHILASIA Shipping Agency Corp., (PHILASIA) on behalf of Intermodal Shipping Inc. (petitioners) as Oiler  on board the vessel M/V Saligna.4 A twelve-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Contract of Employment was duly signed by the parties on January 9, 2002.

This was preceded by four similar contracts, which Tomacruz was able to complete for the petitioners, aboard different vessels. For all five contracts, Tomacruz was required to undergo a pre-employment medical examination and obtain a “fit to work” rating before he could be deployed.

Having been issued a clean bill of health, Tomacruz boarded M/V Saligna on January 15, 2002 and performed his duties without any incident. However, sometime in September 2002, during the term of his last contract, Tomacruz noticed blood in his urine. Tomacruz immediately reported this to the Ship Captain, who referred him to a doctor in Japan. Tomacruz was subjected to several check-ups and ultrasounds, which revealed a “stone” in his right kidney. Despite such diagnosis, no medical certificate was issued; thus, he was allowed to continue working

Tomacruz was repatriated to the Philippines and sent to Micah Medical Clinic & Diagnostic Laboratory. The November 19, 2002 KUB Ultrasound report of the clinic revealed that he had stones in both his kidneys 

Referred by Micah Medical Clinic to Dr. Nicomedes Cruz, the company-designated physician, Tomacruz went through more tests, medications, and treatments. On July 25, 2003, Dr. Cruz declared Tomacruz fit to work despite a showing that there were stones about 0.4 cm in size found in both his kidneys, and there was the possibility of hematoma. Intending to get his sixth contract, Tomacruz, armed with the declaration that he was fit to work, proceeded to the office of the petitioners to seek employment. However, he was told by PHILASIA that because of the huge amount that was spent on his treatment, their insurance company did not like his services anymore.

Tomacruz filed a complaint for disability benefits, sickness wages, damages, and attorney’s fees against the petitioners, before the Quezon City Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter explained that as such, he was a contractual employee, whose employment was governed by the contract that he signed every time he was hired. Thus, the Labor  Arbiter held, once the seafarer’s employment was terminated either by completion of contract or repatriation due to a medical reason or any other authorized cause under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC), the employer was under no obligation to re-contract the seafarer.

Issue: Entitlement of Tomacruz to Disability Benefits

Held:

Entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is governed not only by medical findings but also by contract and by law. By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000, of the Department of Labor and Employment (POEA SEC) and the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement bind the seafarer and the employer.  By law, the Labor Code provisions on disability apply with equal force to seafarers.

The petitioners are mistaken in their notion that only the POEA SEC should be considered in resolving the issue at hand. The applicability of the Labor Code provisions on permanent disability, particularly Article 192(c)(1), to seafarers, is already a settled matter. This Court, in the recent case of Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. Lobusta,  reiterating our ruling in Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,  explained: The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247 to “secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith” and to “promote and protect the well being of Filipino workers overseas.” Section 29 of the 1996 POEA [Standard Employment Contract] itself provides that “[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory.” Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to the “special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.”