Adiong vs. Comelec | DIGEST

BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition violates Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of the date of the petition he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "COMELEC Poster Areas."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes?

RULING:
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

First, the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.

Second, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas.