Sps. Perez vs. Hermano

G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005,

SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO, Petitioners,

 - versus -

ANTONIO HERMANO, R e s p o n d e n t.

Petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano. Respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim simultaneously filed a Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial which was granted by the trial court.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties.

Defendant having filed a special civil action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage and now pending before RTC, he should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever claims plaintiffs may have against defendant Hermano, they can set it up by way of an answer to said judicial foreclosure.

Issue: whether or not the public respondent had plainly and manifestly acted with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint as against respondent Antonio Hermano in civil case.

Held: As far as we can glean from the Orders of the trial court, respondent Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this case.

 To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on joinder of causes of action as exhaustively discussed in Republic v. Hernandez, thus:

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder.

Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:

Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.

There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on joinder of parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.

In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for P10,000,000 each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.

The joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners cause of action against respondent Hermano.

When you struggle

Every now and then, I struggle luckily I found a friend who can understand me...

PSBC vs. CA

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the aforestated article.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable for breach of contract as an academic institution?

Held:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with.  For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.  A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

The negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The SC is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.

Dangwa vs. CA

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet.while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

The testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.

Issue: WON Mr. Cudiamat is considered a passenger?

Held:
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of the witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, the bus had "just started" and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly.  An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owe to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case.

 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger.

By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

Canlapan vs. Atty Balayo

A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016

BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before Executive Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council (Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want!")

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly considering that respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by Higino M. Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission, including the security guard.

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer actively participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case nor was authorized by the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.

Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition, Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao, Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he asked respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role.

Issue: WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the example of obedience to law. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expresses the lawyer's fundamental duty to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law" Respondent's display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by this court.

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.⁴² Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of complainant's claims, it was improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back."

Feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above reproach. They cannot indulge in offensive personalities. They should always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in speech and conduct, not only towards the court but also towards adverse parties and witnesses.

It has been ruled:

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a, lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.