G.R.
No. 147417, July 8, 2005,
SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS
PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO, Petitioners,
- versus -
ANTONIO HERMANO, R e s p o n
d e n t.
Petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor
and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction against
Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele
and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano. Respondent (then defendant)
Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim simultaneously filed a
Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate
Trial which was granted by the trial court.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by
the trial court. Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have
been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his Motion with Leave
to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial was filed almost
two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no
misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of
parties.
Defendant having filed a special civil action for
judicial foreclosure of mortgage and now pending before RTC, he should be
dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever claims plaintiffs
may have against defendant Hermano, they can set it up by way of an answer to
said judicial foreclosure.
Issue: whether
or not the public respondent had plainly and manifestly acted with grave abuse
of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction,
in dismissing the complaint as against respondent Antonio Hermano in civil
case.
Held: As far as we can glean from
the Orders of the trial court, respondent Hermano was dropped from the
complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Petitioners, on the
other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this case.
To
better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on
joinder of causes of action as exhaustively discussed in Republic v. Hernandez, thus:
By
a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant
the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may
under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or
rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
As
can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in
the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action
arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be
joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice
wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To
achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.
While
joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant,
Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in
one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and
character.
The
objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where
the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one
action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation
between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the
disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so
as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights
of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally
construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may
be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of
justice.
The
statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage
joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and
wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition
of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable,
where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a
plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should
nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of
law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
authorized.
Our
rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it
to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and
requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows
unlimited joinder.
Section
6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:
Sec.
6. Misjoinder of causes of action.
- Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the
court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
There
is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section
5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:
Sec.
5. Joinder of causes of action.
- A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The
party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
(b)
The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special
rules;
(c)
Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional
Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction
of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d)
Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
As
far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on
joinder of parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to
remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or
different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there
must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out
of the same transaction or series of transaction.
In
herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after
they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land,
Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to
sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower
consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of
respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for
P10,000,000 each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through
Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties which they had
already agreed to sell to the latter.
The
joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one
action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one
subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners cause of action against
respondent Hermano.
