Chua vs. Torres

G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005,

 CHRISTINE CHUA, Petitioner

- versus -

JORGE TORRES and ANTONIO BELTRAN, Respondents. 

A complaint for damages was lodged before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint was filed by Christine Chua impleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff. Named as defendants in the suit were herein respondents Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran.

Significantly, while Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the second paragraph of the complaint that he was being impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff. There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by Jonathan, and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense. Neither did Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against forum-shopping, although petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified herself as the principal plaintiff.

Upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Jonathan Chua had not executed a certification against forum-shopping stressing Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: whether the absence of the signature in the required verification and certification against forum-shopping of a party misjoined as a plaintiff is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complaint.

Held:

The SC ruled that it is not so, and that the RTC erred in dismissing the instant complaint. There is no judicial precedent affirming or rejecting such a view, but we are comfortable with making such a pronouncement. A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs.

At the same time, Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Moreover, the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit.

It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. Hence, it should not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign the certification against forum-shopping, since he was misjoined as a plaintiff in the first place. The fact that Jonathan was misjoined is clear on the face of the complaint itself, and the error of the RTC in dismissing the complaint is not obviated by the fact that the adverse party failed to raise this point. After all, the RTC could have motu proprio dropped Jonathan as a plaintiff, for the reasons above-stated which should have been evident to it upon examination of the complaint.