Canlapan vs. Atty Balayo

A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016

BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before Executive Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council (Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want!")

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly considering that respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by Higino M. Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission, including the security guard.

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer actively participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case nor was authorized by the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.

Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition, Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao, Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he asked respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role.

Issue: WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the example of obedience to law. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expresses the lawyer's fundamental duty to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law" Respondent's display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by this court.

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.⁴² Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of complainant's claims, it was improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back."

Feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above reproach. They cannot indulge in offensive personalities. They should always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in speech and conduct, not only towards the court but also towards adverse parties and witnesses.

It has been ruled:

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a, lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

Distinction of Attoryney's fee and Acceptance fee

A.C. No. 10912. January 9, 2016
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

There is a distinction between attorney’s fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney’s fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.

Yu Vs.Atty Dela Cruz

A.C. No. 10912. January 9, 2016

PAULINA T. YU, Complainant vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance fees. While the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge. Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, “Account Closed.” Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.

Complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the “abandonment” of the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor against him.

A verified complaint was filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint. Despite having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as shown in a certification issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.

Issue: WON respondent violated CPR?

Held:

The complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client’s property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer’s blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant’s acquiescence to the “pawning” of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer’s act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client’s jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter’s property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.

The Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer’s oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” This indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action, and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar. In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As “vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”

Pitcher Vs. Atty. Gagate

A.C. No. 9532               October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.

Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), a British national who passed away on June 18, 2004. Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.

Complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui (Bantegui), a major stockholder of Consulting Edge, in order to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the company. They agreed to another meeting which was, however, postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.

Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises. However, prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was legal.

On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate key.

However, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door, which prevented the employees thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Prosecutor’s Office a complaint for grave coercion against complainant and respondent. In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting Edge.

Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant. Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts, complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Issue: WON respondent neglected his duties?

Held:

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint despite due notice. This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges leveled against him.

Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz, a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares, the Court meted a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant; to return the money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client on the status of her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, a lawyer who neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s money and to return the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.

Mumar vs. Atty Flores

A.C. No. 5426 April 3, 2007

CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES, Respondent.

The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Chita Pantoja-Mumar charging respondent Atty.Januario C. Flores with fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, falsification of document, breach of duty and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It appears that respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay,Danao City. The deed was executed in favor of the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a torrens title over the property under their names.

In the verified Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent had prepared the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1987, but averred that the transaction did not push through, and the deed was not notarized.

The Investigating Commissioner found that while the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case, the acts and omissions of respondent as notary public have been duly established. According to the Investigating Commissioner:

1.      The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or before December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the transaction was not pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated therein to be December 29, 1987;

2.      Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority and/or in the absence of some of the supposed signatories;

3.      Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix her thumbmark to the document; and

4.      Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did not sign it.

The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions were established through respondents own admission that he notarized the document even if Maximina Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his presence, and that complainant did not appear before him to sign the deed. The Investigating Commissioner also considered respondents testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574. Citing Gonzales v. Ramos, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that the notarial commission of respondent be revoked; and that he be disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Issue: WON respondent violated the Notarial law and his lawyer’s oath?

Held:

It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. Considering that this is the respondents first administrative offense, the Court modifies the IBPs recommendation of a two-year suspension from the practice of law to one year.

San Juan Vs. Judge Bagalacsa

A.M. No. RTJ-97-1395. December 22, 1997

PEDRO SAN JUAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE LORE V. BAGALACSA, respondent.

This is a complaint alleging a conduct by respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Complainant is one of the oppositors in Special Proceedings, then pending before respondent Judge Lore V. Bagalacsa's court.

It appears that one of the properties involved in the intestate proceedings was a parcel of land, consisting of 15,141 square meters, which was tenanted by Sergia Pontillas; that on November 27, 1995, the administrator of the intestate estate sold the property under an emancipation patent to Pontillas for P75,705.00, over the objection of the oppositors; and that, on April 10, 1996, Pontillas in turn sold the land to the Newreach Corporation for P1,514,000.00.

Complainant alleges that on June 6, 1996, respondent judge presented for registration to the register of deeds of Camarines Sur the deed of sale executed by Sergia Pontillas in favor of the Newreach Corp.

Complainant accuses respondent judge of showing interest in the sale of property which was subject of litigation in her sala.

Respondent judge explains that she did not know that the property was involved in the intestate proceeding before her, as title was in the name of Pontillas; that she merely assisted the attorney-in-fact of Pontillas, Victoria Pontillas-Motos, because the latter was her personal friend; that it was Motos who actually presented the title to the register of deeds for registration and respondent judge merely helped her since she (respondent) happened to be there on another business. Respondent claims that the clerk of the register of deeds probably thought that the documents were hers. Respondent explains that she went to see the register of deeds, Atty. Teresita B. Aquino, to check the authenticity of certain bailbonds which had been filed in her court; that on the way to the Office of the Register of Deeds, she saw Motos, who asked for her help in registering the emancipation patent; that she then went to see the register of deeds to ask about the bailbonds which she suspected might be spurious and only incidentally about requirements for the registration of emancipation patents; that as she was about to leave the Office of the Register of Deeds, Motos pleaded with her to intercede in her behalf so that she (Motos) could get the title on the same day. It appears that the new title was issued the next day.

In an affidavit submitted in this case, the register of deeds, Atty. Theresita B. Aquino, corroborates respondent judge and claims that, even without the judge's intercession, title to the land would have been issued after one day because all the papers were in order. She denies that release of the title was facilitated by the intercession of the judge.

The fact that respondent judge wrote the note in question, in which she asked that the title be released to Motos because respondent was going to Libmanan that day, suggests that it was really she who had presented the documents for registration. It does not seem that respondent judge merely happened to be in the Office of the Register of Deeds, met a friend who asked for help and only did the friend a good turn. Indeed, if this had been the case, respondent judge could have just introduced friend, Victoria Pontillas-Motos, to the register of deeds and that would have ended the matter. But respondent judge even had to write the note in question obviously to insure the early release of the title. She thus used her office to facilitate the registration of the sale.

Issue: WON respondent judge conduct is improper?

Held:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities, including their private life. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.

In this case, as Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez correctly observes, respondent judge's note to the register of deeds, requesting that the issuance of the TCT be expedited, "gives ground for suspicion that she is utilizing the power or prestige of her office to promote the interest of others." Indeed, the clerk of the register of deeds thought it was respondent judge who was the one who was causing the transfer of the emancipation patent.

Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

Samson vs. Judge Caballero

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009

OLGA M. SAMSON, Complainant, - v e r s u s - JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO,

Respondent. 

Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.

According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him.

She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.

At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.

On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. It also denied the complainants motion for reconsideration.

While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC. The complainant charged that respondent never informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to be nominated and, subsequently, appointed.

Respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the position of judge. However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said cases.

To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division.  According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction.

The OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document?

Held:

The SC agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document.

There is no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence. Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses.

However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally charged? in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.

Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged? Meaning, charged at any time in the past or present.

In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, the SC held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.

This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

  

Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers’ oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

 This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a plethora of cases. Of particular importance to this case is our decision in Caada v. Suerte where the SC applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic disbarment.

It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning

Spouses Sustento vs. Judge Lilagan

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 08, 2016

SPOUSES CESAR AND THELMA SUSTENTO, Complainants, v. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Respondent.

In the Administrative Complaint filed by Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento, it was averred that the said complainants concurrently appear as the "Defendants" in an Unlawful Detainer case ("Wilfreda Pontillan vs. Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento," as well as the "Plaintiffs" in a Specific Performance and Damages case ("Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento vs. Wilfreda Pontillan, et al.,". In the Unlawful Detainer case, complainants Spouses Sustento raised as one of their three affirmative defenses [in their Answer] the alleged violation of non-forum-shopping rule by the plaintiff for their failure to disclose the pending case for Specific Performance in the RTC, involving the same property subject matter of the ejectment case. Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste issued an Order decreeing inter alia that "it is not plaintiffs’ duty to disclose the pendency of the case for Specific Performance since it was not she who filed the case and [that] the issues and cause of action of the cases are different." Complainants Spouses Sustento filed an Omnibus Motion for a reconsideration of the 09 September 2008 Order. However, in an Order dated 24 November 2008, Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste denied the Omnibus Motion.

On 26 January 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the RTC, praying for the annulment of the aforecited Orders issued by Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste. In an Order dated 03 March 2009, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan directed private respondents to file their comment to the petition. On 31 March 2009, private respondents filed their Comment/Answer. Complainants Spouses Sustento followed suit, filing a rejoinder to Private Respondent's Comments/Answer.

Almost six (6) months had already elapsed [and only after complainants filed a motion for Early Resolution, dated 08 September 2009] before respondent Judge Lilagan issued an Order dated 15 September 2009 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Complainants Spouses Sustento filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 01 December 2009, private respondents' Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration was filed. On 08 December 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento filed their Reply.

On the basis of the foregoing, the complainants have charged the respondent with undue delay in the resolution of the petition for certiorari they had filed to assail the adverse order issued by Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Civil Case entitled Wilfreda Pontillan v. Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento, and undue delay in the resolution of their motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed 90-day period in violation of the Administrative Circular No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. They have further charged him with having issued the order of September 15, 2009 dismissing their petition for certiorari without passing upon the issues raised in the petition by making findings of fact bereft of factual basis, and relying on information that were immaterial and irrelevant to the petition.

Later on, the complainants withdrew their charge against the respondent through their motion dated October 7, 2010, stating that complainant Thelma Sustento had decided "to give herself a softer atmosphere to focus more on the appeal of the main case from which this complaint emanates."

In his comment with motion, the respondent sought the termination of the case based on the withdrawal of the complaint against him.

The OCA denied the motions of the parties, however, pointing out instead that the complainants could not just withdraw the administrative complaint out of a sudden change of mind; and that the unilateral act of the complainants did not control the Court's exercise of its disciplinary power.
In his comment dated May 28, 2011, the respondent denied liability, and contended that the petition for certiorari subject of the complaint was a prohibited pleading for being brought against the interlocutory order issued by MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste in the accion interdictal; that, as such, he was not obliged to rule on the petition for certiorari; that his failure to seasonably resolve the motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 90-day period did not amount to gross incompetence on his part because several reasons justified the delay, namely: (a) his increasing workload; (b) his suspension from work for three months by virtue of another administrative case filed against him; (c) the failure of his Clerk III (Ms. Jerlyn Lapesura) to remind him of the pendency of the motion for reconsideration; and (d) the issuance of the order submitting the motion for reconsideration for resolution on December 10, 2009 coincided with "the period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays." He pleaded for leniency considering that his lapse concerned the motion for reconsideration against the dismissal of the prohibited petition for certiorari. He denied being biased in favor of a colleague, MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition for certiorari, and insisted that such claim was not supported by evidence.

Issue:
Was the respondent guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in rendering an order by not resolving the complainants' motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period?

Held:
The complainants' allegation against the respondent judge of being biased in favor of MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition for certiorari, was untenable because it was based on suspicion. The SC emphasize that every allegation of bias against a judge should be established with proof of clear and actual bias. Otherwise, the allegation should be rejected as speculative.

Anent the delay in the resolution of the complainants' motion for reconsideration, the SC find that the respondent judge was guilty thereof. SC remind that decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy disposition of cases thus becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial. To pursue this aim, the Court, through the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting on cases and matters. In respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are submitted for determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of the court's business and to decide cases within the required periods. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice. Accordingly, any judge who delays the disposition of any case or matter beyond the prescribed period without the Court's express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be administratively sanctioned.

The respondent judge insists that that he did not need to act on the resulting motion for reconsideration because the petition for certiorari, being a prohibited pleading, was a contravention of the rules of procedure. Such insistence did not justify his inability to act promptly. The fact that the petition for certiorari was a prohibited pleading furnished him a better reason to act promptly on the petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration.

The SC is not swayed by his other excuses of not having then a legal researcher assigned to him; and of his branch clerk of court being recently appointed. The court's business did not stop because of such events; hence, he could not use such excuses to delay his actions on the pending matters before his court. Verily, the responsibility for the prompt and expeditious action on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him as the presiding judge, could not be shifted to others like the legal researcher or the recently appointed branch clerk of court.

The respondent judge gave other justifications, like the time when the motion for reconsideration was submitted for resolution on December 10, 2009 being already in "the period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays;" and that he was serving his three-month suspension from office relative to another administrative case of undue delay in rendering an order when the case was filed, but resolved the complainants' motion for reconsideration as soon as he reported back to work. The SC reject these justifications as unworthy explanations of the failure to resolve the motion for reconsideration in an expeditious and seasonal manner simply because they did not place the timely resolution beyond the control of the respondent judge.

The respondent cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case of the complainants. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for the additional time within which to dispose of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him to face the consequences of his inexplicable inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order falls within the category of a less serious charge, and is penalized as follows:


SEC. 11. Sanctions. - x x x

B.  If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2.  A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Rivera vs. Catalo

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4129-RTJ] 

July 20, 2015

FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA v. HON. LEANDRO C. CATALO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 256, MUNTINLUPA CITY

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that he was one of the heirs of Juan Gilbuena; that TCT No. 3460 was registered under the name of Gilbuena; and that the owner's duplicate copy of the said title had remained missing despite their diligent efforts to locate the same. When the case was called for hearing, no oppositor appeared before the RTC. Upon motion, complainant was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. On May 18, 2012, Judge Catalo rendered his decision granting the petition for issuance of new owner's duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence presented by complainant, particularly the affidavit of loss and the certification issued by the Register of Deeds. Respondent judge ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title.

The Register of Deeds, through Acting Records Officer Vivian V. Dacanay, formally filed her Manifestation before the RTC stating that upon examination, it appeared that TCT No. 3460 had long been cancelled as early as 1924 because it was discovered that the title was not lost, rather, it was cancelled by virtue of valid transactions and conveyance. Acting thereon, Respondent Judge after hearing recalled and set aside its earlier decision. Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject administrative complaint against Judge Catalo for gross misconduct. In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) opined that Judge Catalo was administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. It recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P21,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent judge is administratively liable in recalling his earlier decision?

Held:

No. The Court declined the recommendation of the OCA. The Court is not at all convinced that Judge Catalo committed gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. Like any other rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Under the second exception, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.

Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because the second and third exceptions on the doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely applicable.

Where there is no original, there can be no duplicate. Respondent stressed that a court had no jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here, the original title was not lost but officially cancelled. Hence, Judge Catalo correctly exercised his judicial prerogative to amend and control his factually and legally infirm decision.

The validity of a final judgment may be attacked on the ground that the judgment or order is null and void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. The aggrieved party may attack the validity of the final judgment by a direct action or proceeding in order to annul the same, as certiorari, which is not incidental to, but is the main object of the proceeding. The validity of a final judgment may also be attacked collaterally as when a party files a motion for the execution of the judgment and the adverse party resists the motion by claiming that the court has no authority to pronounce the judgment and that the same is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties.  Hence, Judge Catalo committed no gross ignorance of the law. Consequently, the complaint against respondent Judge Leandro C. Catalo is DISMISSED.

DARIA O. DAGING vs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS

A.C. No. 9395               November 12, 2014

DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant vs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.

This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint1 filed by Daria O. Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).

Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased it from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac).

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling) and eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant.

Complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed Amarillo Music Bar.

Complainant alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case

In his Comment, respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept the law office as her retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office.

The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice o flaw for a period of one year.

Issue: WON respondent violated the Canon upon appearing as lawyer in the ejectment case?

 Held:

Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have taken advantage of information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. We are not impressed.

In Hilado v. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.,this Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.

Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo

A.M. No. 7006

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the  Criminal case proceeding originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser.  Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder.  The counsel of the defense filed a Motion to fix the amount of Bail Bond.  Respondent Atty Bagabuyo, then Senior state Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject of bail under the Rules of Court.

Judge Buser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

Respondent appealed to the CA.  Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting to the accused in the issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambast Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.

The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the writer of the article to appear in court to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degrade the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statement in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss.  For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:  WON Prosecutor Bagabuyo violated the canons and his oath as a lawyer?

Held: YES
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

TAN TEK BENG VS. TIMOTEO A. DAVID

A.C. NO. 1261. December 29, 1983


This case was instituted by Tan Tek Beng against David for allegedly not living up to their agreement that lawyer David will give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

The business relation between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier.  When Jacinto became ill and the cost of office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.

Issue:
WON the agreement was valid?

Held:
The SC hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.  Malpractice ordinarily refers to any ,malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.  Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice".  That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.

Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A. NAZARENO vs. JUDGE ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO

[A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195. February 26, 1997]

In a sworn complaint dated 28 February 1994 for gross misconduct or acts unbecoming a judge filed against Judge Enrique M. Almario, then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, the spouses Romeo P. Nazareno and Elisa A. Nazareno:

respondent judge denied all the charges against him.

the Court approved the OCA recommendation and designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to conduct an investigation and submit a report and recommendation.

 Elisa Nazareno she testified and affirmed the truth of the allegations in the complaint.

She first narrated how respondent Judge Almario, on one occasion, asked her to enter his chamber after which he told Elisa, in the Visayan dialect, how he needed money since he was nearing his retirement age and that she should help him ("tulungan mo ako"). She told the judge that she would see what she could do. Elisa then recounted that she later gave Judge Almario ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) on two (2) separate occasions.

Romeo corroborated the testimony of Elisa that Judge Almario met with them to discuss his decision to replace him as administrator. Romeo added that respondent judge made them believe that he wanted the spouses to offer something to him.

Remedios Antipuesto she testified that she worked as a helper for complainant Mrs. Elisa Nazareno.

She recalled a time when Mrs. Nazareno asked her to help cook some food which respondent judge was asking for. She could not remember the exact date but she recalled that an employee of the court where the judge was assigned, a certain "Joe", picked up the food.

Alcantara also testified having seen the Nazareno spouses at the Seaside Beach Resort on at least one occasion when respondent judge and his sister-in-law were there. Alcantara stated that the Nazareno spouses brought food which they handed over to the sister-in-law ("hipag") of respondent Judge Almario

 Salvadora admitted having picked up some food from the food stall of Mrs. Nazareno for the Christmas party of respondent judge's court staff at the Aroma Beach Resort.

Respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario he denied ever receiving any money from the Nazareno spouses. He maintained that the allegations in the complaint against him are all fabricated and were filed because the Nazarenos had been receiving adverse rulings and orders from him in several cases.

ISSUE: WON judge is guilty of gross dishonesty and misconduct?

Held:

After a close and careful study of the records of the proceedings before investigating Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Court finds sufficient evidence to find respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario liable for gross dishonesty and misconduct. His conduct undoubtedly is unbecoming a member of the bench.

The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice, be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest.

It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render decisions in actual controversies that a decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest. It is thus the duty of members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.

In the present case, respondent's denial of the charges leveled by complainants that he had asked for and accepted food contributions on at least two (2) occasions from litigants (herein complainants) is contradicted by his own witnesses, Roldan Alcantara and Jose R.. Salvadora, Jr., who are both employees of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these two (2) court employees shows any motivation other than to tell the truth.

On the charge of having accepted P20,000.00 from the Nazareno spouses and receiving cash in exchange for his salary check which he never gave to Mrs. Nazareno, the Court agrees with the conclusions of Justice Morales that complainant Elisa Nazareno had convincingly proven having given: a) P10,000.00 to respondent judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for respondent's salary check. As correctly observed by Justice Morales, the testimony of Mrs. Nazareno was undented even when subjected to an extended cross examination by respondent judge

In sum, the Court finds the charges of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge as having been sufficiently substantiated. Judge Enrique M. Almario deserves no less than the penalty of dismissal from the service.