johnson and johnson vs. ca

[G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996]

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M. VINLUAN,respondents.

This case was initiated in the trial court by a complaint^[3] filed by petitioner against spouses Delilah A. Vinluan, owner of Vinluan Enterprises, and her husband Capt. Alejo M. Vinluan (the private respondent before us), for collection of a sum of money with damages

The plaintiff-respondent Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of various cosmetics, health, and body care products, as well as medical drugs. On several occasions in the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the plaintiff-respondent corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products, among others. The defendants, under the name and style of 'Vinluan Enterprises,' thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89, for which she issued seven (7) Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates. When presented on their respective due dates, however, the checks given in payment of the obligation bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the accommodations given by the plaintiff-respondent corporation by granting several extensions to the defendant spouses to settle the obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the defendants made a partial payment of P5,000.00, thereby reducing their principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no further payments were made to settle the obligation despite repeated demands, the plaintiff-respondent corporation was constrained to file a complaint on June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation plus interest, with damages.

Issue: May a husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership? May a judgment declaring a wife solely liable, be executed upon conjugal property, over the objection of the husband?

Held:

The respondent Court's original findings, had already become final and indisputable. The respondent Court already found that the defendant husband did not give his consent; neither did the obligation incurred by the defendant wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal partnership, as well as the defendant husband, cannot be held liable. As originally decreed by the Court, only the defendant wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Since the power of the court in execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant husband cannot be levied upon.

The consent of the husband is indeed vital in determining what properties shall be subsidiarily liable in the event the paraphernal properties of Delilah Vinluan should turn out to be insufficient to cover the judgment debt, as fully explained in the Order dated 24 July 1989.

Art. 122 of the Family Code which partly provides that --

The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Imelda PilapIil vs. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116, June 20, 1989

Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany.  Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about 3 1/2 years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany.  He claimed that there was failure of the marriage and that they had been living apart.

ISSUE: WON private respondent has cause of action after divorce?

HELD:
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic in Germany, is admitted.  Said divorce and its legal effect may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended  spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decrees of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.  When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would be no longer be a family to nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.  Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reason for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would be no spousal relationship to speak of.

Rommel Jacinto vs. Rep. of the Philippines G.R. No. 174689

G.R. No. 174689

Petitioner Rommel Jacinto filed a petition for the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate.  He underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok.  Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.  He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.

Petitioner filed the present petition for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

HELD:
NO.
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.  The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purpose of identification.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.  In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.  In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.