IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

As found by the Court of Appeals:

... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will

Issue:

 whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

Held:

Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

 In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

RAMA VS EDUARDO

G.R. No. 169400

NAPOLEON G. RAMA,
Petitioner,
- v e r s u s -
SPOUSES EDUARDO and CONCHITA JOAQUIN, Respondents
September 12, 2008

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the March 29, 2005 decision and July 28, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77327.

During Lucia Rama Limchiu’s (Lucia’s) lifetime, she executed a will designating petitioner Napoleon G. Rama as executor. When she died, a large portion of her estate went to her nephew, Jose Limchiu, Jr. (Jose), including the real property subject of this controversy, Lot 3, Block 12 Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City (Guadalupe Heights property). It was eventually sold by Jose to respondent spouses Eduardo and Conchita Joaquin.

The dispute arose when Jose’s wife and judicial guardian, Gladys I. Limchiu (Gladys), filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 20 to nullify the deed of absolute sale executed by Jose to respondents. She averred that the assailed deed was forged as Jose did not appear before the notary public to subscribe to the same and that the residence certificate in the notarial acknowledgement was fake.

Petitioner filed a complaint in intervention in his capacity as executor of Lucia’s will. He joined Gladys in praying for the nullification of the contentious document on the grounds cited by Gladys and on the additional ground that the sale was in violation of a provision in Lucia’s will prohibiting her devisees from disposing of the properties given to them before they reached the age of 30. Jose sold the subject property to respondents when he was only 28 years old.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgement declaring the sale void.

Issue: was the sale of the contested property valid or void?

Held:

SC agree  with the CA that Lucia’s will indeed contained a provision, found under the third disposition on page 3, prohibiting her heirs from disposing of the properties devised to them before they reached the age of 30:

x x x xxx xxx
It is my express will that the said real properties shall not be sold and disposed of or encumbered in any manner by the devisees until after they have reach[ed] their respective thirtieth (30th) birthday…
x x x xxx xxx

The SC agree with the CA that the prohibition was applicable only to those real properties listed under the third disposition on pages 1, 2 and 3 of the will. The use by the testatrix of the phrase "the said real properties" showed her intention to prohibit the alienation only of those real properties that she had specifically identified and listed.

It is well-settled that in construing the provisions of a will, the intent of the testator is controlling. In this case, had it been Lucia’s intention to prohibit the disposition of all her properties (listed and residual alike), she could have easily said so, especially since, as pointed out by petitioner himself, the will itself was replete with limiting provisions allegedly pointing to the inescapable conclusion that she wanted the properties to remain in her heirs' hands until they reached 30.
Indeed, the will did resonate convincingly with said intention, and more. A perusal of the will also reveals that it was specifically tailored to the testatrix's wishes.

As can be seen, Lucia not only controlled the manner in which her estate was to be distributed among her heirs, she also saw it fit to include in her will the foregoing provisions to ensure that her every wish would be followed to the last detail. Thus, had it been her intention to subject the remaining estate to the same prohibition covering the listed real properties, she could have easily done so. She did not. In any case, it was not entirely impossible for her to have allowed the rest of her properties to be alienated by her heirs as necessary.

Finally, petitioner insists that the sale of the property was void in other aspects as well (i.e., that the assailed deed of absolute sale was a forgery and that the residence certificate entered in the notarial acknowledgement thereof was fake). There is no need to pass upon these issues. By virtue of our ruling that the prohibition did not apply to the Guadalupe Heights property, Lucia’s estate which petitioner represents and which is the real party in interest no longer has the personality to assail the validity of the sale. Legally speaking, petitioner has become a stranger to the transaction as he does not stand to benefit from its annulment.

MANALO VS CA

G.R. NO. 129242       January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Orders  of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution  which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Issue:
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Held:

It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defences contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.  A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.  the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.