FIRST
SECOND ORAL ARGUMENT
Wednesday, January 27, 2016
Study habits
Here I found some tips on how to study. Winter, summer or regular school days studying of law does not stop.
Monday, January 4, 2016
Fortich vs. Corona
G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value atP2.38 million.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
Held:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts , which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
Held:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts , which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)