People vs. Mengote

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo.  A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place and saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. Patrolmen Mercado and Juan approached appellant and identified themselves as policemen. Appellant and his companion tried to run away but was caught. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them.

Appellant contend that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

RULING: It is not valid.

Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.

Altarejos vs. Comelec

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS vs. COMELEC, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA

(G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004)

AZCUNA, J.:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza filed to the COMELEC a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.

Petitioner object that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period. Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum subsequently.

Atty. Zaragoza, Jr hearing officer of this case recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor.

Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

ISSUE: When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?

RULING:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty-three years of age on election day).

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:

x x x

The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

Mata vs. Bayona

SORIANO MATA v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA
(G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984)

DE CASTRO, J.:

Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites.

The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Petitioner was charged under PD 810, as amended by PD1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."

Petitioner claims that he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.

Petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid search warrant.

RULING: The search warrant is not valid.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

The search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Alvarez vs. CFI Tayabas

NARCISO ALVAREZ vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD

G.R. No. L-45358             January 29, 1937

IMPERIAL, J.:

A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

A search warrant was issued to petitioner alleging violation of the Anti-usury law. The respondent court issued a search warrant based on the information of the secret agent of respondent Board.  Petitioner alleged that the search warrant issued is illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and prays that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant is valid?

HELD:

No. The search warrant is not valid. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."

Petitioner alleged, in support of his claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, the Court hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."

The secret agent in his oath at the end of the affidavit state that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.

With regard in issuing warrant must describe particularly the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court explained that Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

Salazar vs. Achacoso

HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

SARMIENTO, J.

Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search

Rosalie Tesoro filed complaint in POEA against petitioner Hortecia Salazar for illegal recruitment.  Having ascertained that the petitioner operates a recruitment agency, public respondent Achacoso issued his challenged Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 stating to CLOSE the recruitment agency being operated and the seize documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment. POEA with its team members accompanied by policemen and media men proceeded to petitioners’ residence. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. Petitioner requested to return the confiscated costumes and contend that the acts of POEA team members violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

RULING: No.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.

The SC reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the SC affirmed the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.