Aquino Presidency

"It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino."

[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.] LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.

Sanidad vs. Comelec

PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 90878               January 29, 1990

FACTS:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. A plebiscite was scheduled for the ratification of said Organic Act by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 2226.
The COMELEC govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167, which provides: “Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.” The petitioner alleged that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

On November 28, 1989, a temporary restraining orders enjoining respondent COMELEC from enforcing and implementing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 was issued.

Respondent COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 does not violate the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The Resolution does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the COMELEC space and airtime.

Respondent COMELEC has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 prohibits Columnist from expressing their opinions during plebiscite periods?

RULING:
Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution granted the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. COMELEC spaces and COMELEC radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

Adiong vs. Comelec | DIGEST

BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition violates Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of the date of the petition he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "COMELEC Poster Areas."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes?

RULING:
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

First, the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.

Second, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas.

Telecommunications and Broadcaster vs. Comelec | CASE DIGEST

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc. challenge the validity of Section 92 of BP 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses in providing COMELEC Time in the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners contend that Section 92 of BP 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation claiming that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers. Petitioners claim that Section 92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although Section 5 of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated. Petitioners also complain that B.P. 881, Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit?

RULING:

Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution authorized the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the object of the power were the same.

The prohibition in Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is only half of the regulatory provision in the statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space and air time for allocation to candidates. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government more than merely depriving their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, Section 6 states that "the use of property bears a social function and the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises is subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands."

To affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of Section 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

Brillantes vs. Yorac

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.VS.

HAYDEE B. YORAC, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING CHAIR¬PERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990

FACTS:

The President of the Philippines designated Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’état attempt. For this reason, petitioner questions such designation contending that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence.  He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice.  No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commissions on Elections is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes. 

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.  Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.  Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it.  In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation.  But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution.  Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which, is the security of tenure of its members.  That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commissions on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

NPC vs. Comelec

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two individuals who are candidates for office in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

Petitioners argued that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional?

RULING:

Yes. 

Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The COMELEC may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled subdivision and its subsidiary.” 

The COMELEC has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." The provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period.

The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. It is designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution for it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro

AQUILES U. REYES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH XXXIX, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ADOLFO G. COMIA, AND THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO

G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner considering that there was another candidate bearing the same surname.  The petitioner was proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate without resolving the petition and took his oath of office.

Private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court alleging that a vital mistake had been committed by the Board of Canvassers in the computation of the total number of votes garnered by petitioner.

The motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner was denied by the Trial Court. The Municipal Board of Canvassers admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. The trial court annulled the proclamation of petitioner and declared private respondent as the eighth winning candidate. 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and the petition for mandamus and prohibition   to the CA to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member. The CA dismissed the petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate court's decision became final and executory. On the other hand, the COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

Petitioner contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave abuse of discretion, first by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by private respondent despite the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and second by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may be dispensed of by the petitioner?

RULING:

The motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari as provided by Article IX(C), Section 2. Petitioner contention that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of law. 

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX (A) Section 7 may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.