Gun Control

What do you think about gun control?

Credits to the owner of the picture.

What law was enacted today?

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 2036

CREATING THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

Andrada vs. Cera

AC no. 10187

Celina F. Andrada, complainant vs. Atty. Rodrigo Cera, respondent

Sometime in late 2009, complainant hired respondent to represent her in an annulment case pending before the RTC, Branch 59, Baguio City.

In order to file the annulment case, the complainant needed to submit National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of her children's birth certificates - documents which could not be obtained from the NSO because of her husband's failure to completely accomplish the certificates resulting in the non-registration of the births of their two children, Juliane Lourdes and Jose Sebastian. The complainant gave the respondent the amount of three thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to process the registration and issuance of her children's birth certificates with the NSO. The complainant also gave the respondent, through a friend, the amount of ten thousand pesos (Pl0,000.00) as advance payment for the hiring of a psychologist and/or the conduct of psychologist tests for herself and her children.

In July 2010 when the complainant herself followed up with the NSO the release of her children's birth certificates she ·was asked to present the corresponding receipt for her request. Knowing that the respondent had the receipt, the complainant called him up but she failed to get even the receipt number because the respondent allegedly did not have it in his possession at that time. However, the respondent reassured the complainant that the necessary payment had been made for the processing of the birth certificates.

The complainant, through her father Freddie J. Farres, wrote a demand letter to the respondent for the surrender of the NSO receipt and the return of the P10,000.00 that was supposedly for the administration of the psychological tests, within two (2) days from receipt of the letter. The respondent received the demand letter on May 30, 2011.

On June 7, 2011, after the respondent refused to heed the complainant's demands, the complainant filed the present administrative complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD). The complainant alleged that the respondent's deceitful, irresponsible, and unprofessional conduct in handling her case - his failure to file the necessary application with the NSO for the issuance of her children's birth certificates, and to provide for a psychologist to administer psychological tests on herself and her children, as well as his tardiness or absence during hearings – resulted in the unwarranted delay of her case and forced her to file anew an annulment case against her husband.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Cera was engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct in violation of the CPR?

Held:

When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his client's rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed by his client, and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts, and society.

It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his client's case and completely reneged on the obligations due his client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the necessary

application and payment with the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the complainant's children. Despite the complainant's repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply with their agreement to provide a psychologist to administer the necessary psychological tests, thus causing further delay in the proceedings of the complainant's annulment case.

He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer when he unlawfully withheld the complainant's money. The money given to the respondent was never used for its intended purposes, as could be gleaned from the NSO's non-issuance of birth certificates of the complainant's children, and by the non-administration of psychological tests on the complainant and her children. These omissions confirm the presumption that the respondent misappropriated the funds of his client, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust of all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. The respondent, likewise, violated Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 (which provides that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand") when he failed to return the complainant's money upon demand. We note that it was only after a year that the respondent, under threat of a criminal case filed against him, returned the complainant's money. The respondent's restitution cannot serve to mitigate his administrative liability as he returned the complainant's money not voluntarily but for fear of possible criminal liability.

Happy Love day!

Spouses Algura vs Local Gov't of City of Naga

G. R. No. 150135, Oct. 30, 2006

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, Petitioners,

- versus - 

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR. LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR., Respondents. 

Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint  for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.

Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Alguras pay showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 and a net pay PhP 3,616.99.

Finding that petitioners’ motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious RTC granted petitioners plea for exemption from filing fees.

Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Governments demolition of a portion of petitioners’ house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders’ rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Alguras sari-sari store and Antonio Alguras small take home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others.

Respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses’ boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.

Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.

 The Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.

Petitioners submitted their Compliance attaching the affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and Erlinda Bangate, to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141, Section 18 of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants. Petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00.  Also, they did not own any real property as certified by the assessor’s office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income from her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to pay the family’s basic necessities.

To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit of Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that petitioners derived substantial income from their boarders; that they lost said income from their boarders rentals when the Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, through its officers, demolished part of their house because from that time, only a few boarders could be accommodated; that the income from the small store, the boarders, and the meager salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their basic necessities like food and clothing, considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew that petitioners did not own any real property.

Issue: Whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing fees?

Held:

The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.

Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice and yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant.

The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them. Hence, every statute [or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

  

 In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141 that is, the applicants gross income and that of the applicants immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than PhP 300,000.00. If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.

Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn’t have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family. In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.

Love is still alive while reading codals.

Afulgencia vs Metrobank

G. R. No. 185145, Feb. 5, 2014

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,

vs.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan, Respondents.

Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City

Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.

After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411.

Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.

Petitioners submitted a Reply  stating that the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored; that leave of court is not necessary for the taking of Metrobank’s officers’ depositions; that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive, but instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the same during the presentation of its own evidence; that the documents sought to be produced are relevant and will prove whether petitioners have paid their obligations to Metrobank in full, and will settle the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; and that the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

Issue:

            THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE 15, RULES OF COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS WHEN SUCH REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO DEPOSITION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.

Held:

On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition.

As officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling party’s main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without significant consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.

Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of their causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners’ claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with these documents even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were never furnished the same, any inferences generated from this would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.

Zuneca Pharmaceutical vs Natrapharm,

G. R. No. 197802, Nov. 11, 2015

ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS ARAIN, M.D. DBA ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v. NATRAPHARM, INC., Respondent.

Respondent is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures and sells a medicine bearing the generic name "CITICOLINE," which is indicated for heart and stroke patients. The said medicine is marketed by respondent under its registered trademark "ZYNAPSE," which respondent obtained from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on September 24, 2007 under Certificate of Trademark Registration No. 4-2007-005596. With its registration, the trademark "ZYNAPSE" enjoys protection for a term of 10 years from September 24, 2007.

Early 2001, petitioners have been selling a medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan bearing the generic name "CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the brand name "ZYNAPS," which trademark is however not registered with the IPO. "ZYNAPS" is pronounced exactly like "ZYNAPSE."

Respondent claimed that the drug CARBAMAZEPINE has one documented serious and disfiguring side-effect called "Stevens-Johnson Syndrome," and that the sale of the medicines "ZYNAPSE" and "ZYNAPS" in the same drugstores will give rise to medicine switching.

Petitioners claimed that they had prior use of the name "ZYNAPS" since year 2003, having been issued by the BFAD a Certificate of Product Registration (CPR) on April 15, 2003, which allowed them to sell CARBAMAZEPINE under the brand name "ZYNAPS."

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for trademark infringement for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC).

In their answer, petitioners argued that they enjoyed prior use in good faith of the brand name "ZYNAPS," having submitted their application for CPR with the BFAD on October 2, 2001, with the name "ZYNAPS" expressly indicated thereon. The CPR was issued to them on April 15, 2003.Petitioners averred that under Section 159 of the IPC their right to use the said mark is protected.

 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied respondent's application for a TRO, ruling that even if respondent was able to first register its mark "ZYNAPSE" with the IPO in 2007, it is nevertheless defeated by the prior actual use by petitioners of "ZYNAPS" in 2003.

In this Court's objective evaluation, neither party is, at this point, entitled to any injunctive solace. Plaintiff, while admittedly the holder of a registered trademark under the IPC, may not invoke ascendancy or superiority of its CTR [certificate of trademark registration] over the CPR [certificate of product registration of the BFAD] of the defendants, as the latter certificate is, in the Court's opinion, evidence of its "prior use". Parenthetically, the plaintiff would have been entitled to an injunction as against any or all third persons in respect of its registered mark under normal conditions, that is, in the event wherein Section 159 would not be invoked by such third person. Such is the case however in this litigation. Section 159 of the IPC explicitly curtails the registrant's rights by providing for limitations on those rights as against a "prior user" under Section 159.

CA issued a Resolution denying respondent's application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of merit. The CA found no compelling reason to grant the application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction because there was no showing that respondent had a clear and existing right that will be violated by petitioners. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA in its July 31, 2008 Resolution.

Issue:

 Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a petition for certiorari against the denial of an application for a preliminary injunction issued by the RTC?

Held:

Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and permanent injunction. Section 1, Rule 58 provides for the definition of preliminary injunction:

SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.

On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent injunction in this wise:

SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated.

By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, forms part of the judgment on the merits and it can only be properly ordered only on final judgment. A permanent injunction may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the merits of the case and a decree granting or refusing an injunction should not be entered until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing denials is filed or where no answer is required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an answer.

As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the decision in the main petition.

This Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by issuing a permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety of the denial of an ancillary writ. But with the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on the case for "Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages and Destruction," the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic. We note that the case brought to the CA on a petition for certiorari merely involved the RTC's denial of respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, a mere ancillary writ. Since a decision on the merits has already been rendered and which includes in its disposition a permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an appeal from the decision in the main case.

Leticia Naguit Aquino vs Cesar B. Quiason

G.R. No. 201248, March 11, 2015

LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, ROMMEL NAGUIT, ELMA NAGUIT TAYAG, YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA NAGUIT AUMENTADO, RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN, CARIDAD NAGUIT PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, ZOILO NAGUIT, AND AMELIA NAGUIT DIZON, REPRESENTED BY YSSEL L. NAGUIT, Petitioners, v. CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON, JOSE B. QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B. QUIAZON, REPRESENTED BY JAIME B. QUIAZON, Respondent.

A complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC by the petitioners. They alleged that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot consisting of 557 square meters, by virtue of a Deed of Sale, dated April 20, 1894; that since then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than a hundred years, constructing houses and paying real estate taxes on the property; that sometime in June 2005, they received various demand letters from the respondents.

The respondents claiming ownership over the subject property and demanding that they vacate the same; that upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, they confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213777-R; that the said title was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable; and that they were the true owners of the property. Respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject land as per TCT No. 213777-R; that they had inherited the same from their predecessor-in-interest, Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1138 (11376), as per the Project of Partition and Deed of Agreement and those petitioners had been occupying the property by mere tolerance. They denied the allegations in the complaint and proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims.

They argued that: First, the petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action "against them, because their deed of sale was spurious and could not prevail over Land Registration Decree No. 122511 issued on June 28, 1919 in Land Registration Case No. 5, LRC Records No. 128, by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. The predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were among the oppositors in the land registration proceeding but, nevertheless, after the trial, the subject lot was awarded, decreed and titled in favor of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, as per OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga. Second, the action was barred by prescription and that petitioners were guilty of laches in asserting their interest over the subject lot, considering that Land Registration Decree No. 122511 was issued on June 28, 1919 and OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) was issued on May 12, 1922. Hence, it was much too late for petitioners to institute the action after more than 80 years. They also raised the settled rule that a title registered under the Torrens system could not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession, or by prescription. Third, the action was also barred by res judicata and violated the prohibition against forum shopping, considering that petitioners had earlier filed a similar case for quieting of title against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 5487, which the RTC-Br. 56 dismissed.

As regards the allegation of prescription, the petitioners countered that an action to quiet title did not prescribe if the plaintiffs were in possession of the property in question. They argued that they were neither guilty of laches nor were they in possession of the property by mere tolerance, their possession being in the concept of owner for more than a hundred years.

Lastly, regarding the argument on res judicata, petitioners explained that they were not the same plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5487 and that the case was dismissed without prejudice. Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in considering external factors beyond the allegations in the petition. They aver that it is a settled rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action, only facts alleged in the complaint shall be considered, and it is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold a preliminary hearing to determine their existence.

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that it was within the discretion of the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action, where both parties were given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint. Furthermore, they argue that the Court has previously upheld cases where the court took into account external factors in the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. They assert that since petitioners were given reasonable opportunity to present evidence to prove their cause of action, they are now estopped from invoking the rule that only allegations in the complaint should be considered.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action.

Held:

The Court notes that respondents raised the affirmative defense in their Answer that petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action," raising factual matters, which is effectively the ground of "lack of cause of action."

The distinction between the grounds of "failure to state a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action" was aptly discussed in Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals, to wit:

As a preliminary matter, we wish to stress the distinction between the two grounds for dismissal of an action: failure to state a cause of action, on the one hand, and lack of cause of action, on the other hand. The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action. Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause may be raised any time. Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from the decisions of both the trial court and the CA that respondents' defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually treated as a "failure to state a cause of action," which is a ground for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16. This is apparent from their reliance on Section 6 of Rule 16, which pertains to grounds of a motion to dismiss raised as affirmative defenses; as well as the doctrines cited in resolving the case. The CA even referred to both as one and the same ground for a motion to dismiss when it stated that: "Indubitably, lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action, being one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss, is included thereby."

The trial court held a preliminary hearing resolving the ground of "lack of cause of action" pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 16, which allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on grounds for dismissal provided in the same rule that have been raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. The ground of "lack of cause of action," as already explained, however, is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6. On this point alone, the trial court clearly erred in receiving evidence on the ground of "lack of cause of action" during the preliminary hearing. The factual matters raised by respondents in their affirmative defense arguing the non-existence of a cause of action, should have been duly resolved during a trial on the merits of the case. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for a motion to dismiss. The pertinent ground is found under Section 1(g), which reads as follows:

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

The test for determining the existence of a cause of action was amply discussed in Insular Investment and Trust Corporation v. Capital One Equities Corporation, citing Perpetual Savings Bank v. Fajardo, to wit:

The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. In Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court elaborated on this established standard in the following manner:

"The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]).

In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.

In the case at bench, petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to quiet title under Article 476 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Evangelista v. Santiago elucidates:

The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers, this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned:

It is already well-settled that in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion.

Exceptions and Section 6 of Rule 16 not applicable

The Court does not discount, however, that there are exceptions to the general rule that allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. First, there is no hypothetical admission of (a) the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice; (b) allegations that are legally impossible; (c) facts inadmissible in evidence; and (d) facts which appear, by record or document included in the pleadings, to be unfounded., inquiry is not confined to the complaint if culled (a) from annexes and other pleadings submitted by the parties; (b) from documentary evidence admitted by stipulation which disclose facts sufficient to defeat the claim; or (c) from evidence admitted in the course of hearings related to the case.

Pointing to the exception that inquiry was not confined to the complaint if evidence had been presented in the course of hearings related to the case, the CA ruled that it was within the trial court's discretion to receive and consider other evidence aside from the allegations in the complaint in resolving a party's affirmative defense. It held that this discretion was recognized under Section 6 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which allowed the court to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant's affirmative defense if no corresponding motion to dismiss was filed. This section reads in part:

Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

A review of the first ground under paragraph 6 of the answer reveals that respondents alleged that "plaintiffs have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action against the defendants." It is at this point that it must again be emphasized that it is not "lack or absence of cause of action" that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint under Rule 16, but rather, that "the complaint states no cause of action." The issue submitted to the court was, therefore, the determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact were true, as there was a hypothetical admission of facts alleged in the complaint. An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of action as against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved after the conduct of the trial on the merits. A reading of respondents' arguments in support of this ground readily reveals that the arguments relate not to the failure to state a cause of action, but to the existence of the cause of action, which goes into the very crux of the controversy and is a matter of evidence for resolution after a full-blown hearing.

It is of note that although the trial court might not have erred in holding a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it is readily apparent from the decisions of the lower courts that no disquisition whatsoever was made on these grounds. It cannot be denied that evidence in support of the ground of "lack of cause of action" was received and given great weight by the trial court. In fact, all the evidence given credence by the trial court were only in support of the ground of "lack of cause of action." This all the more highlight that the trial court erred in receiving evidence to determine whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Although neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it appears that this case could not have been dismissed on these grounds. First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing in the present case. Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a violation of the prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No. 5487 had been dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners initiated their complaint for quieting of title.

Patalastas

Here is 2 days and 1 night variety show in KBS.   :)