Chua vs. CA

G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993

ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents.

Facts:

Judge Francisco issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premised of R.R Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Respondent Canoy seized the vehicle and took custody of it.

a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares

Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. The writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.

Respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by petitioner. The motion to dismiss and to quash the writ of replevin was denied.

Issue: WON replevin applies to custodia legis?

Held:

It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie

Tantano vs. Espina-Caboverde

G.R. No. 203585               July 29, 2013

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE, Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners files a complaint of annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring lots from their parents Maximo and Dominalda. During the pendency of the case the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their respective products and improvements. Under the PSA, Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine, shall be appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.

Both Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan then took their respective oaths of office and filed a motion to fix and approve bond which was approved by the trial court over petitioners’ opposition.

Petitioners harp on the fact that the court a quo failed to require Dominalda to post a bond prior to the issuance of the order appointing a receiver, in violation of Section 2, Rule 59 of the Rules of court

Respondents insist that where there is sufficient cause to appoint a receiver, there is no need for an applicant’s bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of the bond is to answer for all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause.

Issue:

WON posting bond is required in receivership?

Held:

Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.

Yau vs. Manila Banking

[G.R. No. 126731. July 11, 2002]
ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner, vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.

[G.R. No. 128623. July 11, 2002]
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTEENTH DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, respondents.

Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058, entitled Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, et al., which included Silverio as one of the defendants. The decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution was issued. Silverio failed to pay said judgement and the only asset of Silverio that could satisfy of the judgment was his proprietary membership share in the Manila Golf.  The share was auctioned and Yau emerged as the highest and only bidder and the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued in his name.

However, at the time of the execution sale, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment obtained by the Manilabank before which complaints for sums of money were pending, in which Silverio is also one of the defendants.

Yau filed separate motions to intervene in both cases pending before the RTC. RTC denied the motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-513 on the ground that the motion was filed after the parties have rested their respective cases and the same will only unduly delay the disposition of the case. However, Yau was granted the motion to intervene in the Civil Case No. 90-271.

In G.R. No. 128623, the issue revolves on the legality of the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC. Manilabank argues that Yau has no legal interest to justify intervention in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC, nor does he have standing and legal basis to assail the Writ of Attachment. Manilabank submits that whatever rights Yau may have in the subject property can be fully protected, as in fact they are already protected, in a separate proceeding. Besides, the intervention of Yau will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC. Finally, Manilabank contends that allowing intervention after trial had already been concluded is in violation of the rule that intervention may only be allowed before or during trial.

Issue: WON Yau is allowed to intervene.

Held:

The contention of Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in the matter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and the appellate court, a person may, before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. Yau falls under the last instance. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment.

Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 and the purchaser at the public auction sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected by the disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of attachment issued by the RTC, should a decision be rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has standing to intervene to protect his interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect his interests where the Silverio share is under custodia legis. If we follow the contention of Manilabank, this would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of judicial stability or non-interference.

Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow intervention before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. The rule on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suits.

De Guia vs. Ciriaco

[G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001]

MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO, LEON, VICTORINA, TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA, respondents.

 Plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De Guia, Tomasa De Guia and Irene Manuel filed with the court below a complaint for partition against defendants Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina and Pablo De Guia. They alleged that the real properties therein described were inherited by plaintiffs and defendants from their predecessors-in-interest, and that the latter unjustly refused to have the properties subdivided among them.  The lower court impleaded Tomasa De Guia as defendant for the reason that she had become an unwilling co-plaintiff.

The Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference and said notice were sent by registered mails to parties and their counsels. Both defendant and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference and was declared in default. Plaintiff were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.

Defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order which declared them as in default. They explained therein that they received the Notice of pre-trial only in the afternoon of June 18, 1992, giving them no chance to appear for such proceeding in the morning of that day. The Motion was opposed by plaintiffs who pointed out that per Postal Delivery Receipt, defendants counsel actually received his copy of the Notice on June 17, 1992 or one day before the date of pre-trial. Citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, plaintiffs further urged that counsels receipt of the said notice on June 17, 1992 was sufficient to bind defendants who received said notice on the next day. Finally, they faulted defendants for failing to support their Motion for Reconsideration with an affidavit of merit showing among others that they had a meritorious defense.

Issue: WON there is notice of Pre-Trial.

Held:
When the present dispute arose in 1992, the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule 20 of the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided as follows:

SECTION 1. Pre-trial mandatory. -- In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference to consider:

This provision mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the parties and their lawyers. In Taroma v. Sayo, the Court explained: For the guidance of the bench and bar, therefore, the SC  in reaffirming the ruling that notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record, restates that while service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his counsel at counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver counsel a written authority to represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default.

Hence, before being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel must be shown to have been served with notice of the pretrial conference. Moreover, if served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or after the pretrial scheduled on the morning of that day. Moreover, although the Notice was also sent to their counsel, it did not contain any imposition or directive that he informs his clients of the pretrial conference. The Notice merely stated: You are hereby notified that the above-entitled case will be heard before this court on the 18th day of June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial.

Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to a lack of notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default and in denying them the opportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.

Of course, this situation would not have arisen under Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It specifically provides that notice of pretrial shall be served on counsel, who is charged with the duty of notifying the client. Considering the milieu of the present case, however, such amended proviso is not applicable.