People vs. Del Rosario

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994

MELO, J.:

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.

A raiding team was organized to buy shabu from appellant and after buying from appellants’ house, the raiding team will implement search warrant. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. They found black canister constaining shabu and a paltik .22 caliber.  At police station, the seized items were taped and initialed. In addition, the search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other.

ISSUE: Whether or not police officers can seize items not mentioned in search warrant.

RULING: NO

The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence. The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Section 3[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines).

Harvey vs. Santiago

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION

G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

The Immigration Law empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, are both American, while Adriaan Van Elshout is a Dutch citizen.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents. Two (2) days after apprehension seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty-two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.

Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid.

HELD: Yes, the warrant of arrest is valid. The Supreme Court decided in the case of Vivo vs. Montesa that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) is not inviolable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.

Also, the requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings."  There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.

Who may issue search warrant?

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.


For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

How Despositions is taken?

The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing. (Mata vs. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984)

San Juan vs. Valenzuela

G.R. No. L-59906 October 23, 1982

BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and DOROTEA MEJIA, respondents.

Facts:

The marriage of respondent Mejia and petitioner was declared null and void on the ground of a prior and subsisting marriage between petitioner and one Isabel Bandin.  Respondent instituted the action seeking support for herself and her two minor children. Petitioner sought reduction of the amount of support pendent lite for the reason it is beyond his means to pay.

Issue: WON the amount fixed previously can be changed.

Held:

Change or reduction of the amount should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the proper hearing. The order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in the sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support