Principle of mutuality of contracts

G.R. No. 124290 January 16, 1998

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, OSCAR D. TAN-QUECO, LUCIA D. TANQUECO-MATIAS, RUBEN D. TANQUECO and NESTOR D. TANQUECO, respondents.

 Article 1308 of the Civil Code expresses what is known in law as the principle of mutuality of contracts. It provides that "the contract must bind both the contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." This binding effect of a contract on both parties is based on the principle that the obligations arising from the contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between them based essentially on their equality under which it is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract while leaving the other free therefrom. The ultimate purpose is to render void a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent solely upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is frequent and subject to statutory restrictions, valid and binding on the parties. This option, which is provided in the same lease agreement, is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from any other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the lessee. It is a purely executory contract and at most confers a right to obtain a renewal if there is compliance with the conditions on which the rights is made to depend. The right of renewal constitutes a part of the lessee's interest in the land and forms a substantial and integral part of the agreement.

The fact that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render it void for lack of mutuality. After all, the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the lessee. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not, once he exercises his option to continue and the lessor accepts, both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed, and the lessee is entitled to retain possession of the property for the duration of the new lease, and the lessor may hold him liable for the rent therefor. The lessee cannot thereafter escape liability even if he should subsequently decide to abandon the premises. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since they remain with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment.

With respect to the meaning of the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee," we sustain petitioner's contention that its exercise of the option resulted in the automatic extension of the contract of lease under the same terms and conditions. The subject contract simply provides that "the term of this lease shall be fourteen (14) years and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee." As we see it, the only term on which there has been a clear agreement is the period of the new contract, i.e., fourteen (14) years, which is evident from the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee," the phrase "for a like term" referring to the period. It is silent as to what the specific terms and conditions of the renewed lease shall be. Shall it be the same terms and conditions as in the original contract, or shall it be under the terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties after the expiration of the existing lease?

In Ledesma v. Javellana  this Court was confronted with a similar problem. In the case the lessee was given the sole option to renew the lease, but the contract failed to specify the terms and conditions that would govern the new contract. When the lease expired, the lessee demanded an extension under the same terms and conditions. The lessor expressed conformity to the renewal of the contract but refused to accede to the claim of the lessee that the renewal should be under the same terms and conditions as the original contract. In sustaining the lessee, this Court made the following pronouncement:

. . . in the case of Hicks v. Manila Hotel Company, a similar issue was resolved by this Court. It was held that "such a clause relates to the very contract in which it is placed, and does not permit the defendant upon the renewal of the contract in which the clause is found, to insist upon different terms and those embraced in the contract to be renewed;" and that "a stipulation to renew always relates to the contract in which it is found and the rights granted thereunder, unless it expressly provides for variations in the terms of the contract to be renewed."

The same principle is upheld in American Law regarding the renewal of lease contracts. we find the following citations: "The rule is well-established that a general covenant to renew or extend a lease which makes no provision as to the terms of a renewal or extension implies a renewal or extension upon the same terms as provided in the original lease."

In the lease contract under consideration, there is no provision to indicate that the renewal will be subject to new terms and conditions that the parties may yet agree upon. It is to renewal provisions of lease contracts of the kind presently considered that the principles stated above squarely apply. We do not agree with the contention of the appellants that if it was intended by the parties to renew the contract under the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract of lease, such should have expressly so stated in the contract itself. The same argument could easily be interposed by the appellee who could likewise contend that if the intention was to renew the contract of lease under such new terms and conditions that the parties may agree upon, the contract should have so specified. Between the two assertions, there is more logic in the latter.

The settled rule is that in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision granting extension to a contract of lease, the tenant is the one favored and not the landlord. "As a general rule, in construing provisions relating to renewals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the tenants is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter, having the power of stipulating in his own favor, has neglected to do so; and also upon the principle that every man's grant is to be taken most strongly against himself

Besides, if we were to adopt the contrary theory that the terms and conditions to be embodied in the renewed contract were still subject to mutual agreement by and between the parties, then the option — which is an integral part of the consideration for the contract — would be rendered worthless. For then, the lessor could easily defeat the lessee's right of renewal by simply imposing unreasonable and onerous conditions to prevent the parties from reaching an agreement, as in the case at bar. As in a statute no word, clause, sentence, provision or part of a contract shall be considered surplusage or superfluous, meaningless, void, insignificant or nugatory, if that can be reasonably avoided. To this end, a construction which will render every word operative is to be preferred over that which would make some words idle and nugatory.

Fabay vs. Atty Resuena

A.C. No. 8723 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2974], January 26, 2016

GREGORY FABAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. REX A. RESUENA, Respondent.

Complainant Fabay alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by notarizing a special power of attorney notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals therein, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of the SPA. Complainant added that Atty. Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for ejectment in 2003 where Apolo Perez was made to appear as attorney-in-fact of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez when again the latter could not have possibly authorized him as they were already dead. Further, complainant averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs, participated in the barangay conciliations which is prohibited under the law.

Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SPA on behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was no misrepresentation since Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and she was likewise previously authorized by the other co-owners, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, to represent them.

Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented the certificate issued by the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his attendance during the confrontations of the parties before the barangay. He, however, did not deny that Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution and notarization of the  SPA,  he argued that in the same SPA, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were signed by or represented by Remedios Perez. He further insisted that in the acknowledgment portion of the SPA, the names of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were not included as among the parties who have personally appeared before him. Thus, Atty. Resuena insisted that there was no misrepresentation done in the notarization of the SPA.

Issue:
WON respondent violated the notarial law?

Held:
The SC have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA without all the affiant's personal appearance. As found by the IBP-CBD, the purpose of the SPA was to authorize a certain Apolo D. Perez to represent the principals "to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling that Atty. Resuena permitted Remedios Perez to sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were already dead at that time and more so when he justified that the latter's names were nevertheless not included in the acknowledgment albeit they are signatories of the SPA. Equally deplorable is the fact that Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were said to be residing abroad. Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an ejectment case that was filed in court. In effect, Atty. Resuena, in notarizing the SPA, contented himself with Remedios' representation of four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with the actual physical appearance of all the parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena ignored the basics of notarial procedure and actually displayed his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the notarial law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.

Atty. Resuena's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also made a mockery of the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. More so, in this case, where Atty. Resuena being the counsel of the plaintiffs-affiants can be assumed to have known the circumstances of the subject case, as well as the fact that affiants Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution of the subject SPA. Having appeared to have intentionally violated the notarial law, Atty. Resuena has, in fact, allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud which this Court will not tolerate.

Through his acts, Atty. Resuena committed a serious breach of the fundamental obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.

Samson vs. Judge Caballero

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009

OLGA M. SAMSON, Complainant, - v e r s u s - JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO,

Respondent. 

Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.

According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him.

She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.

At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.

On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. It also denied the complainants motion for reconsideration.

While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC. The complainant charged that respondent never informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to be nominated and, subsequently, appointed.

Respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the position of judge. However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said cases.

To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division.  According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction.

The OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document?

Held:

The SC agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document.

There is no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence. Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses.

However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally charged? in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.

Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged? Meaning, charged at any time in the past or present.

In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, the SC held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.

This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

  

Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers’ oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

 This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a plethora of cases. Of particular importance to this case is our decision in Caada v. Suerte where the SC applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic disbarment.

It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning

Spouses Sustento vs. Judge Lilagan

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 08, 2016

SPOUSES CESAR AND THELMA SUSTENTO, Complainants, v. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Respondent.

In the Administrative Complaint filed by Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento, it was averred that the said complainants concurrently appear as the "Defendants" in an Unlawful Detainer case ("Wilfreda Pontillan vs. Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento," as well as the "Plaintiffs" in a Specific Performance and Damages case ("Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento vs. Wilfreda Pontillan, et al.,". In the Unlawful Detainer case, complainants Spouses Sustento raised as one of their three affirmative defenses [in their Answer] the alleged violation of non-forum-shopping rule by the plaintiff for their failure to disclose the pending case for Specific Performance in the RTC, involving the same property subject matter of the ejectment case. Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste issued an Order decreeing inter alia that "it is not plaintiffs’ duty to disclose the pendency of the case for Specific Performance since it was not she who filed the case and [that] the issues and cause of action of the cases are different." Complainants Spouses Sustento filed an Omnibus Motion for a reconsideration of the 09 September 2008 Order. However, in an Order dated 24 November 2008, Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste denied the Omnibus Motion.

On 26 January 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the RTC, praying for the annulment of the aforecited Orders issued by Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste. In an Order dated 03 March 2009, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan directed private respondents to file their comment to the petition. On 31 March 2009, private respondents filed their Comment/Answer. Complainants Spouses Sustento followed suit, filing a rejoinder to Private Respondent's Comments/Answer.

Almost six (6) months had already elapsed [and only after complainants filed a motion for Early Resolution, dated 08 September 2009] before respondent Judge Lilagan issued an Order dated 15 September 2009 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Complainants Spouses Sustento filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 01 December 2009, private respondents' Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration was filed. On 08 December 2009, complainants Spouses Sustento filed their Reply.

On the basis of the foregoing, the complainants have charged the respondent with undue delay in the resolution of the petition for certiorari they had filed to assail the adverse order issued by Judge Sylvia Z. Pocpoc-Lamoste of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Civil Case entitled Wilfreda Pontillan v. Spouses Cesar Sustento and Thelma Sustento, and undue delay in the resolution of their motion for reconsideration beyond the prescribed 90-day period in violation of the Administrative Circular No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. They have further charged him with having issued the order of September 15, 2009 dismissing their petition for certiorari without passing upon the issues raised in the petition by making findings of fact bereft of factual basis, and relying on information that were immaterial and irrelevant to the petition.

Later on, the complainants withdrew their charge against the respondent through their motion dated October 7, 2010, stating that complainant Thelma Sustento had decided "to give herself a softer atmosphere to focus more on the appeal of the main case from which this complaint emanates."

In his comment with motion, the respondent sought the termination of the case based on the withdrawal of the complaint against him.

The OCA denied the motions of the parties, however, pointing out instead that the complainants could not just withdraw the administrative complaint out of a sudden change of mind; and that the unilateral act of the complainants did not control the Court's exercise of its disciplinary power.
In his comment dated May 28, 2011, the respondent denied liability, and contended that the petition for certiorari subject of the complaint was a prohibited pleading for being brought against the interlocutory order issued by MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste in the accion interdictal; that, as such, he was not obliged to rule on the petition for certiorari; that his failure to seasonably resolve the motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 90-day period did not amount to gross incompetence on his part because several reasons justified the delay, namely: (a) his increasing workload; (b) his suspension from work for three months by virtue of another administrative case filed against him; (c) the failure of his Clerk III (Ms. Jerlyn Lapesura) to remind him of the pendency of the motion for reconsideration; and (d) the issuance of the order submitting the motion for reconsideration for resolution on December 10, 2009 coincided with "the period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays." He pleaded for leniency considering that his lapse concerned the motion for reconsideration against the dismissal of the prohibited petition for certiorari. He denied being biased in favor of a colleague, MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition for certiorari, and insisted that such claim was not supported by evidence.

Issue:
Was the respondent guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in rendering an order by not resolving the complainants' motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period?

Held:
The complainants' allegation against the respondent judge of being biased in favor of MTCC Judge Pocpoc-Lamoste, the respondent in the petition for certiorari, was untenable because it was based on suspicion. The SC emphasize that every allegation of bias against a judge should be established with proof of clear and actual bias. Otherwise, the allegation should be rejected as speculative.

Anent the delay in the resolution of the complainants' motion for reconsideration, the SC find that the respondent judge was guilty thereof. SC remind that decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy disposition of cases thus becomes the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial. To pursue this aim, the Court, through the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting on cases and matters. In respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are submitted for determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of the court's business and to decide cases within the required periods. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice. Accordingly, any judge who delays the disposition of any case or matter beyond the prescribed period without the Court's express clearance is liable for gross inefficiency and must be administratively sanctioned.

The respondent judge insists that that he did not need to act on the resulting motion for reconsideration because the petition for certiorari, being a prohibited pleading, was a contravention of the rules of procedure. Such insistence did not justify his inability to act promptly. The fact that the petition for certiorari was a prohibited pleading furnished him a better reason to act promptly on the petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration.

The SC is not swayed by his other excuses of not having then a legal researcher assigned to him; and of his branch clerk of court being recently appointed. The court's business did not stop because of such events; hence, he could not use such excuses to delay his actions on the pending matters before his court. Verily, the responsibility for the prompt and expeditious action on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him as the presiding judge, could not be shifted to others like the legal researcher or the recently appointed branch clerk of court.

The respondent judge gave other justifications, like the time when the motion for reconsideration was submitted for resolution on December 10, 2009 being already in "the period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays;" and that he was serving his three-month suspension from office relative to another administrative case of undue delay in rendering an order when the case was filed, but resolved the complainants' motion for reconsideration as soon as he reported back to work. The SC reject these justifications as unworthy explanations of the failure to resolve the motion for reconsideration in an expeditious and seasonal manner simply because they did not place the timely resolution beyond the control of the respondent judge.

The respondent cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case of the complainants. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for the additional time within which to dispose of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him to face the consequences of his inexplicable inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order falls within the category of a less serious charge, and is penalized as follows:


SEC. 11. Sanctions. - x x x

B.  If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2.  A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.