Castillo vs. Court of First Instance

G.R. No. L-55869 February 20, 1984
SALOME M. CASTILLO, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH IV and FELIBERTO V. CASTILLO, respondents.

Private respondent and petitioner are husband and wife. Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for administration of conjugal properties, alleging that petitioner took possession and administration of the assets of the conjugal partnership; that they were separated de facto.

Summons was issued by the respondent court. The address of petitioner as alleged in the complaint and indicated in the summon is 129 or 35 Lapu Lapu Street, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. Deputy Sheriff instead of serving the summons at the aforesaid address, served it at No. 8 Mango Road, Malabon, Metro Manila, but was informed by Atty. Jose M. Castillo, a son of the spouses, that petitioner is not residing in said address and is presently in the United States of America. When the Deputy Sheriff inquired the location of 129 Lapu Lapu Street, Caloocan City, Atty. Castillo accompanied him in said address where his brother is residing. In said address, the Deputy Sheriff was likewise informed that petitioner is abroad. The Castillo brothers filed a manifestation before the respondent court that petitioner is abroad.

Private respondent requested the Deputy Sheriff to serve the summons at No. 8 Mango Road, Northern Hills, Malabon, Metro Manila. The Deputy Sheriff served the summons on the said address delivering a copy thereof to a certain Chua Yok, an overseer of one Ngo Kieng, who was the lessee of the premises belonging to the conjugal partnership of petitioner and private respondent.
For failure of petitioner to file answer, private respondent filed a motion to declare the former in default which was granted by the trial court. Private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

Issue:
WON a valid service of summon was made upon petitioner.

Held:
There was no valid service of summons upon petitioner. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant and of the subject matter of the action by virtue of the service of summons in the manner required by law. In the present case, petitioner is a resident temporarily out of the Philippines. Such being the case, service of summons is governed by Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which states:

Section 18. Resident temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court be effected out of the Philippines as under the preceding section.

Under Section 17, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant. Failure to comply with the above provisions of law, as in this case, is a fatal defect in the service of summons as to annul the proceedings taken by the lower court. Chua Yok, a mere overseer of the lessee of the premises owned by the parties herein, and to whom the summons was served, is not in any way authorized to receive any pleading in behalf of petitioner. Hence, service of summons to him is not proper and legal.

Non-service of summons upon petitioner constitutes a deprivation of procedural due process. It is fair and just that she be given her day in court. It is a jurisdictional defect proper for the present recourse.

Toyota vs. CA

[G.R. No. 126321. October 23, 1997]
TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.

Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra and paid by means of Check in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored. Petitioner requested that Guevarra should make good the check.  Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address thru his sister-in-law by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. Respondent failed to answer of the complaint and was declared default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

Respondent petition the CA for the nullification of the ex-parte judgement and claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him.

Issue:
 WON the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by failure to serve summon in his person.

Held:
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.

Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law.

In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, the SC say that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriffs return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed therein.

The SC, however, has elucidated that evidence must in such a case be duly presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted service. Hence -
The private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioners separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with.

And, in Keister vs. Navarro, the Court said:
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.

The summons must be served to the defendant in person.  It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.  Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.  This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is `in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.  Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.

Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him. 
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served. Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that Irregularities of this kind substituted service might be cured by proof that the copies have actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.

The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the private respondent of his right to due process.

Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President

G.R. No. 203372               June 16, 2015

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 206290

ATTY. DINDO G. VENTURANZA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice, CLARO A. ARELLANO, in his capacity as the Prosecutor General, and RICHARD ANTHONY D. FADULLON, in his capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209138

IRMA A. VILLANUEVA and FRANCISCA B. ROSQUITA, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 212030

EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondent.

The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." 

None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

Issue:

(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and

(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.

Held:

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:

(1)   authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

(2)   transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.

(3)   a vacant position at the time of appointment; and

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

(4)   receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

Chua vs. Torres

G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005,

 CHRISTINE CHUA, Petitioner

- versus -

JORGE TORRES and ANTONIO BELTRAN, Respondents. 

A complaint for damages was lodged before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint was filed by Christine Chua impleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff. Named as defendants in the suit were herein respondents Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran.

Significantly, while Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the second paragraph of the complaint that he was being impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff. There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by Jonathan, and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense. Neither did Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against forum-shopping, although petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified herself as the principal plaintiff.

Upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Jonathan Chua had not executed a certification against forum-shopping stressing Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: whether the absence of the signature in the required verification and certification against forum-shopping of a party misjoined as a plaintiff is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complaint.

Held:

The SC ruled that it is not so, and that the RTC erred in dismissing the instant complaint. There is no judicial precedent affirming or rejecting such a view, but we are comfortable with making such a pronouncement. A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs.

At the same time, Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Moreover, the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit.

It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. Hence, it should not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign the certification against forum-shopping, since he was misjoined as a plaintiff in the first place. The fact that Jonathan was misjoined is clear on the face of the complaint itself, and the error of the RTC in dismissing the complaint is not obviated by the fact that the adverse party failed to raise this point. After all, the RTC could have motu proprio dropped Jonathan as a plaintiff, for the reasons above-stated which should have been evident to it upon examination of the complaint.