San Juan Vs. Judge Bagalacsa

A.M. No. RTJ-97-1395. December 22, 1997

PEDRO SAN JUAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE LORE V. BAGALACSA, respondent.

This is a complaint alleging a conduct by respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Complainant is one of the oppositors in Special Proceedings, then pending before respondent Judge Lore V. Bagalacsa's court.

It appears that one of the properties involved in the intestate proceedings was a parcel of land, consisting of 15,141 square meters, which was tenanted by Sergia Pontillas; that on November 27, 1995, the administrator of the intestate estate sold the property under an emancipation patent to Pontillas for P75,705.00, over the objection of the oppositors; and that, on April 10, 1996, Pontillas in turn sold the land to the Newreach Corporation for P1,514,000.00.

Complainant alleges that on June 6, 1996, respondent judge presented for registration to the register of deeds of Camarines Sur the deed of sale executed by Sergia Pontillas in favor of the Newreach Corp.

Complainant accuses respondent judge of showing interest in the sale of property which was subject of litigation in her sala.

Respondent judge explains that she did not know that the property was involved in the intestate proceeding before her, as title was in the name of Pontillas; that she merely assisted the attorney-in-fact of Pontillas, Victoria Pontillas-Motos, because the latter was her personal friend; that it was Motos who actually presented the title to the register of deeds for registration and respondent judge merely helped her since she (respondent) happened to be there on another business. Respondent claims that the clerk of the register of deeds probably thought that the documents were hers. Respondent explains that she went to see the register of deeds, Atty. Teresita B. Aquino, to check the authenticity of certain bailbonds which had been filed in her court; that on the way to the Office of the Register of Deeds, she saw Motos, who asked for her help in registering the emancipation patent; that she then went to see the register of deeds to ask about the bailbonds which she suspected might be spurious and only incidentally about requirements for the registration of emancipation patents; that as she was about to leave the Office of the Register of Deeds, Motos pleaded with her to intercede in her behalf so that she (Motos) could get the title on the same day. It appears that the new title was issued the next day.

In an affidavit submitted in this case, the register of deeds, Atty. Theresita B. Aquino, corroborates respondent judge and claims that, even without the judge's intercession, title to the land would have been issued after one day because all the papers were in order. She denies that release of the title was facilitated by the intercession of the judge.

The fact that respondent judge wrote the note in question, in which she asked that the title be released to Motos because respondent was going to Libmanan that day, suggests that it was really she who had presented the documents for registration. It does not seem that respondent judge merely happened to be in the Office of the Register of Deeds, met a friend who asked for help and only did the friend a good turn. Indeed, if this had been the case, respondent judge could have just introduced friend, Victoria Pontillas-Motos, to the register of deeds and that would have ended the matter. But respondent judge even had to write the note in question obviously to insure the early release of the title. She thus used her office to facilitate the registration of the sale.

Issue: WON respondent judge conduct is improper?

Held:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities, including their private life. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.

In this case, as Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez correctly observes, respondent judge's note to the register of deeds, requesting that the issuance of the TCT be expedited, "gives ground for suspicion that she is utilizing the power or prestige of her office to promote the interest of others." Indeed, the clerk of the register of deeds thought it was respondent judge who was the one who was causing the transfer of the emancipation patent.

Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

What law was enacted today?

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10173, known as the “Data Privacy Act of 2012”

La Mallorca vs. CA

G.R. No. L-20761             July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.

On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757, owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.

After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians’ side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.

Issue:
Whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.

Held:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads —

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and determined.

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

Liquez vs CA

G.R. No. L-11240        December 18, 1957

CONCHITA LIGUEZ, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA NGO VDA. DE LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents.

The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-appellant against the widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of 51.84 hectares of land, situated in barrio Bogac-Linot, of the municipality of Mati, Province of Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez.  the Court of Appeals found that when the donation was made, Lopez had been living with the parents of appellant for barely a month; that the donation was made in view of the desire of Salvador P. Lopez, a man of mature years, to have sexual relations with appellant Conchita Liguez; that Lopez had confessed to his love for appellant to the instrumental witnesses, with the remark that her parents would not allow Lopez to live with her unless he first donated the land in question; that after the donation, Conchita Liguez and Salvador P. Lopez lived together in the house that was built upon the latter's orders, until Lopez was killed on July 1st, 1943, by some guerrillas who believed him to be pro-Japanese. It was also ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo.

Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of donation was inoperative, and null and void (1) because the husband, Lopez, had no right to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the donation was tainted with illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and donee were participants.

Issue:

1. WON the donor and donee are pari delicto?

2. WON the donation was valid?

Held:

1.     The SC held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying to the present case the pari delicto rule. First, because it cannot be said that both parties here had equal guilt when we consider that as against the deceased Salvador P. Lopez, who was a man advanced in years and mature experience, the appellant was a mere minor, 16 years of age, when the donation was made; that there is no finding made by the Court of Appeals that she was fully aware of the terms of the bargain entered into by and Lopez and her parents; that, her acceptance in the deed of donation (which was authorized by Article 626 of the Old Civil Code) did not necessarily imply knowledge of conditions and terms not set forth therein; and that the substance of the testimony of the instrumental witnesses is that it was the appellant's parents who insisted on the donation before allowing her to live with Lopez. These facts are more suggestive of seduction than of immoral bargaining on the part of appellant. It must not be forgotten that illegality is not presumed, but must be duly and adequately proved.

In the second place, the rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense.  

2.     The Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character and the right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law.

ART. 1409. The conjugal partnership shall also be chargeable with anything which may have been given or promised by the husband alone to the children born of the marriage in order to obtain employment for them or give then, a profession or by both spouses by common consent, should they not have stipulated that such expenditures should be borne in whole or in part by the separate property of one of them.

ART. 1415. The husband may dispose of the property of the conjugal partnership for the purposes mentioned in Article 1409.

ART. 1413. In addition to his powers as manager the husband may for a valuable consideration alienate and encumber the property of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife.

The text of the articles makes it plain that the donation made by the husband in contravention of law is not void in its entirety, but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife.

To determine the prejudice to the widow, it must be shown that the value of her share in the property donated cannot be paid out of the husband's share of the community profits. The requisite data, however, are not available to us and necessitate a remand of the records to the court of origin that settled the estate of the late Salvador P. Lopez.

The situation of the children and forced heirs of Lopez approximates that of the widow. As privies of their parent, they are barred from invoking the illegality of the donation. But their right to a legitime out of his estate is not thereby affected, since the legitime is granted them by the law itself, over and above the wishes of the deceased. Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far as in officious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 654) computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that "collationable gifts" under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers. So that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor's estate.

In view of the foregoing, the decisions appealed from are reversed and set aside, and the appellant Conchita Liguez declared entitled to so much of the donated property as may be found, upon proper liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership with Salvador P. Lopez or the legitimes of the forced heirs of the latter.

Fabilo vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-68838             March 11, 1991

FLORENCIO FABILLO and JOSEFA TANA (substituted by their heirs Gregorio Fabillo, Roman Fabillo, Cristeta F. Maglinte and Antonio Fabillo), petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Case Division) and ALFREDO MURILLO (substituted by his heirs Fiamita M. Murillo, Flor M. Agcaoili and Charito M. Babol), respondents.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the appellate court's decision interpreting in favor of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo the contract of services entered into between him and his clients, spouses Florencio Fabillo and Josefa Taña.

In her last will and testament dated August 16, 1957, Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a house and lot in San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte which was covered by tax declaration No. 19335, and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte.  After Justina's death, Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. On June 2, 1962, the probate court approved the project of partition "with the reservation that the ownership of the land declared under Tax Declaration No. 19335 and the house erected thereon be litigated and determined in a separate proceeding." 

Two years later, Florencio sought the assistance of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in recovering the San Salvador property.

Florencio and Murillo entered into a contract.

Pursuant to said contract, Murillo filed for Florencio Fabillo Civil Case No. 3532 against Gregorio D. Brioso to recover the San Salvador property. The case was terminated on October 29, 1964 when the court, upon the parties' joint motion in the nature of a compromise agreement, declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful owner not only of the San Salvador property but also the Pugahanay parcel of land.

Consequently, Murillo proceeded to implement the contract of services between him and Florencio Fabillo by taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said properties. He installed a tenant in the Pugahanay property.

Sometime in 1966, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive right over the two properties and refused to give Murillo his share of their produce.  Inasmuch as his demands for his share of the produce of the Pugahanay property were unheeded, Murillo filed on March 23, 1970 in the then Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint captioned "ownership of a parcel of land, damages and appointment of a receiver" against Florencio Fabillo, his wife Josefa Taña, and their children Ramon Fabillo and Cristeta F. Maglinte.

Issue: WON the contract of services agreed upon is in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Held: The contract of services did not violate said provision of law. Article 1491 of the Civil Code, prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, properties and rights which are the objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property. 

Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. 

As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.  Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo. 

However, SC disagree with the courts below that the contingent fee stipulated between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo is 40% of the properties subject of the litigation for which Murillo appeared for the Fabillos. A careful scrutiny of the contract shows that the parties intended forty percent of the value of the properties as Murillo's contingent fee. This is borne out by the stipulation that "in case of success of any or both cases," Murillo shall be paid "the sum equivalent to forty per centum of whatever benefit" Fabillo would derive from favorable judgments. The same stipulation was earlier embodied by Murillo in his letter of August 9, 1964 aforequoted.

Worth noting are the provisions of the contract which clearly states that in case the properties are sold, mortgaged, or leased, Murillo shall be entitled respectively to 40% of the "purchase price," "proceeds of the mortgage," or "rentals." The contract is vague, however, with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold, mortgaged or leased because Murillo is allowed "to have the option of occupying or leasing to any interested party forty per cent of the house and lot." Had the parties intended that Murillo should become the lawful owner of 40% of the properties, it would have been clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the contract considering that the Fabillos would part with actual portions of their properties and cede the same to Murillo.

The ambiguity of said provision, however, should be resolved against Murillo as it was he himself who drafted the contract.  This is in consonance with the rule of interpretation that, in construing a contract of professional services between a lawyer and his client, such construction as would be more favorable to the client should be adopted even if it would work prejudice to the lawyer.  Rightly so because of the inequality in situation between an attorney who knows the technicalities of the law on the one hand and a client who usually is ignorant of the vagaries of the law on the other hand. 

Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof, the length of time and effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo is entitled to the amount of P3,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered in the case which ended on a compromise agreement. In so ruling, we uphold "the time-honored legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy."