Cayetano vs. Monsod

RENATO L. CAYETANO VS.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, AND HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

G.R. No. 100113, September 03, 1991

PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.  Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

 On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.  On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.  On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

 Whether the appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC null and void.

RULING:

No. 

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.  The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).  Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. 

In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

 Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement - that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

 "It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law.  The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.  It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.  To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority.  An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." 

 The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:  (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.. 

 

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: "The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.  Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.  Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.  In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

Sarmiento vs. Comelec

RODULFO SARMIENTO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF VIRAC and JOSE "CITO" ALBERTO II

G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992

The special civil actions for certiorari hereby jointly resolved, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases (SPC): 1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return; 2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein; 3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts; 4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers; 5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election returns; 6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166; 7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass; 8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao; 9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition. 

Petitioners question the resolutions for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion for violating Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resolutions issued by the COMELEC violate Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:

Article IX Section 3(C) of the 1987 Constitution provides that election cases including pre-proclamation controversies and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. 

The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.

Accordingly, the instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular election protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.

Arroyo vs. DOJ

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM

G.R. No. 199082               July 23, 2013

The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation. The Fact-Finding Team concluded that there was a manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao and recommended that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato, results in Maguindanao and Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. The Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court Separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. The petitions were eventually consolidated. The Joint Committee denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings Arroyo and the Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam filed by Mike Arroyo and GMA.

The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution promulgated by the Joint Committee subject to modifications. The information for electoral sabotage is filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Mike Arroyo argued on the independence of the COMELEC as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-COMELEC resolutions. Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the COMELEC and lastly, DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the COMELEC but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.

GMA claims that it is the COMELEC and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the creation of the Joint Committee does not undermine the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body because it is still the COMELEC that ultimately determines probable cause.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the COMELEC but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction?

RULING:

Under the present law, the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. 

The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

The COMELEC and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of  two complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the COMELEC and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases. 

Quimzon vs. Ozaeta

BRAULIO QUIMSON VS. BOMAN OZAETA, ET AL., 

G.R. No, L-8321, March 26, 1956

Sometime in 1947, plaintiff-appellant Braulio Quimson, deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal, was recommended for appointment by Aurelio  R. Pefia, a comptroller and performs duties of auditor in representation of the Auditor General of Rural Progress Administration (Administration), a public corporation created for the purpose of acquiring landed estates through  purchase, expropriation or lease, and later sub-letting or sub-leasing the same to  tenants or occupants, as an agent collector of the Administration on a part time basis. Without waiting for the approval of said appointment, Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector of the Administration until October 21,  1949 when he was informed that his services was terminated because of the disapproval of his appointment by the Auditor General who alleged among others that, since Quimson was  deputy  provincial  treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan,  his  additional compensation as  agent-ollector  would contravene  the  Constitutional prohibition  against  double  compensation.

The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no objection to the additional compensation of Quimson as agent collector provided it was authorized in a special provision exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra compensation in accordance with section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code.  In this connection, it may be stated that this section of the Administrative Code provides that in the absence of special provision, no officer or employee in any branch of the Government service shall  receive additional  compensation  on  account of  the discharge of duties pertaining to another or to the performance  of public service   of  whatever  nature. 

ISSUE:
 Whether the appointment extended to Quimson was illegal and the administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services rendered.

RULING:
The appointment or employment of plaintiff-appellant Quimson as agent-collector was not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer.   In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal treasurer.  There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.  Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated, as provincial sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers, like plaintiff are often appointed and designated as deputy provincial treasurer.  The Department Secretaries are often, designated to act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations.  The objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to double appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.

The trouble was that plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the appointment had to go through. Plaintiff, therefore, took the risk or hazard of not being paid for any service that he may render in the meantime.  He should have known that his appointment had to go over or through several obstacles and hazards, but he took the risk and began serving, as agent-collector before his, appointment was approved.  We are afraid that he has no one to blame but himself.

Comelec vs. Silva

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON. LORENZO R. SILVA, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branches 2 and 3, Balanga, Bataan, HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, as Presiding Judge, Branch 1, of the same Court, ERASTO TANCIONGCO, and NORMA CASTILLO

G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998

FACTS:

The COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of Sec.27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan for tampering the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes received of senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections. The twelve cases were presided over by respondent Judges, Honorable Lorenzo R. Silva Jr. and Honorable Benjamin T. Vianzon.

Tanciongco and Castillo filed a joint "Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the Cases." Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. Complainant, Aquilino Q. Pimentel,Jr. did not object to the dismissal of the cases. 

Respondent Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents. It also denied the Notice of Appeal filed by the COMELEC on the ground that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Respondent Judges is correct in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by the COMELEC?

RULING:

The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. It was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC and leave to the trial courts the determination of probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, to dismissed it. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from the cases but he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.

Flores vs. Drilon

ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ AND MANUEL P. REYES  VS.

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND RICHARD J. GORDON

G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U. S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that “no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "the President shall xxx x appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts.

ISSUE:

Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.

Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, the basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency;[ the Vice President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph

People vs. Delgado

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Br. 29, Toledo City, ELSIE RAGO LUMANGTAD, VIVENCIA ABARIDO, AVELINA BUTASLAC, ROSELLANO BUTASLAC, HAYDELISA LUMANGTAD, SILVESTRE LUMANGTAD, MAXIMO RACAZA, NENA RACAZA, VICTORIANO/ VICTOR RAGO, EDNA TEJAS, MERCEDITA TEJAS, TEOFISTO TEJAS, BERNABE TOQUERO, JR., and PEDRO RAFAELA

G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990

FACTS:

Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City filed a complaint against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. Atty. Oyson submitted a report finding a prima facie case and recommending the filing of information against each of the private respondents for violation of Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as recommended.

Fifteen information were filed against each of private respondents in the RTC of Toledo City. In three separate manifestations the Regional Election Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Respondent court issued an order directing the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit the report within 10 days after termination. The Toledo City INP was directed to hold in abeyance the service of the warrants of arrest until the submission of the reinvestigation report.

The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but it was denied.
On the other hand, the private respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has the authority to order reinvestigation of the actions of the COMELEC in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in its court?

RULING:
It is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before a competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.  The COMELEC cannot conduct a re-investigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court. 

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless, the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 

The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.

People vs. Basilla

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENRY B. BASILLA, SALVACION COLAMBOT, SPOUSES JAIME AND ADORACION TAYONG and MELCHOR YANSON

G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989

FACTS:

Complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate by Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Governor against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong vote-buying, Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot for vote buying and PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson for carrying of deadly weapon.

The Provincial Fiscal filed three separate criminal complaints against the three accused but respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed it on the ground that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC and the COMELEC did not investigate the case which violates Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) which states that The Commission on Election shall “ investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."

The private complainants alleged that the act of Respondent Judge dismissing the three criminal information constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since the COMELEC has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the COMELEC did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal information thereof.

On the other hand, private respondents contend that the deputation by the COMELEC of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance.

The Respondent Judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses?

 RULING:

We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the COMELEC, it at the same time authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the COMELEC would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the COMELEC of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of the COMELEC to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the COMELEC had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the COMELEC become deputies or agents of the COMELEC and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the COMELEC in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the COMELEC itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the COMELEC’s authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions.

The Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PETITIONER, VS.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENT. 

G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND CRISPIN T. REYES, VS.

PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, AS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE; LOURDES QUISUMBING, AS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., AS SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES; VICENTE V. JAYME, AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; SEDFREY ORDONEZ, AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, AS SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; LUIS SANTOS, AS SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; FIDEL V. RAMOS, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, AS PRESS SECRETARY; JUANITO FERRER, AS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, AS SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; JOSE CONCEPCION, AS SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, AS SECRETARY OF TOURISM; ALFREDO R. A. BENGZON, AS SECRETARY OF HEALTH; REINERIO D. REYES, AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUDGET; AND SOLITA MONSOD, AS HEAD OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. NO. 83815 FEBRUARY 22, 1991

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.  According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:  (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibi¬tion in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned, admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.  In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception ap¬plicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.  To construe said qualify¬ing phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure.

Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.  Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

People vs. Inting

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR.

G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990

FACTS:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City: to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, to prepare and file the necessary information in court, to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752. The resolution is based on sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which charged the COMELEC with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and on the Omnibus Election Code which implements the constitutional provision.

 Atty. filed with the respondent Trial Court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor and fixed the bail at P5,000.00 as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor. However, before the accused could be arrested, the Trial Court issued another order setting aside its previous order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal.

Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. The trial court quashed the information and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

RULING:
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.

The respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.

Galido vs. Comelec

PERFECTO V. GALIDO VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SATURNINO R. GALEON

G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991

PADILLA, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol.  Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes.

Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).  Through its First Division, the COMELEC reversed the trial court's decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes.  Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc reso¬lution of September 20, 1990 which affirmed the decision of its First Division.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering decision declaring private respondent the duly elected mayor.

RULING:
 The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.  (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commis¬sion on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.

We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.  It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from commit¬ting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

As correctly argued by public respondent COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. 

Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision.  The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of.  In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic.

SSSEA vs. CA

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANTE, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO VS.   THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

FACTS:

On June 9, 1987, the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:  implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. 

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against SSSEA alleging that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.  Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

After due notice and hearing, the Regional Trial Court enjoined the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and ordered the striking employees to return to work.  

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.

ISSUE:

Whether employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike covered by the Civil Service Commission.

RULING:

The Court is of the considered view that they are.  Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.  This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

 

Government employees may, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.  If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.  But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands.

While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions of the law.  A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.