Mercado vs. Espina

G.R. No. 173987               February 25, 2012

PADILLA MERCADO, ZULUETA MERCADO, BONIFACIA MERCADO, DAMIAN MERCADO and EMMANUEL MERCADO BASCUG, Petitioners, 
vs.
SPOUSES AGUEDO ESPINA and LOURDES ESPINA, Respondents.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the heirs of the late spouses Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who were the owners of the subject parcel of land; after the death of Santiago and Sofronia, petitioners inherited the disputed lot, possessing the same as owners; sometime in 1996, herein respondents claimed ownership over the subject parcel of land, alleging that they bought the same from one Josefa Mercado Espina (Josefa) who, in turn, previously bought the same in 1939 from a certain Genivera Mercado Kavanaugh; that Genivera supposedly purchased the same property from one Escolastico Mercado in 1937 who, in turn, allegedly bought it from Santiago Mercado. Petitioners further alleged that in 1962, Josefa, through fraudulent machinations, was able to obtain a title (Original Certificate of Title No. 35) over the subject property in her name. Asserting that the above-mentioned contracts of sale never happened, petitioners prayed for the declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale between Santiago and Escolastico, Escolastico and Genivera, and between Genivera and Josefa.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case due to the failure of the complainant to state the assessed value of the property, that petitioners' cause of action is barred by prescription, laches and indefeasibility of title, and that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action against respondents who are buyers in good faith

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on grounds of prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title and lack of cause of action.

Issue:
WON failure to state a cause of action is a ground for motion to dismiss

Held:

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right

If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A perusal of the Amended Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

Aneco Realty vs. Landex

G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008 
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus -  LANDEX DEVELOPMENT  CORPORATION, Respondent.

Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots. It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC

The RTC rendered a Decision granting the complaint for injunction. Landex moved for reconsideration. Records reveal that Landex failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the defect, Landex later filed a motion setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a motion for execution claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory.

The RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and dismissing the complaint of Aneco.

Issue:
 Whether or not the requirement of notice of hearing should be strictly or liberally applied under the circumstances.

Held:
A motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. It does not toll the running of the period to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. It is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder rather than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities. Substantive justice trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla, the SC held:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, SC has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

Here, the SC find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed that there is no vested right to technicalities. It is within the courts sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied.

SC finds that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for reconsideration but Anecos counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration.

Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the CA correctly ignored the procedural defect.

Traders Royal Bank vs. CA

G.R. No. 60222 April 22, 1992

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (PASAY CITY), BRANCH XXIX, THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA, public respondents, G.M. WOOD EXPORT INDUSTRIES, INC. and SONIA GONZALES, private respondents.

Petitioner filed with the respondent trial court a complaint for a sum of money, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against the private respondents. Its principal causes of action involve a promissory note and domestic letters of credit in the amounts. In connection with said letters of credit, private respondent G.M. Wood Export Industries, Inc. through its President and General Manager, private respondent Gonzales, signed and delivered to the petitioner the corresponding documents of trust.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. However, petitioner and private respondents filed a Joint Motion containing stipulations regarding a temporary arrangement between them under which G.M. Wood was allowed to continue with its business operations without, however, prejudicing or jeopardizing petitioner's interest in the attached or garnished properties of G.M. Wood.

The trial court approved the joint motion but lifted partially the attachment levied on private respondent's properties.

Petitioner filed an omnibus motion praying, among others, for: (a) the reconsideration of the above order insofar as it mandated the partial lifting of the writ of attachment and (b) the total reinstatement of the attachment on the properties.  The hearing for this motion was postponed three (3) times at the instance of private respondents. On the third time, the hearing was again postponed but private respondents did not appear; petitioner then verbally moved for the submission of the motion for resolution. The formal motion to this effect was likewise filed. The trial court did not act thereon; instead it issued an Order granting private respondents' urgent motion for the release to private respondent Gonzales of the marginal deposit. Petitioner was not furnished with a copy of the motion, which does not even contain the required notice of hearing. Petitioner thus filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied in its order.

Issue: WON there was notice of hearing in the motion

Held:

The trial court then acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the petitioner to release the marginal deposit. What is more reprehensible in the conduct of the trial court is its deliberate failure to act with dispatch on petitioner's motion to reconsider both the Order insofar as it partially lifted the writ of attachment and the approval, ex parte, of the motion to release the marginal deposit. There was, of course, merit in the first motion as the trial court acted rather capriciously when it partially lifted the writ. None of the parties asked for such lifting. On the contrary, in their joint motion, they explicitly agreed a. That the writ of attachment is not hereby lifted by virtue of this temporary arrangement and the attachment/garnishment/levy on the properties of defendant shall subsists.  As to the motion for release, SC noted from the Order dated 29 January 1981 that it is denominated as urgent and was filed only on 28 January 1981. Respondents do not deny the fact that no copy thereof was furnished the petitioner; they also do not dispute the fact that no notice of its hearing was indicated in the motion. The movants then deliberately violated the requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. This requirement is mandatory. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and the clerk of court has no right to receive it.  Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no other alternative but to disregard it. Even if the motion contained a notice, still the trial court could not have validly acted on it for, as of the date it acted thereon, no proof of service of the notice on petitioner was shown. Section 6 of the aforecited Rule provides that:

No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
In this case, the right of the petitioner was definitely affected. That petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and that it underwent a full-blown hearing did not, contrary to the postulation of the Court of Appeals, cure the fatal error.