Aquino Presidency

"It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino."

[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.] LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.

Sanidad vs. Comelec

PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 90878               January 29, 1990

FACTS:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. A plebiscite was scheduled for the ratification of said Organic Act by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 2226.
The COMELEC govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167, which provides: “Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.” The petitioner alleged that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

On November 28, 1989, a temporary restraining orders enjoining respondent COMELEC from enforcing and implementing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 was issued.

Respondent COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 does not violate the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The Resolution does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the COMELEC space and airtime.

Respondent COMELEC has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 prohibits Columnist from expressing their opinions during plebiscite periods?

RULING:
Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution granted the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. COMELEC spaces and COMELEC radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

Adiong vs. Comelec | DIGEST

BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition violates Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of the date of the petition he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "COMELEC Poster Areas."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes?

RULING:
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

First, the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.

Second, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas.

Telecommunications and Broadcaster vs. Comelec | CASE DIGEST

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc. challenge the validity of Section 92 of BP 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses in providing COMELEC Time in the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners contend that Section 92 of BP 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation claiming that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers. Petitioners claim that Section 92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although Section 5 of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated. Petitioners also complain that B.P. 881, Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit?

RULING:

Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution authorized the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the object of the power were the same.

The prohibition in Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is only half of the regulatory provision in the statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space and air time for allocation to candidates. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government more than merely depriving their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, Section 6 states that "the use of property bears a social function and the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises is subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands."

To affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of Section 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

Brillantes vs. Yorac

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.VS.

HAYDEE B. YORAC, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING CHAIR¬PERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990

FACTS:

The President of the Philippines designated Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’état attempt. For this reason, petitioner questions such designation contending that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence.  He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice.  No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commissions on Elections is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes. 

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.  Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.  Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it.  In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation.  But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution.  Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which, is the security of tenure of its members.  That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commissions on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

NPC vs. Comelec

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two individuals who are candidates for office in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

Petitioners argued that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional?

RULING:

Yes. 

Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The COMELEC may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled subdivision and its subsidiary.” 

The COMELEC has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." The provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period.

The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. It is designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution for it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro

AQUILES U. REYES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH XXXIX, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ADOLFO G. COMIA, AND THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO

G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner considering that there was another candidate bearing the same surname.  The petitioner was proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate without resolving the petition and took his oath of office.

Private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court alleging that a vital mistake had been committed by the Board of Canvassers in the computation of the total number of votes garnered by petitioner.

The motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner was denied by the Trial Court. The Municipal Board of Canvassers admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. The trial court annulled the proclamation of petitioner and declared private respondent as the eighth winning candidate. 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and the petition for mandamus and prohibition   to the CA to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member. The CA dismissed the petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate court's decision became final and executory. On the other hand, the COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

Petitioner contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave abuse of discretion, first by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by private respondent despite the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and second by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may be dispensed of by the petitioner?

RULING:

The motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari as provided by Article IX(C), Section 2. Petitioner contention that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of law. 

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX (A) Section 7 may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

RENATO L. CAYETANO VS.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, AND HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

G.R. No. 100113, September 03, 1991

PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.  Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

 On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.  On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.  On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

 Whether the appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC null and void.

RULING:

No. 

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.  The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).  Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. 

In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

 Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement - that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

 "It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law.  The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.  It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.  To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority.  An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." 

 The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:  (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.. 

 

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: "The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.  Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.  Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.  In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

Sarmiento vs. Comelec

RODULFO SARMIENTO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF VIRAC and JOSE "CITO" ALBERTO II

G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992

The special civil actions for certiorari hereby jointly resolved, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases (SPC): 1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return; 2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein; 3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts; 4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers; 5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election returns; 6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166; 7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass; 8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao; 9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition. 

Petitioners question the resolutions for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion for violating Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resolutions issued by the COMELEC violate Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:

Article IX Section 3(C) of the 1987 Constitution provides that election cases including pre-proclamation controversies and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. 

The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.

Accordingly, the instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular election protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.

Arroyo vs. DOJ

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM

G.R. No. 199082               July 23, 2013

The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation. The Fact-Finding Team concluded that there was a manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao and recommended that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato, results in Maguindanao and Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. The Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court Separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. The petitions were eventually consolidated. The Joint Committee denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings Arroyo and the Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam filed by Mike Arroyo and GMA.

The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution promulgated by the Joint Committee subject to modifications. The information for electoral sabotage is filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Mike Arroyo argued on the independence of the COMELEC as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-COMELEC resolutions. Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the COMELEC and lastly, DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the COMELEC but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.

GMA claims that it is the COMELEC and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the creation of the Joint Committee does not undermine the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body because it is still the COMELEC that ultimately determines probable cause.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the COMELEC but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction?

RULING:

Under the present law, the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. 

The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

The COMELEC and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of  two complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the COMELEC and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases. 

Quimzon vs. Ozaeta

BRAULIO QUIMSON VS. BOMAN OZAETA, ET AL., 

G.R. No, L-8321, March 26, 1956

Sometime in 1947, plaintiff-appellant Braulio Quimson, deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal, was recommended for appointment by Aurelio  R. Pefia, a comptroller and performs duties of auditor in representation of the Auditor General of Rural Progress Administration (Administration), a public corporation created for the purpose of acquiring landed estates through  purchase, expropriation or lease, and later sub-letting or sub-leasing the same to  tenants or occupants, as an agent collector of the Administration on a part time basis. Without waiting for the approval of said appointment, Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector of the Administration until October 21,  1949 when he was informed that his services was terminated because of the disapproval of his appointment by the Auditor General who alleged among others that, since Quimson was  deputy  provincial  treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan,  his  additional compensation as  agent-ollector  would contravene  the  Constitutional prohibition  against  double  compensation.

The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no objection to the additional compensation of Quimson as agent collector provided it was authorized in a special provision exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra compensation in accordance with section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code.  In this connection, it may be stated that this section of the Administrative Code provides that in the absence of special provision, no officer or employee in any branch of the Government service shall  receive additional  compensation  on  account of  the discharge of duties pertaining to another or to the performance  of public service   of  whatever  nature. 

ISSUE:
 Whether the appointment extended to Quimson was illegal and the administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services rendered.

RULING:
The appointment or employment of plaintiff-appellant Quimson as agent-collector was not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer.   In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal treasurer.  There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.  Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated, as provincial sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers, like plaintiff are often appointed and designated as deputy provincial treasurer.  The Department Secretaries are often, designated to act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations.  The objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to double appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.

The trouble was that plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the appointment had to go through. Plaintiff, therefore, took the risk or hazard of not being paid for any service that he may render in the meantime.  He should have known that his appointment had to go over or through several obstacles and hazards, but he took the risk and began serving, as agent-collector before his, appointment was approved.  We are afraid that he has no one to blame but himself.

Comelec vs. Silva

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. HON. LORENZO R. SILVA, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branches 2 and 3, Balanga, Bataan, HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, as Presiding Judge, Branch 1, of the same Court, ERASTO TANCIONGCO, and NORMA CASTILLO

G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998

FACTS:

The COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of Sec.27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan for tampering the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes received of senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections. The twelve cases were presided over by respondent Judges, Honorable Lorenzo R. Silva Jr. and Honorable Benjamin T. Vianzon.

Tanciongco and Castillo filed a joint "Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the Cases." Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. Complainant, Aquilino Q. Pimentel,Jr. did not object to the dismissal of the cases. 

Respondent Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents. It also denied the Notice of Appeal filed by the COMELEC on the ground that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Respondent Judges is correct in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by the COMELEC?

RULING:

The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. It was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC and leave to the trial courts the determination of probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, to dismissed it. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from the cases but he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.

Flores vs. Drilon

ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ AND MANUEL P. REYES  VS.

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND RICHARD J. GORDON

G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U. S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that “no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "the President shall xxx x appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts.

ISSUE:

Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.

Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, the basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency;[ the Vice President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph

People vs. Delgado

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Br. 29, Toledo City, ELSIE RAGO LUMANGTAD, VIVENCIA ABARIDO, AVELINA BUTASLAC, ROSELLANO BUTASLAC, HAYDELISA LUMANGTAD, SILVESTRE LUMANGTAD, MAXIMO RACAZA, NENA RACAZA, VICTORIANO/ VICTOR RAGO, EDNA TEJAS, MERCEDITA TEJAS, TEOFISTO TEJAS, BERNABE TOQUERO, JR., and PEDRO RAFAELA

G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990

FACTS:

Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City filed a complaint against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. Atty. Oyson submitted a report finding a prima facie case and recommending the filing of information against each of the private respondents for violation of Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as recommended.

Fifteen information were filed against each of private respondents in the RTC of Toledo City. In three separate manifestations the Regional Election Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Respondent court issued an order directing the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit the report within 10 days after termination. The Toledo City INP was directed to hold in abeyance the service of the warrants of arrest until the submission of the reinvestigation report.

The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but it was denied.
On the other hand, the private respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has the authority to order reinvestigation of the actions of the COMELEC in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in its court?

RULING:
It is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before a competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.  The COMELEC cannot conduct a re-investigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court. 

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless, the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 

The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.

People vs. Basilla

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENRY B. BASILLA, SALVACION COLAMBOT, SPOUSES JAIME AND ADORACION TAYONG and MELCHOR YANSON

G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989

FACTS:

Complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate by Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Governor against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong vote-buying, Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot for vote buying and PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson for carrying of deadly weapon.

The Provincial Fiscal filed three separate criminal complaints against the three accused but respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed it on the ground that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC and the COMELEC did not investigate the case which violates Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) which states that The Commission on Election shall “ investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."

The private complainants alleged that the act of Respondent Judge dismissing the three criminal information constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since the COMELEC has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the COMELEC did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal information thereof.

On the other hand, private respondents contend that the deputation by the COMELEC of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance.

The Respondent Judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses?

 RULING:

We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the COMELEC, it at the same time authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the COMELEC would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the COMELEC of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of the COMELEC to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the COMELEC had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the COMELEC become deputies or agents of the COMELEC and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the COMELEC in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the COMELEC itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the COMELEC’s authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions.

The Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PETITIONER, VS.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENT. 

G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND CRISPIN T. REYES, VS.

PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, AS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE; LOURDES QUISUMBING, AS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., AS SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES; VICENTE V. JAYME, AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; SEDFREY ORDONEZ, AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, AS SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; LUIS SANTOS, AS SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; FIDEL V. RAMOS, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, AS PRESS SECRETARY; JUANITO FERRER, AS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, AS SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; JOSE CONCEPCION, AS SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, AS SECRETARY OF TOURISM; ALFREDO R. A. BENGZON, AS SECRETARY OF HEALTH; REINERIO D. REYES, AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUDGET; AND SOLITA MONSOD, AS HEAD OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. NO. 83815 FEBRUARY 22, 1991

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.  According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:  (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibi¬tion in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned, admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.  In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception ap¬plicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.  To construe said qualify¬ing phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure.

Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.  Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

People vs. Inting

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR.

G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990

FACTS:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City: to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, to prepare and file the necessary information in court, to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752. The resolution is based on sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which charged the COMELEC with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and on the Omnibus Election Code which implements the constitutional provision.

 Atty. filed with the respondent Trial Court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor and fixed the bail at P5,000.00 as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor. However, before the accused could be arrested, the Trial Court issued another order setting aside its previous order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal.

Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. The trial court quashed the information and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

RULING:
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.

The respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.

Galido vs. Comelec

PERFECTO V. GALIDO VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SATURNINO R. GALEON

G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991

PADILLA, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol.  Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes.

Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).  Through its First Division, the COMELEC reversed the trial court's decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes.  Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc reso¬lution of September 20, 1990 which affirmed the decision of its First Division.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering decision declaring private respondent the duly elected mayor.

RULING:
 The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.  (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commis¬sion on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.

We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.  It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from commit¬ting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

As correctly argued by public respondent COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. 

Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision.  The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of.  In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic.

SSSEA vs. CA

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANTE, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO VS.   THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

FACTS:

On June 9, 1987, the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:  implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. 

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against SSSEA alleging that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike.  Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

After due notice and hearing, the Regional Trial Court enjoined the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and ordered the striking employees to return to work.  

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.

ISSUE:

Whether employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike covered by the Civil Service Commission.

RULING:

The Court is of the considered view that they are.  Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.  This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

 

Government employees may, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.  If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.  But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands.

While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions of the law.  A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Edding vs. Comelec

NORBI H. EDDING VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND PABLO BERNARDO

G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995

FACTS:

 Petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga Del Norte during the May 1992 elections. After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over Edding by 212 votes.  Unconvinced and alleging massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June 9, 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga  Del Norte docketed as Election Case No. SE-10. Upon termination of the protest proceedings and recounting of the ballots, the RTC rendered judgment on July 2, 1993 proclaiming Edding as the winner of the election for the mayoralty seat of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, and declaring as null and void the election of respondent Bernardo so that on July 15, 1993, Edding assumed office and replaced Bernardo.

On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as SPR No. 5-93 seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due course to the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order on July 19, 1993.

ISSUE:

 Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.

RULING:

 This court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides as follows: "SEC. 50. Definition. - x x x The commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases."

COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, invoking Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part: "Sec. 2. The commission on elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: x x x (2) xxx appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. xxx Sec. 3. The commission on elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election case, including pre-proclamation controversies.  x x x"

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.  

Relampagos vs. Cumba and Comelec

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, VS. 

ROSITA C. CUMBA AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan Del Norte.  The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.

 

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.

 

As a result, the private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution.  The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.

 

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution stating that, the Commission has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby granted and that the Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared null and void and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 is lifted.

ISSUE:

 Whether Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

RULING:

 Yes. 

We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: “The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases” remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.  Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

 

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction

Guevara vs. Gimenez

GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA vs. THE HONORABLE PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, as the Auditor General of the Philippines and ISMAEL MATHAY, as the Auditor of the Central Bank

G.R. NO. L-17115           November 30, 1962

FACTS:

On or about September 1, 1959, Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines asked petitioner Guillermo Guevara to cooperate with the legal counsel of the Central Bank in defending the same and its Monetary Board in a Civil Case filed against them by R. Marino Corpus. Petitioner entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents in said case. 

Governor Cuaderno urged petitioner to submit a proposal setting forth the terms and conditions under which his professional services were being rendered, and petitioner stated that his professional fees would be as follows: "retainer's fee of P10,000, plus a per diem of P300 for every hearing or trial. In precise of appeal to the Supreme Court and another fee of P5,000.00". Governor Cuaderno accepted the proposal, as regards the retainer's fee and the per diem of petitioner's appearance in said case. 

Petitioner had sent to the Central Bank his bill for the retainer's fee of P10,000. The Bank Auditor sought advice from the Auditor General, who stated that he would not object to said retainer's fees of P10,000, provided that its payment was made "not in lump sum as causes or circumstances may arise which may prevent Judge Guevara from proceeding or continuing as counsel of the Bank in the aforesaid case before it is finally terminated", but, in installments with the understanding that, "in case there is no appeal from the CFI decision, the balance will be paid in full the decision has become final. As regards the P300 per diem, the Auditor General express the belief that it is "excessive and may be allowed in audit". 

Hence, the present action for mandamus filed on July 6, 1960, to compel respondent to approve payment of petitioner's retainer fee of P10,000 and his per diem aggregating P3,300, for the eleven (11) hearings attended by him. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has the duty to pass in audit and approved the payment of the amounts claimed by the petitioner?

RULING:

Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution. Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do so more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary.