Mercado vs. Espina

G.R. No. 173987               February 25, 2012

PADILLA MERCADO, ZULUETA MERCADO, BONIFACIA MERCADO, DAMIAN MERCADO and EMMANUEL MERCADO BASCUG, Petitioners, 
vs.
SPOUSES AGUEDO ESPINA and LOURDES ESPINA, Respondents.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the heirs of the late spouses Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who were the owners of the subject parcel of land; after the death of Santiago and Sofronia, petitioners inherited the disputed lot, possessing the same as owners; sometime in 1996, herein respondents claimed ownership over the subject parcel of land, alleging that they bought the same from one Josefa Mercado Espina (Josefa) who, in turn, previously bought the same in 1939 from a certain Genivera Mercado Kavanaugh; that Genivera supposedly purchased the same property from one Escolastico Mercado in 1937 who, in turn, allegedly bought it from Santiago Mercado. Petitioners further alleged that in 1962, Josefa, through fraudulent machinations, was able to obtain a title (Original Certificate of Title No. 35) over the subject property in her name. Asserting that the above-mentioned contracts of sale never happened, petitioners prayed for the declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale between Santiago and Escolastico, Escolastico and Genivera, and between Genivera and Josefa.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case due to the failure of the complainant to state the assessed value of the property, that petitioners' cause of action is barred by prescription, laches and indefeasibility of title, and that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action against respondents who are buyers in good faith

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on grounds of prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title and lack of cause of action.

Issue:
WON failure to state a cause of action is a ground for motion to dismiss

Held:

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right

If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A perusal of the Amended Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

Aneco Realty vs. Landex

G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008 
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus -  LANDEX DEVELOPMENT  CORPORATION, Respondent.

Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots. It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC

The RTC rendered a Decision granting the complaint for injunction. Landex moved for reconsideration. Records reveal that Landex failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the defect, Landex later filed a motion setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a motion for execution claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory.

The RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and dismissing the complaint of Aneco.

Issue:
 Whether or not the requirement of notice of hearing should be strictly or liberally applied under the circumstances.

Held:
A motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. It does not toll the running of the period to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. It is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder rather than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities. Substantive justice trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla, the SC held:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, SC has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

Here, the SC find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed that there is no vested right to technicalities. It is within the courts sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied.

SC finds that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for reconsideration but Anecos counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration.

Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the CA correctly ignored the procedural defect.

Traders Royal Bank vs. CA

G.R. No. 60222 April 22, 1992

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (PASAY CITY), BRANCH XXIX, THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA, public respondents, G.M. WOOD EXPORT INDUSTRIES, INC. and SONIA GONZALES, private respondents.

Petitioner filed with the respondent trial court a complaint for a sum of money, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against the private respondents. Its principal causes of action involve a promissory note and domestic letters of credit in the amounts. In connection with said letters of credit, private respondent G.M. Wood Export Industries, Inc. through its President and General Manager, private respondent Gonzales, signed and delivered to the petitioner the corresponding documents of trust.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. However, petitioner and private respondents filed a Joint Motion containing stipulations regarding a temporary arrangement between them under which G.M. Wood was allowed to continue with its business operations without, however, prejudicing or jeopardizing petitioner's interest in the attached or garnished properties of G.M. Wood.

The trial court approved the joint motion but lifted partially the attachment levied on private respondent's properties.

Petitioner filed an omnibus motion praying, among others, for: (a) the reconsideration of the above order insofar as it mandated the partial lifting of the writ of attachment and (b) the total reinstatement of the attachment on the properties.  The hearing for this motion was postponed three (3) times at the instance of private respondents. On the third time, the hearing was again postponed but private respondents did not appear; petitioner then verbally moved for the submission of the motion for resolution. The formal motion to this effect was likewise filed. The trial court did not act thereon; instead it issued an Order granting private respondents' urgent motion for the release to private respondent Gonzales of the marginal deposit. Petitioner was not furnished with a copy of the motion, which does not even contain the required notice of hearing. Petitioner thus filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied in its order.

Issue: WON there was notice of hearing in the motion

Held:

The trial court then acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the petitioner to release the marginal deposit. What is more reprehensible in the conduct of the trial court is its deliberate failure to act with dispatch on petitioner's motion to reconsider both the Order insofar as it partially lifted the writ of attachment and the approval, ex parte, of the motion to release the marginal deposit. There was, of course, merit in the first motion as the trial court acted rather capriciously when it partially lifted the writ. None of the parties asked for such lifting. On the contrary, in their joint motion, they explicitly agreed a. That the writ of attachment is not hereby lifted by virtue of this temporary arrangement and the attachment/garnishment/levy on the properties of defendant shall subsists.  As to the motion for release, SC noted from the Order dated 29 January 1981 that it is denominated as urgent and was filed only on 28 January 1981. Respondents do not deny the fact that no copy thereof was furnished the petitioner; they also do not dispute the fact that no notice of its hearing was indicated in the motion. The movants then deliberately violated the requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. This requirement is mandatory. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and the clerk of court has no right to receive it.  Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no other alternative but to disregard it. Even if the motion contained a notice, still the trial court could not have validly acted on it for, as of the date it acted thereon, no proof of service of the notice on petitioner was shown. Section 6 of the aforecited Rule provides that:

No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
In this case, the right of the petitioner was definitely affected. That petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and that it underwent a full-blown hearing did not, contrary to the postulation of the Court of Appeals, cure the fatal error.

Castillo vs. Court of First Instance

G.R. No. L-55869 February 20, 1984
SALOME M. CASTILLO, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH IV and FELIBERTO V. CASTILLO, respondents.

Private respondent and petitioner are husband and wife. Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for administration of conjugal properties, alleging that petitioner took possession and administration of the assets of the conjugal partnership; that they were separated de facto.

Summons was issued by the respondent court. The address of petitioner as alleged in the complaint and indicated in the summon is 129 or 35 Lapu Lapu Street, Caloocan City, Metro Manila. Deputy Sheriff instead of serving the summons at the aforesaid address, served it at No. 8 Mango Road, Malabon, Metro Manila, but was informed by Atty. Jose M. Castillo, a son of the spouses, that petitioner is not residing in said address and is presently in the United States of America. When the Deputy Sheriff inquired the location of 129 Lapu Lapu Street, Caloocan City, Atty. Castillo accompanied him in said address where his brother is residing. In said address, the Deputy Sheriff was likewise informed that petitioner is abroad. The Castillo brothers filed a manifestation before the respondent court that petitioner is abroad.

Private respondent requested the Deputy Sheriff to serve the summons at No. 8 Mango Road, Northern Hills, Malabon, Metro Manila. The Deputy Sheriff served the summons on the said address delivering a copy thereof to a certain Chua Yok, an overseer of one Ngo Kieng, who was the lessee of the premises belonging to the conjugal partnership of petitioner and private respondent.
For failure of petitioner to file answer, private respondent filed a motion to declare the former in default which was granted by the trial court. Private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

Issue:
WON a valid service of summon was made upon petitioner.

Held:
There was no valid service of summons upon petitioner. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant and of the subject matter of the action by virtue of the service of summons in the manner required by law. In the present case, petitioner is a resident temporarily out of the Philippines. Such being the case, service of summons is governed by Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which states:

Section 18. Resident temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court be effected out of the Philippines as under the preceding section.

Under Section 17, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant. Failure to comply with the above provisions of law, as in this case, is a fatal defect in the service of summons as to annul the proceedings taken by the lower court. Chua Yok, a mere overseer of the lessee of the premises owned by the parties herein, and to whom the summons was served, is not in any way authorized to receive any pleading in behalf of petitioner. Hence, service of summons to him is not proper and legal.

Non-service of summons upon petitioner constitutes a deprivation of procedural due process. It is fair and just that she be given her day in court. It is a jurisdictional defect proper for the present recourse.

Toyota vs. CA

[G.R. No. 126321. October 23, 1997]
TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.

Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra and paid by means of Check in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored. Petitioner requested that Guevarra should make good the check.  Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address thru his sister-in-law by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. Respondent failed to answer of the complaint and was declared default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

Respondent petition the CA for the nullification of the ex-parte judgement and claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him.

Issue:
 WON the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by failure to serve summon in his person.

Held:
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.

Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law.

In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, the SC say that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriffs return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed therein.

The SC, however, has elucidated that evidence must in such a case be duly presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted service. Hence -
The private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioners separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with.

And, in Keister vs. Navarro, the Court said:
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.

The summons must be served to the defendant in person.  It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.  Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.  This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is `in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.  Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.

Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him. 
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served. Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that Irregularities of this kind substituted service might be cured by proof that the copies have actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.

The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the private respondent of his right to due process.

Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President

G.R. No. 203372               June 16, 2015

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 206290

ATTY. DINDO G. VENTURANZA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice, CLARO A. ARELLANO, in his capacity as the Prosecutor General, and RICHARD ANTHONY D. FADULLON, in his capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209138

IRMA A. VILLANUEVA and FRANCISCA B. ROSQUITA, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 212030

EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondent.

The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." 

None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

Issue:

(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and

(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.

Held:

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:

(1)   authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

(2)   transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.

(3)   a vacant position at the time of appointment; and

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

(4)   receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

Chua vs. Torres

G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005,

 CHRISTINE CHUA, Petitioner

- versus -

JORGE TORRES and ANTONIO BELTRAN, Respondents. 

A complaint for damages was lodged before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint was filed by Christine Chua impleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff. Named as defendants in the suit were herein respondents Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran.

Significantly, while Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the second paragraph of the complaint that he was being impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff. There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by Jonathan, and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense. Neither did Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against forum-shopping, although petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified herself as the principal plaintiff.

Upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Jonathan Chua had not executed a certification against forum-shopping stressing Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: whether the absence of the signature in the required verification and certification against forum-shopping of a party misjoined as a plaintiff is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complaint.

Held:

The SC ruled that it is not so, and that the RTC erred in dismissing the instant complaint. There is no judicial precedent affirming or rejecting such a view, but we are comfortable with making such a pronouncement. A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs.

At the same time, Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Moreover, the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit.

It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. Hence, it should not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign the certification against forum-shopping, since he was misjoined as a plaintiff in the first place. The fact that Jonathan was misjoined is clear on the face of the complaint itself, and the error of the RTC in dismissing the complaint is not obviated by the fact that the adverse party failed to raise this point. After all, the RTC could have motu proprio dropped Jonathan as a plaintiff, for the reasons above-stated which should have been evident to it upon examination of the complaint.

Sps. Perez vs. Hermano

G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005,

SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO, Petitioners,

 - versus -

ANTONIO HERMANO, R e s p o n d e n t.

Petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano. Respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim simultaneously filed a Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial which was granted by the trial court.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties.

Defendant having filed a special civil action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage and now pending before RTC, he should be dropped as one of the defendants in this case and whatever claims plaintiffs may have against defendant Hermano, they can set it up by way of an answer to said judicial foreclosure.

Issue: whether or not the public respondent had plainly and manifestly acted with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint as against respondent Antonio Hermano in civil case.

Held: As far as we can glean from the Orders of the trial court, respondent Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this case.

 To better understand the present controversy, it is vital to revisit the rules on joinder of causes of action as exhaustively discussed in Republic v. Hernandez, thus:

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder.

Section 6, Rule 2 on misjoinder of causes of action provides:

Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.

There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

As far as can be gathered from the assailed Orders, it is the first condition - on joinder of parties - that the trial court deemed to be lacking. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.

In herein case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying notes and acknowledgment receipts for P10,000,000 each. Petitioners claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled them to mortgage their properties which they had already agreed to sell to the latter.

The joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners cause of action against respondent Hermano.

When you struggle

Every now and then, I struggle luckily I found a friend who can understand me...

PSBC vs. CA

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the aforestated article.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable for breach of contract as an academic institution?

Held:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with.  For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.  A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

The negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The SC is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.

Dangwa vs. CA

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet.while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

The testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.

Issue: WON Mr. Cudiamat is considered a passenger?

Held:
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of the witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, the bus had "just started" and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly.  An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owe to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case.

 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger.

By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

Canlapan vs. Atty Balayo

A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016

BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before Executive Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council (Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want!")

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly considering that respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by Higino M. Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission, including the security guard.

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer actively participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case nor was authorized by the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.

Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition, Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao, Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he asked respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role.

Issue: WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the example of obedience to law. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expresses the lawyer's fundamental duty to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law" Respondent's display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by this court.

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.⁴² Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of complainant's claims, it was improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back."

Feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above reproach. They cannot indulge in offensive personalities. They should always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in speech and conduct, not only towards the court but also towards adverse parties and witnesses.

It has been ruled:

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a, lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

Distinction of Attoryney's fee and Acceptance fee

A.C. No. 10912. January 9, 2016
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

There is a distinction between attorney’s fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney’s fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.

What law was enacted today?

PROCLAMATION No. 1081

September 21, 1979 

 PROCLAIMING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

Yu Vs.Atty Dela Cruz

A.C. No. 10912. January 9, 2016

PAULINA T. YU, Complainant vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance fees. While the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge. Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, “Account Closed.” Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.

Complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the “abandonment” of the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor against him.

A verified complaint was filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint. Despite having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as shown in a certification issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.

Issue: WON respondent violated CPR?

Held:

The complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client’s property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer’s blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant’s acquiescence to the “pawning” of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer’s act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client’s jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter’s property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.

The Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer’s oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” This indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action, and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar. In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As “vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”

Pitcher Vs. Atty. Gagate

A.C. No. 9532               October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.

Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), a British national who passed away on June 18, 2004. Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.

Complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui (Bantegui), a major stockholder of Consulting Edge, in order to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the company. They agreed to another meeting which was, however, postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.

Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises. However, prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was legal.

On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate key.

However, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door, which prevented the employees thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Prosecutor’s Office a complaint for grave coercion against complainant and respondent. In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting Edge.

Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant. Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts, complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Issue: WON respondent neglected his duties?

Held:

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint despite due notice. This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges leveled against him.

Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz, a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares, the Court meted a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant; to return the money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client on the status of her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, a lawyer who neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s money and to return the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.

Mumar vs. Atty Flores

A.C. No. 5426 April 3, 2007

CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES, Respondent.

The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Chita Pantoja-Mumar charging respondent Atty.Januario C. Flores with fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, falsification of document, breach of duty and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It appears that respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay,Danao City. The deed was executed in favor of the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a torrens title over the property under their names.

In the verified Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent had prepared the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1987, but averred that the transaction did not push through, and the deed was not notarized.

The Investigating Commissioner found that while the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case, the acts and omissions of respondent as notary public have been duly established. According to the Investigating Commissioner:

1.      The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or before December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the transaction was not pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated therein to be December 29, 1987;

2.      Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority and/or in the absence of some of the supposed signatories;

3.      Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix her thumbmark to the document; and

4.      Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did not sign it.

The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions were established through respondents own admission that he notarized the document even if Maximina Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his presence, and that complainant did not appear before him to sign the deed. The Investigating Commissioner also considered respondents testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574. Citing Gonzales v. Ramos, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that the notarial commission of respondent be revoked; and that he be disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Issue: WON respondent violated the Notarial law and his lawyer’s oath?

Held:

It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. Considering that this is the respondents first administrative offense, the Court modifies the IBPs recommendation of a two-year suspension from the practice of law to one year.