Oposa vs. Factoran

 The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of environment but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."

The plaintiffs seek to cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. They expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

The original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff has legal standing to the case filed?

Held:

Petitioners instituted the Civil Case as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, The Supreme Court rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. They likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. It is no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Mayor Marcial Vargas vs. Fortunato Cajucom

GR. No.171095

MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,

FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, Respondent

In the complaint, Cajucom alleged that he had intended to start a gasoline station business on his lot in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, but several illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno, et al. were obstructing access to his site, thus, also frustrating his plan. He claimed that demand was made for Puno, et al. to remove their structures, but to no avail. Cajucom then alleged that he tried to enlist the help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario, but the latter similarly did not act. Cajucom ultimately prayed for

the court to command the said municipal mayor and engineer to cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned road shoulder by Puno, et al.

On February 14, 2001, the court rendered a Decision in favor of Cajucom. It held that as correctly alleged by Cajucom, the mayor and municipal engineer failed to perform their duties under the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), among which duties is the duty to order the demolition or removal of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures on the road shoulder.

No appeal was interposed from the decision. As the decision became final and executory, Cajucom filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.

Then, the court sheriff reported that on May 28, 2001, he served a copy of the writ of execution on Mayor Vargas and Engr. del Rosario. The writ of execution was signed as received by the mayor's private secretary and by Engr. del Rosario on said date. However, the sheriff also reported in his Return of Service dated July 2, 2001 that, as of June 13, 2001 the judgment has not been executed.

Puno, et al. filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with the Court of Appeals to annul the February 14,

2001 decision of the RTC. That case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69035 entitled Rodel Puno et al. v. Raymundo Annang, et al. The grounds alleged in the petition include the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and its speculation as to certain facts of the case.

Issue: whether grounds exist to quash the subject writ of execution.

Held:

It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining its issuance. In addition, even a writ of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to the process of execution and is logically also issued as a consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. − Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of

the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the

judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

Petitioners cite the following as grounds for the quashal of the writ of execution: (1) that it allegedly would compel the municipal engineer to exercise the powers and duties of the mayor; (2) that it forces the

mayor to perform a discretionary duty; (3) that there was no exhaustion of administrative remedies; and, (4) that the judgment obligee had no well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus.

Such grounds, however, go into the substance and merits of the case which had been decided with finality, and have no bearing on the validity of the issuance of the writ of execution.

Puno, et al., filed a petition to annul the judgment, also raising the trial court's alleged lack of jurisdiction and the same arguments as aforementioned, but such petition was denied by the CA, which denial was

affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court. Hence, to this Court, the final judgment has become the law of the case which is now immovable. The rudiments of fair play, justice, and due process require that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial of a motion to quash a writ of execution issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even on appeal from the decision of the trial court

The petition does not clearly state whether the subject writ of execution falls under any of the above exceptions. It raised two grounds, i.e., that the writ is incapable of being enforced and that it varies the

judgment, which can be interpreted as falling under the exceptions above, but these grounds as applied to the case at bar simply lack merit.