Villarica Pawnshop vs. Gernale

G.R. No. 163344, March 20, 2009,  

VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., represented by Atty. Henry R. Villarica, Maria Consolacion Valmadrid and Rafael Valmadrid Tan, Petitioners,
- versus -
SPOUSES ROGER G. GERNALE and CORAZON C. GERNALE, FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO. (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Respondents.

Respondent spouses Roger and Corazon Gernale (Gernale spouses) filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against Villarica. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 in RTC.

The Gernale spouses alleged that they purchased two parcels of land from Valmadrid as evidenced by two deeds of sale of even date; subsequently, they sought to register the sale and cause the transfer of the title to their names, but they failed because the then acting Register of Deeds informed them that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 90266 and 90267 covering the subject lots were among those totally burned during a conflagration that took place.  the Gernale spouses filed a petition for the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT Nos. 90266 and 90267; their petition was granted and was subsequently issued to them the reconstituted titles TCT Nos. RT-46962(90266) and RT-46963(90267). thereafter, the Gernale spouses saw representatives of Villarica fencing the said properties; upon verification with the Registry of Deeds, respondent spouses discovered that TCT Nos. T-225971(M) and T-225972(M), covering the same parcels of land which they bought, were issued in the name of Villarica in 1995; and the titles of Villarica were void, as the issuance thereof proceeded from an illegal source. The Gernales prayed that the TCTs in the name of Villarica as well as all documents and conveyances relevant thereto be declared null and void, and that Villarica be ordered to pay them moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The Gernale spouses mortgaged the subject properties to then Far East Bank & Trust Company, now Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 502-M-2002, for annulment and cancellation of titles and for damages against herein respondents.

The Gernale spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 502-M-2002, contending that petitioners' allegations in their Complaint were identical with its allegations in its Answer with Counterclaim, and that all the elements of litis pendentia were present in the said cases.

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Gernale spouses and directed them to file their answer to petitioners' Complaint. Respondent spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in its Order

Issue:
1. whether there is litis pendentia
2. whether the petition for certiorari filed by respondents with the CA was the proper remedy to question the orders of the RTC, which denied their motion to dismiss and their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

HeLd:

1. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.

The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action.

This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

With respect to the first requisite, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that there is identity of parties in Civil Case Nos. 438-M-2002 and 502-M-2002. It is true that in Civil Case No. 502-M-2002, Valmadrid and Tan were added as plaintiffs, while BPI and the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan were added as defendants. However, identity of parties does not mean total identity of parties in both cases. It is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. The inclusion of new parties in the second action does not remove the case from the operation of the rule of litis pendentia. What is primordial is that the primary litigants in the first case are also parties to the second action. A different rule would render illusory the principle of litis pendentia.  The fact that new parties were included in Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 does not detract from the fact that the principal litigants, Villarica and the Gernale spouses, are the same in both cases. Besides, it is clear that Valmadrid and Tan, being the previous owners from whom Villarica bought the subject properties, represent the same interests as the latter. On the other hand, the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan was impleaded merely as a nominal party.

With respect to the second and third requisites, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.

Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 is for quieting of title and damages, while Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 is for annulment and cancellation of titles and damages. The two cases are different only in the form of action, but an examination of the allegations in both cases reveals that the main issue raised, which is ownership of the land, and the principal relief sought, which is cancellation of the opposing parties' transfer certificates of title, are substantially the same. The evidence required to substantiate the parties' claims is likewise the same. The proceedings in Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 would entail the presentation of essentially the same evidence, it is clear that there is litis pendentia, and that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant respondents' motion to dismiss.

 2. While indeed, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, and that the appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course, this rule is not absolute.

Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, the Supreme Court has allowed a writ of certiorari (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (3) for certain special considerations, as public welfare or public policy; (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations

Calalang vs. CA

G.R. No. 103185 January 22, 1993

CONRADO CALALANG, petitioner, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK, respondents.

Respondent Filipinas Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money1against petitioner Conrado Calalang and 3 other defendants namely, Hugo M. Arca, Rio Arturo Salceda and the Acropolis Trading Corporation with the Court of First Instance.

Petitioner, after having been served with summons on May 19, 1980, filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 2, 1980. The other summoned defendant, Hugo M. Arca, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on June 5, 1980. The two other defendants namely, the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda were also summoned but only a clerk-employee of the Acropolis Trading Corporation received the summons while Arturo R. Salceda was no longer residing at his given address.

Over a year after, the Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted. Meanwhile, the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner Calalang was left unresolved. The last pleading filed regarding the Motion to Dismiss was the reply of petitioner Calalang to the opposition to the motion to dismiss by respondent bank

This case has been set several times for pre-trial. Petitioner Calalang moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent bank failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time.

Issue: WON there was failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.

Held:

To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial processes.

In Marahay vs. Melicor, the Court set forth the test for dismissal of a case due to failure to prosecute, to wit:

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

Dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion, however, must not be abused. Thus, courts may not enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case. The availability of this recourse must be determined according to each case's procedural history, situation at the time of the dismissal and whether, and under the circumstances of the particular case, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.

Delgado vs. CA

[G. R. No. 137881. December 21, 2004]

ISAAC DELGADO and FERNANDO DELGADO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ZACARIAS LIMPANGOG, REMEGIO LAGUNA, SANTIAGO BALORO, CAMILO EVANGELISTA, NEMESIO AMORES and RUSTICO RUIZO, respondents.

Plaintiffs alleged that they are duly registered and recognized, as tenants, by the DAR on parcel of ricelands owned by defendant Isaac Delgado, duly administered by his son, defendant Fernando Delgado. They started plowing and tilling these ricelands sometime in 1962 upon the authorization of defendant Isaac Delgado wherein they were appointed as tenants.

From 1962 up to 1981, plaintiffs and defendant Isaac Delgado shared the produce of the ricelands through their labor and hardship on a 50-50 basis. The sharing arrangement was, later on, changed, sometime in 1982, to 1/4-3/4 basis, in favor of the plaintiffs. The new sharing agreement, however, was not accepted by the defendants in spite of the fact that it was in accordance with the provisions of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. Because of defendants’ refusal, plaintiffs were compelled to sell their share and deposited the proceeds with the Philippine National Bank for its safekeeping.

After the effectivity of PD 27, the subject land being devoted to the production of rice, was covered by Operation Land Transfer for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. Plaintiffs were identified by the DAR as the qualified beneficiaries on their respective portion of the land. As a consequence, Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), in their respective names, were generated and issued.

Defendants destroyed and razed to the grounds the newly sprouted rice plants, which they planted, to their great prejudice and embarrassment. Defendant Fernando Delgado threatened them, by pointing a gun, and warned them to stop tilling and cultivating the subject land resulting in their ejectment thereon. Because of these unlawful acts, plaintiffs were deprived of their share of the produce of the land.

Defendants raised that Defendants pointed out that plaintiffs filed before the RTC a case for Reinstatement with Damages against them involving the subject land. This case was subsequently dismissed and plaintiffs filed the same action for Reinstatement with Damages before the Lower Board.

Issue: WON the present action should be dismissed on ground of res judicata.

Held:

There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the RTC case that the dismissal was without prejudice. In accordance, therefore, with the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Dismissal by the order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.

Such dismissal is without prejudice. As held in Vallangca vs. Court of Appeals, a dismissal order is generally deemed to be without prejudice to the filing of another action. The only instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when the order itself so states. Stated differently, when the court issues, upon the plaintiff’s instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without prejudice.
The dismissal of the agrarian case by the RTC on motion of plaintiffs-respondents did not constitute res judicata inasmuch as the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.

The principle of res judicata does not apply when the dismissal of the earlier complaint, involving the same plaintiffs, same subject matter, same theory and the same defendants, was made without prejudice to its refiling at a future date, or in a different venue, as in this case. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had not been commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the same subject matter.

Neither can respondents be held guilty of abandonment. Abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the intent to abandon a right or claim and the second being the external act by which that intention is expressed and carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. These requirements are clearly lacking in the present case. There is nothing in the record to show a deliberate intent to discontinue the suit without intention of refiling the same. This inference of abandonment is belied by the fact that respondents filed the proper case in the Provincial Adjudication Board. Abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of the same action in the appropriate forum.