[G. R. No. 137881. December 21, 2004]
ISAAC DELGADO and FERNANDO DELGADO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ZACARIAS LIMPANGOG, REMEGIO LAGUNA, SANTIAGO BALORO, CAMILO EVANGELISTA, NEMESIO AMORES and RUSTICO RUIZO, respondents.
Plaintiffs alleged that they are duly registered and recognized, as tenants, by the DAR on parcel of ricelands owned by defendant Isaac Delgado, duly administered by his son, defendant Fernando Delgado. They started plowing and tilling these ricelands sometime in 1962 upon the authorization of defendant Isaac Delgado wherein they were appointed as tenants.
From 1962 up to 1981, plaintiffs and defendant Isaac Delgado shared the produce of the ricelands through their labor and hardship on a 50-50 basis. The sharing arrangement was, later on, changed, sometime in 1982, to 1/4-3/4 basis, in favor of the plaintiffs. The new sharing agreement, however, was not accepted by the defendants in spite of the fact that it was in accordance with the provisions of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. Because of defendants’ refusal, plaintiffs were compelled to sell their share and deposited the proceeds with the Philippine National Bank for its safekeeping.
After the effectivity of PD 27, the subject land being devoted to the production of rice, was covered by Operation Land Transfer for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. Plaintiffs were identified by the DAR as the qualified beneficiaries on their respective portion of the land. As a consequence, Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), in their respective names, were generated and issued.
Defendants destroyed and razed to the grounds the newly sprouted rice plants, which they planted, to their great prejudice and embarrassment. Defendant Fernando Delgado threatened them, by pointing a gun, and warned them to stop tilling and cultivating the subject land resulting in their ejectment thereon. Because of these unlawful acts, plaintiffs were deprived of their share of the produce of the land.
Defendants raised that Defendants pointed out that plaintiffs filed before the RTC a case for Reinstatement with Damages against them involving the subject land. This case was subsequently dismissed and plaintiffs filed the same action for Reinstatement with Damages before the Lower Board.
Issue: WON the present action should be dismissed on ground of res judicata.
Held:
There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the RTC case that the dismissal was without prejudice. In accordance, therefore, with the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Dismissal by the order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
Such dismissal is without prejudice. As held in Vallangca vs. Court of Appeals, a dismissal order is generally deemed to be without prejudice to the filing of another action. The only instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when the order itself so states. Stated differently, when the court issues, upon the plaintiff’s instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without prejudice.
The dismissal of the agrarian case by the RTC on motion of plaintiffs-respondents did not constitute res judicata inasmuch as the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
The principle of res judicata does not apply when the dismissal of the earlier complaint, involving the same plaintiffs, same subject matter, same theory and the same defendants, was made without prejudice to its refiling at a future date, or in a different venue, as in this case. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had not been commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the same subject matter.
Neither can respondents be held guilty of abandonment. Abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the intent to abandon a right or claim and the second being the external act by which that intention is expressed and carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. These requirements are clearly lacking in the present case. There is nothing in the record to show a deliberate intent to discontinue the suit without intention of refiling the same. This inference of abandonment is belied by the fact that respondents filed the proper case in the Provincial Adjudication Board. Abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of the same action in the appropriate forum.
ISAAC DELGADO and FERNANDO DELGADO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ZACARIAS LIMPANGOG, REMEGIO LAGUNA, SANTIAGO BALORO, CAMILO EVANGELISTA, NEMESIO AMORES and RUSTICO RUIZO, respondents.
Plaintiffs alleged that they are duly registered and recognized, as tenants, by the DAR on parcel of ricelands owned by defendant Isaac Delgado, duly administered by his son, defendant Fernando Delgado. They started plowing and tilling these ricelands sometime in 1962 upon the authorization of defendant Isaac Delgado wherein they were appointed as tenants.
From 1962 up to 1981, plaintiffs and defendant Isaac Delgado shared the produce of the ricelands through their labor and hardship on a 50-50 basis. The sharing arrangement was, later on, changed, sometime in 1982, to 1/4-3/4 basis, in favor of the plaintiffs. The new sharing agreement, however, was not accepted by the defendants in spite of the fact that it was in accordance with the provisions of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. Because of defendants’ refusal, plaintiffs were compelled to sell their share and deposited the proceeds with the Philippine National Bank for its safekeeping.
After the effectivity of PD 27, the subject land being devoted to the production of rice, was covered by Operation Land Transfer for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. Plaintiffs were identified by the DAR as the qualified beneficiaries on their respective portion of the land. As a consequence, Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), in their respective names, were generated and issued.
Defendants destroyed and razed to the grounds the newly sprouted rice plants, which they planted, to their great prejudice and embarrassment. Defendant Fernando Delgado threatened them, by pointing a gun, and warned them to stop tilling and cultivating the subject land resulting in their ejectment thereon. Because of these unlawful acts, plaintiffs were deprived of their share of the produce of the land.
Defendants raised that Defendants pointed out that plaintiffs filed before the RTC a case for Reinstatement with Damages against them involving the subject land. This case was subsequently dismissed and plaintiffs filed the same action for Reinstatement with Damages before the Lower Board.
Issue: WON the present action should be dismissed on ground of res judicata.
Held:
There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the RTC case that the dismissal was without prejudice. In accordance, therefore, with the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Dismissal by the order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
Such dismissal is without prejudice. As held in Vallangca vs. Court of Appeals, a dismissal order is generally deemed to be without prejudice to the filing of another action. The only instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when the order itself so states. Stated differently, when the court issues, upon the plaintiff’s instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without prejudice.
The dismissal of the agrarian case by the RTC on motion of plaintiffs-respondents did not constitute res judicata inasmuch as the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
The principle of res judicata does not apply when the dismissal of the earlier complaint, involving the same plaintiffs, same subject matter, same theory and the same defendants, was made without prejudice to its refiling at a future date, or in a different venue, as in this case. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had not been commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the same subject matter.
Neither can respondents be held guilty of abandonment. Abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the intent to abandon a right or claim and the second being the external act by which that intention is expressed and carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. These requirements are clearly lacking in the present case. There is nothing in the record to show a deliberate intent to discontinue the suit without intention of refiling the same. This inference of abandonment is belied by the fact that respondents filed the proper case in the Provincial Adjudication Board. Abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of the same action in the appropriate forum.
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