Bonilla vs. Barcena

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, petitioners, 
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra,respondents. 

Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

Defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein

Fortunata Barcena died and counsel for the plaintiff asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

Counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether substitution is allowed?

Held:

While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.

Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law.  The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.


Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted

Sps. Renato & Angelina Lantin vs. Hon. Jane Aurora Lantion

G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006

Sps. Renato & Angelina Lantin vs. Hon. Jane Aurora Lantion

Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin took several peso and dollar loans from respondent Planters Development Bank and executed several real estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. They defaulted on the payments so respondent bank foreclosed the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed properties, in partial satisfaction of petitioners debt, were sold at a public auction where the respondent bank was the winning bidder. On November 8, 2003, petitioners filed against Planters Development Bank and its officers Elizabeth Umali, Alice Perce and Jelen Mosca (private respondents), a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. 

Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.

According to the petitioners, the venue stipulation in the loan documents is not an exclusive venue stipulation under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

 The pertinent provisions of the several real estate mortgages and promissory notes executed by the petitioner respectively read as follows:

18. In the event of suit arising out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes of auction (sic) exclusively in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by the Mortgagee,the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other venue.

I/We further submit that the venue of any legal action arising out of this note shall exclusively be at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila, Philippines or any other venue chosen by the BANK, waiving for this purpose any other venue provided by the Rules of Court

Issue: Whether or not there is improper venue?

Held:

Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

The words exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements

Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015       Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982.

Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.

When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed; (2) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (3) their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent had been declared void ab initio.

The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC

Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.

Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The process server’s return only contained a general statement that substituted service was resorted to “after several futile attempts to serve the same personally,” without stating the dates and reasons of the failed attempts.

In his Comment, filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the server’s return satisfactorily stated the reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002; and it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was sent to the same address which she declared in this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

Held: Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of summons, to wit:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

 (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met and there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The decision in Civil Case must be declared null and void.

The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses." Although the decision in Civil Case was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone. Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.

UST, et. al vs. Danes B. Sanchez

G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010 

A Complaint for  Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of Records (ToR). 

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelors Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. Respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrars Office, paid the required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite repeated attempts by the respondent to secure a copy of his ToR, and submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment, UST refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release respondents ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. They claimed that the respondents graduation, attendance in classes, and taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he failed to enroll during the second semester of school year 2000-2001.

Petitioners then filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint. Petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies.

Issues:

1)           The CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondents demand for the release of his ToR. Thus, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies;

 2)           Since respondent sought recourse with both the CHED and the RTC, respondent violated the rule against forum-shopping; and

 3)           The Complaint failed to state a cause of action, since respondent admitted that he was not enrolled in UST in the last three semesters prior to graduation.

Held:

1.   1.   The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action.

In this case, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the CHED is mandatory or even possible in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners liability if any for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. The Supreme Court held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology

x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of .Administrative agencies are not courts; x x x neither [are they] part of the judicial system, [or] deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. 

In addition, the rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.

2.   2.   Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Here, there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial power, and cannot make any disposition of the case whether favorable or otherwise. 

3.3.      Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. To clarify the essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained that the test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is whether admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Stated otherwise, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.

The Complaint makes the following essential allegations: that petitioners unjustifiably refused to release respondents ToR despite his having obtained a degree from UST; that petitioners claim that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue; that as a result of petitioners unlawful actions, respondent has not been able to take the nursing board exams since 2002; that petitioners actions violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and that petitioners should be ordered to release respondents ToR and held liable for P400,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of suit, and P15,000.00 as actual damages. Clearly, assuming that the facts alleged in the Complaint are true, the RTC would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the Complaint.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 02

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 02

OPERATIONALIZING IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND THE STATE POLICIES TO FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND PROVIDING GUIDELINES THEREFOR

WHEREAS, pursuant to Article 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest, subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law;

WHEREAS, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;

WHEREAS, the incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free and open exchange of information in a democracy, meant to enhance transparency and accountability in government official acts, transactions, or decisions;

WHEREAS, the Executive Branch recognizes the urgent need to operationalize these Constitutional provisions;

WHEREAS, the President, under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, has control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, and the duty to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed;

WHEREAS, the Data Privacy Act of 2012 (R.A. 10173), including its implementing Rules and Regulations, strengthens the fundamental human right of privacy, and of communication while ensuring the free flow of information to promote innovation and growth;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Definition. For the purpose of this Executive Order, the following terms shall mean:

(a) “Information” shall mean any records, documents, papers, reports, letters, contracts, minutes and transcripts of official meetings, maps, books, photographs, data, research materials, films, sound and video recording, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data, computer stored data, any other like or similar data or materials recorded, stored or archived in whatever format, whether offline or online, which are made, received, or kept in or under the control and custody of any government office pursuant to law, executive order, and rules and regulations or in connection with the performance or transaction of official business by any government office.

(b) “Official record/records” shall refer to information produced or received by a public officer or employee, or by a government office in an official capacity or pursuant to a public function or duty.

(c) “Public record/records” shall include information required by laws, executive orders, rules, or regulations to be entered, kept and made publicly available by a government office.

SECTION 2. Coverage. This order shall cover all government offices under the Executive Branch, including but not limited to the national government and all its offices, departments, bureaus, offices, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state universities and colleges. Local government units (LGUs) are encouraged to observe and be guided by this Order.

SECTION 3. Access to information. Every Filipino shall have access to information, official records, public records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development.

SECTION 4. Exception. Access to information shall be denied when the information falls under any of the exceptions enshrined in the Constitution, existing law or jurisprudence.

The Department of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General are hereby directed to prepare an inventory of such exceptions and submit the same to the Office of the President within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of effectivity of this Order.

The Office of the President shall thereafter, immediately circularize the inventory of exceptions for the guidance of all government offices and instrumentalities covered by this Order and the general public.

Said inventory of exceptions shall periodically be updated to properly reflect any change in existing law and jurisprudence and the Department of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General are directed to update the inventory of exceptions as the need to do so arises, for circularization as hereinabove stated.

SECTION 5. Availability of SALN. Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 3 and 4 of this Order, all public officials are reminded of their obligation to file and make available for scrutiny their Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, and the spirit and letter of this Order.

SECTION 6. Application and Interpretation. There shall be a legal presumption in favor of access to information, public records and official records. No request for information shall be denied unless it clearly falls under any of the exceptions listed in the inventory or updated inventory of exceptions circularized by the Office of the President provided in the preceding section.

The determination of the applicability of any of the exceptions to the request shall be the responsibility of the Head of the Office which is in custody or control of the information, public record or official record, or the responsible central or field officer duly designated by him in writing.

In making such determination, the Head of the Office or his designated officer shall exercise reasonable diligence to ensure that no exception shall be used or availed of to deny any request for information or access to public records, or official records if the denial is intended primarily and purposely to cover up a crime, wrongdoing, graft or corruption.

SECTION 7. Protection of Privacy. While providing access to information, public records, and official records, responsible officials shall afford full protection to the right to privacy of the individual as follows:

(a) Each government office per Section 2 hereof shall ensure that personal information in its custody or under its control is disclosed or released only if it is material or relevant to the subject-matter of the request and its disclosure is permissible under this order or existing law, rules or regulations;

(b) Each government office must protect personal information in its custody or control by making reasonable security arrangements against leaks or premature disclosure of personal information which unduly exposes the individual whose personal information is requested, to vilification, harassment or any other wrongful acts.

(c) Any employee, official or director of a government office per Section 2 hereof who has access, authorized or unauthorized, to personal information in the custody of the office, must not disclose that information except when authorized under this order or pursuant to existing laws, rules or regulation.

SECTION 8. People’s Freedom to Information (FOI) Manual. For the effective implementation of this Order, every government office is directed to prepare within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days from the effectivity of this Order, its own People’s FOI Manual, which shall include among others the following provisions:

(a) The location and contact information of the head, regional, provincial, and field offices, and other established places where the public can obtain information or submit requests;
(b) The person or office responsible for receiving requests for information;
(c) The procedure for the filing and processing of the request as specified in the succeeding section 8 of this Order.
(d) The standard forms for the submission of requests and for the proper acknowledgment of requests;
(e) The process for the disposition of requests;
(f) The procedure for the administrative appeal of any denial for access to information; and
(g) The schedule of applicable fees.

SECTION 9. Procedure. The following procedure shall govern the filing and processing of request for access to information:

(a) Any person who requests access to information shall submit a written request to the government office concerned. The request shall state the name and contact information of the requesting party, provide valid proof of his identification or authorization, reasonably describe the information requested, and the reason for, or purpose of, the request for information: Provided, that no request shall be denied or refused acceptance unless the reason for the request is contrary to law, existing rules and regulations or it is one of the exceptions contained in the inventory or updated inventory of exception as hereinabove provided.

(b) The public official receiving the request shall provide reasonable assistance, free of charge, to enable, to enable all requesting parties and particularly those with special needs, to comply with the request requirements under this Section.

(c) The request shall be stamped by the government office, indicating the date and time of receipt and the name, rank, title and position of the receiving public officer or employee with the corresponding signature, and a copy thereof furnished to the requesting party. Each government office shall establish a system to trace the status of all requests for information received by it.

(d) The government office shall respond to a request fully compliant with requirements of sub-section (a) hereof as soon as practicable but not exceeding fifteen (15) working days from the receipt thereof. The response mentioned above refers to the decision of the agency or office concerned to grant or deny access to the information requested.

(e) The period to respond may be extended whenever the information requested requires extensive search of the government office’s records facilities, examination of voluminous records, the occurrence of fortuitous cases or other analogous cases. The government office shall notify the person making the request of the extension, setting forth the reasons for such extension. In no case shall the extension go beyond twenty (20) working days unless exceptional circumstances warrant a longer period.

(f) Once a decision is made to grant the request, the person making the request shall be notified of such decision and directed to pay any applicable fees.

SECTION 10. Fees. Government offices shall not charge any fee for accepting requests for access to information. They may, however, charge a reasonable fee to reimburse necessary costs, including actual costs of reproduction and copying of the information required, subject to existing rules and regulations. In no case shall the applicable fees be so onerous as to defeat the purpose of this Order.

SECTION 11. Identical or Substantially Similar Requests. The government office shall not be required to act upon an unreasonable subsequent identical or substantially similar request from the same requesting party whose request from the same requesting party whose request has already been previously granted or denied by the same government office.

SECTION 12. Notice of Denial. If the government office decides to deny the request, in whole or in part, it shall as soon as practicable, in any case within fifteen (15) working days from the receipt of the request, notify the requesting party the denial in writing. The notice shall clearly set forth the ground or grounds for denial and the circumstances on which the denial is based. Failure to notify the requesting party of the action taken on the request within the period herein stipulated shall be deemed a denial of the request for access to information.

SECTION 13. Remedies in Cases of Denial of Request for Access to Information.
(a) Denial of any request for access to information may be appealed to the person or office next higher in the authority, following the procedure mentioned in Section 7 (f) of this Order: Provided, that the written appeal must be filed by the same person making the request within fifteen (15) working days from the notice of denial or from the lapse of the relevant period to respond to the request.

(b) The appeal be decided by the person or office next higher in authority within thirty (30) working days from the filing of said written appeal. Failure of such person or office to decide within the afore-stated period shall be deemed a denial of the appeal.

(c) Upon exhaustion of administrative appeal remedies, the requesting part may file the appropriate case in the proper courts in accordance with the Rules of Court.

SECTION 14. Keeping of Records. Subject to existing laws, rules, and regulations, government offices shall create and/or maintain accurate and reasonably complete records of important information in appropriate formats, and implement a records management system that facilitates easy identification, retrieval and communication of information to the public.

SECTION 15. Administrative Liability. Failure to comply with the provisions of this Order may be a ground for administrative and disciplinary sanctions against any erring public officer or employee as provided under existing laws or regulations.

SECTION 16. Implementing Details. All government offices in the Executive Branch are directed to formulate their respective implementing details taking into consideration their mandates and the nature of information in their custody or control, within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of this Order.

SECTION 17. Separability Clause. If any section or part of this Order is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions not otherwise affected shall remain in full force or effect.

SECTION 18. Repealing Clause. All orders, rules and regulations, issuances or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly: Provided, that the provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 78 (s. 1964), as amended, shall not be deemed repealed pending further review.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Order shall take effect immediately upon publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

DONE, in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of July in the year of our Lord two thousand and sixteen.

(Sgd.) RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE
President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA
Executive Secretary

E.O No. 02

johnson and johnson vs. ca

[G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996]

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M. VINLUAN,respondents.

This case was initiated in the trial court by a complaint^[3] filed by petitioner against spouses Delilah A. Vinluan, owner of Vinluan Enterprises, and her husband Capt. Alejo M. Vinluan (the private respondent before us), for collection of a sum of money with damages

The plaintiff-respondent Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of various cosmetics, health, and body care products, as well as medical drugs. On several occasions in the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the plaintiff-respondent corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products, among others. The defendants, under the name and style of 'Vinluan Enterprises,' thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89, for which she issued seven (7) Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates. When presented on their respective due dates, however, the checks given in payment of the obligation bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the accommodations given by the plaintiff-respondent corporation by granting several extensions to the defendant spouses to settle the obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the defendants made a partial payment of P5,000.00, thereby reducing their principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no further payments were made to settle the obligation despite repeated demands, the plaintiff-respondent corporation was constrained to file a complaint on June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation plus interest, with damages.

Issue: May a husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership? May a judgment declaring a wife solely liable, be executed upon conjugal property, over the objection of the husband?

Held:

The respondent Court's original findings, had already become final and indisputable. The respondent Court already found that the defendant husband did not give his consent; neither did the obligation incurred by the defendant wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal partnership, as well as the defendant husband, cannot be held liable. As originally decreed by the Court, only the defendant wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Since the power of the court in execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant husband cannot be levied upon.

The consent of the husband is indeed vital in determining what properties shall be subsidiarily liable in the event the paraphernal properties of Delilah Vinluan should turn out to be insufficient to cover the judgment debt, as fully explained in the Order dated 24 July 1989.

Art. 122 of the Family Code which partly provides that --

The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose

G.R. No. L-7397 December 11, 1916

AMPARO NABLE JOSE, ET AL., STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK and CARMEN CASTRO, plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs.
MARIANO NABLE JOSE, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

The husband-administrator of the affairs of the conjugal partnership with his first wife, long after her death and after he had married a second time, executed a mortgage in favor of the Standard Oil Company on certain property, real and personal, to assure the payment of certain obligations assumed by him as agent of the company after the death of his first wife. It appears that a large part of this property was acquired during the first marriage, in the exclusive possession of the husband as administrator of the affairs of the conjugal partnership which has never been liquidated. It appears also that the title to all this property was in the name of the husband, the title to the real estate being registered in his name. It appears also that the Standard Oil Company had no knowledge at the time of the execution of the mortgage of the existence of a prior marriage, or that the mortgaged property was held by the husband as administrator of the conjugal property acquired during the former marriage.

Issue: what is the determination of the power of the husband to sell or mortgage the conjugal property pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership?

Held: Article 1393 of the Civil Code provides that:

The conjugal community shall always begin on the same day that the marriage is celebrated.

Any stipulation of the contrary shall be void.

Article 1417 of that Code provides that:

The conjugal community expires on the dissolution of the marriage or when it is declared null.

The consort who, on account of his or her bad faith, caused the nullity, shall not share any part of the property of the community.

The conjugal society shall also terminate in the cases specified in article 1433.

There is danger of confusion and error if any attempt is made to reason from a supposed analogy between his powers and those of an ordinary administrator or trustee. The only safe guide is the law which defines his duties and prescribes the mode in which they are to be performed. The law prescribes his duties with relation to the conjugal property, which consist substantially of the preparation of an inventory, the payment of the debts, and the distribution of the net remainder. But how the debts shall be paid and how the "net remainder" of the property shall be distributed the law does not attempt to direct. Articles 1418 to 1421, Civil Code. "The object to be accomplished is fixed, but the means of accomplishment," which "are as varied as the circumstances and discretion of men" are not indicated. To secure the object in view, he has the exclusive possession and control of the property, and in the performance of his duties, he is not subjected to the guidance or control of the courts (as is the ordinary administrator of the estate of a deceased person) except of course when fraud upon the rights of creditors or the heirs is alleged and proven.

The duty to pay debts and obligations of the partnership imposed in Article 1423 of the Code carries with it by necessary implication the right to realize the funds necessary for that purpose from the property charged with the debts. But the law nowhere prescribes how this shall be done or what property shall be sold or mortgaged, or in what order the debts shall be paid, or what compromises or settlements the liquidator may accept, or how the debts shall be ascertained. Since he is personally liable for the debts, he may pay all or any part of them from his personal funds, and reimburse himself from the partnership property. No judicial authorization or approval of such sales is required, whether the property sold is real or personal. In a word, the husband, as liquidator, is left absolutely free, in the exercise of his uncontrolled discretion, to provide for the payment of the debts from the partnership funds in such manner as he sees fit.

Such powers in the disposition of the partnership property necessarily carry with them the power to make a good and valid title to both real and personal property, otherwise the full value of the property sold would seldom be realized, and in many instances the power to sell would be wholly illusory.

We conclude therefore that the husband, acting as liquidator of the conjugal partnership, and charged with the payment of the community debts, may sell or mortgage all or any part of the conjugal property, real or personal, in the fulfillment of the duties imposed upon him and give good and valid title to the purchaser or mortgagee.

It would be inconsistent with the breadth and power of the discretion conferred upon the husband to hold that purchases from him of personal or real estate should be required, at their peril, to ascertain whether sales made by him are made in good faith for the purpose of the payment of the debts of the partnership, or to require such purchasers to see that the purchase price is in fact applied to the payment of such debts. The purchaser has the right to assume that in disposing of the property, the husband, as administrator, is proceeding according to law. And this is true even though the purchaser knows that the husband intends to apply the money for the payment of his own personal debts contracted after the dissolution of the partnership, because, as we have said already, the husband may pay the partnership debts out of his private funds and reimburse himself from the partnership property. So far as the purchaser is concerned, he has the right to assume that when the husband liquidates or sells partnership property and applies the proceeds to the payment of his personal debts, the transaction is merely the means adopted by the husband to reimburse himself for payments of partnership indebtedness theretofore made out of the husband's private funds.

It has been suggested that the power of the husband to sell real or personal property and to give good and valid title thereto may also be inferred from the uncontrolled discretion which is claimed for the husband in determining whether he will distribute the property in kind, or sell all the property, and after payment of debts, distribute the net remainder in cash. We do not deem it necessary, however, to discuss or decide the questions involved in this contention, because for the purposes of the case now pending before us, the power of the husband-administrator to sell the property for the payment of debts affords a sufficient foundation for the conclusion that he has the implied power to give good and valid title to any property in his possession and control as exclusive administrator of the community property.

But what are the effects upon the transactions of the husband with third parties of the perpetration of such frauds, or the attempt to perpetrate such frauds on the rights of the heirs? Manifestly, where third persons are in connivance with the husband-administrator or knowingly lend their aid or countenance, directly or indirectly, to the commission of such fraud, the court will see to it that they will not profit by their misconduct, and the fraud to which they are parties will vitiate and annul all such transaction.

The case is different, however, with innocent third person dealing with the husband in good faith, and with no knowledge of his misconduct in the discharge of his duties as administrator.

The law clothes the surviving husband with the exclusive possession and all the insignia of the power of disposal of the partnership property. It imposes upon him the duty and the right to sell all or any part of the property, which, in the exercise of his uncontrolled discretion, he may deem necessary in the performance of his duties as liquidator. It follows, that notwithstanding the possibility that the husband may have it in mind to make away with the proceeds of the sale and thus defraud the heirs, the purchaser in good faith must be held to take a good and valid title which cannot be set aside thereafter upon proof that in making the sale, or in the use made of the proceeds, the husband liquidator acted in fraud of the rights of the heirs. The heirs must seek their remedy against their father, who is accountable to them for their share of the "net remainder" of the partnership property, after the affairs of the partnership have been liquidated.

We think that it must be clear from what has been said already, that whatever claims the children of the deceased wife may have against their father, they cannot successfully challenge the validity of the mortgage to the Standard Oil Company.

In accepting the mortgage the company relied (as it had a right to do) upon the fact that the title to all of this property was in the name of the husband, and that he was clothed with all the insignia of power to dispose of it by sale or mortgage. The company had no means of ascertaining with certainty whether this property was or was not the individual property of the husband or conjugal property of the first or the second marriage. As a matter of fact, the company did not know that this property was a part of the conjugal property of the first marriage, but even had the company been advised of that fact, it had the right to assume, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that the husband was acting within his rights as exclusive administrator and that he had authority to see, mortgage or otherwise dispose of it, either for the purpose of securing funds for the payment of the partnership debts, or to reimburse himself for the payment of such debts from his own personal funds.

The trial court recognized the right of the children to intervene in this action and to have the mortgage of the conjugal property declared invalid as to their interest therein, which he held to amount to a one-half undivided interest in the mortgage property. But from what has been said it is clear that the trial court erred in recognizing the claims of the heirs of the firs wife of Mariano Nable Jose to a one-half undivided share of the specific property mortgaged by him to the Standard Oil Company, which was alleged to be a part of the conjugal property acquired by the conjugal partnership composed of Mariano Nable Jose and his first wife; and further, that the trial court erred in declaring the mortgage invalid in so far as it affects the one-half undivided share of said property, which the court erroneously held to be the property of these heirs, and in rendering a money judgment in their favor for the sum of P750 on account of rents and the proceeds of the sale of a part of these properties as set forth in the final section of the judgment entered in the court below.