Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015       Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982.

Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.

When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed; (2) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (3) their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent had been declared void ab initio.

The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC

Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.

Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The process server’s return only contained a general statement that substituted service was resorted to “after several futile attempts to serve the same personally,” without stating the dates and reasons of the failed attempts.

In his Comment, filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the server’s return satisfactorily stated the reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002; and it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was sent to the same address which she declared in this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

Held: Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of summons, to wit:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

 (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met and there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The decision in Civil Case must be declared null and void.


The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses." Although the decision in Civil Case was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone. Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.

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