Toyota vs. CA

[G.R. No. 126321. October 23, 1997]
TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.

Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra and paid by means of Check in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored. Petitioner requested that Guevarra should make good the check.  Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address thru his sister-in-law by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. Respondent failed to answer of the complaint and was declared default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

Respondent petition the CA for the nullification of the ex-parte judgement and claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him.

Issue:
 WON the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by failure to serve summon in his person.

Held:
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.

Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law.

In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, the SC say that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriffs return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed therein.

The SC, however, has elucidated that evidence must in such a case be duly presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted service. Hence -
The private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioners separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with.

And, in Keister vs. Navarro, the Court said:
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.

The summons must be served to the defendant in person.  It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.  Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.  This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is `in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.  Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.

Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him. 
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served. Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that Irregularities of this kind substituted service might be cured by proof that the copies have actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.

The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the private respondent of his right to due process.

Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015       Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982.

Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.

When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed; (2) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (3) their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent had been declared void ab initio.

The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC

Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.

Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The process server’s return only contained a general statement that substituted service was resorted to “after several futile attempts to serve the same personally,” without stating the dates and reasons of the failed attempts.

In his Comment, filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the server’s return satisfactorily stated the reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002; and it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was sent to the same address which she declared in this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

Held: Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of summons, to wit:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

 (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met and there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The decision in Civil Case must be declared null and void.

The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses." Although the decision in Civil Case was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone. Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.