NPC vs. Comelec

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two individuals who are candidates for office in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

Petitioners argued that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional?

RULING:

Yes. 

Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The COMELEC may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled subdivision and its subsidiary.” 

The COMELEC has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." The provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period.

The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. It is designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution for it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.