Edding vs. Comelec

NORBI H. EDDING VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND PABLO BERNARDO

G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995

FACTS:

 Petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga Del Norte during the May 1992 elections. After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over Edding by 212 votes.  Unconvinced and alleging massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June 9, 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga  Del Norte docketed as Election Case No. SE-10. Upon termination of the protest proceedings and recounting of the ballots, the RTC rendered judgment on July 2, 1993 proclaiming Edding as the winner of the election for the mayoralty seat of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, and declaring as null and void the election of respondent Bernardo so that on July 15, 1993, Edding assumed office and replaced Bernardo.

On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as SPR No. 5-93 seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due course to the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order on July 19, 1993.

ISSUE:

 Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.

RULING:

 This court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides as follows: "SEC. 50. Definition. - x x x The commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases."

COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, invoking Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part: "Sec. 2. The commission on elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: x x x (2) xxx appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. xxx Sec. 3. The commission on elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election case, including pre-proclamation controversies.  x x x"

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.  

Relampagos vs. Cumba and Comelec

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, VS. 

ROSITA C. CUMBA AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan Del Norte.  The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.

 

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.

 

As a result, the private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution.  The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.

 

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution stating that, the Commission has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby granted and that the Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared null and void and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 is lifted.

ISSUE:

 Whether Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

RULING:

 Yes. 

We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: “The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases” remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.  Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

 

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction

Guevara vs. Gimenez

GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA vs. THE HONORABLE PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, as the Auditor General of the Philippines and ISMAEL MATHAY, as the Auditor of the Central Bank

G.R. NO. L-17115           November 30, 1962

FACTS:

On or about September 1, 1959, Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines asked petitioner Guillermo Guevara to cooperate with the legal counsel of the Central Bank in defending the same and its Monetary Board in a Civil Case filed against them by R. Marino Corpus. Petitioner entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents in said case. 

Governor Cuaderno urged petitioner to submit a proposal setting forth the terms and conditions under which his professional services were being rendered, and petitioner stated that his professional fees would be as follows: "retainer's fee of P10,000, plus a per diem of P300 for every hearing or trial. In precise of appeal to the Supreme Court and another fee of P5,000.00". Governor Cuaderno accepted the proposal, as regards the retainer's fee and the per diem of petitioner's appearance in said case. 

Petitioner had sent to the Central Bank his bill for the retainer's fee of P10,000. The Bank Auditor sought advice from the Auditor General, who stated that he would not object to said retainer's fees of P10,000, provided that its payment was made "not in lump sum as causes or circumstances may arise which may prevent Judge Guevara from proceeding or continuing as counsel of the Bank in the aforesaid case before it is finally terminated", but, in installments with the understanding that, "in case there is no appeal from the CFI decision, the balance will be paid in full the decision has become final. As regards the P300 per diem, the Auditor General express the belief that it is "excessive and may be allowed in audit". 

Hence, the present action for mandamus filed on July 6, 1960, to compel respondent to approve payment of petitioner's retainer fee of P10,000 and his per diem aggregating P3,300, for the eleven (11) hearings attended by him. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has the duty to pass in audit and approved the payment of the amounts claimed by the petitioner?

RULING:

Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution. Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do so more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary.

Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA | CASE DIGEST

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR THROUGH ITS GOVERNOR, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN AND PROVINCIAL TREASURER, VS. 

COURT OF APPEALS AND TITO B. DATO

G.R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995

On October 12, 1972, private respondent Tito Dato was granted a temporary appointment as Assistant Provincial Warden by then Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr which was renewed annually. On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards.  Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to.  His appointment therefore remained temporary.

On March 16, 1976, private respondent Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. After a period, Dato was acquitted of the charges against him and requested the Governor for reinstatement and back wages but was denied. As consequence, Dato filed an action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur which renders decision in his favor.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. In due course, petitioner, Province of Camarines Sur appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
 Whether private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur thus entitled to benefits.

RULING:
 No.  The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service Commission.  CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it.  It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee.  The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it must so attest.  If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases.

Based on the foregoing, private respondent Tito Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to the relief he seeks, including his claim for back wages for the entire period of his suspension.

Gallardo vs. Tabamo

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVES, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO, AND NOEL NAVARRO VS. HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 28 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, AND PEDRO P. ROMUALDO 

G.R. No. 104848, January 29, 1993

FACTS:

 This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners would have us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus  with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit, docketed therein as Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order because the case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of the private respondent in issuing the Temporary Restraining Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465

RULING:

 Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage -- the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

 

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:

"1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

 The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.

 

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.”

The present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission on Elections broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. 

Lindo vs. Comelec

CONRADO C. LINDO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, OCTAVIO D. VELASCO AND THE HON. ENRIQUE ALMARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH XV, TRECE MARTIRES CITY

G.R. No. 95016, February 11, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private respondent Octavio D. Velasco were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Ternate, Cavite, in the January 18, 1988 local elections.  After canvass, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate proclaimed petitioner Lindo as the elected mayor of Ternate on January 19, 1988. However, Velasco filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, with station at Trece Martires City. After hearing the testimonies of the respective chairmen of the four controverted precincts, the trial court issued an order on November 11, 1988 excluding the ballots from these precincts from the revision.  

Velasco filed a motion for reconsideration of the order which was denied on December 9, 1988. As a result, Velasco filed a Notice of Appeal to the COMELEC on February 17, 1990 alleging that the winner in an election protest case should be determined not only on the basis of the results obtained from the contested precincts but from the results of both the contested and uncontested precincts.  

 On June 6, 1990, after hearing the arguments of the parties and after the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the COMELEC rendered its decision declaring Octavio Velasco as the duly elected mayor of Ternate, Cavite and directed Conrado Lindo to vacate the said Office of Mayor of Ternate, Cavite and to turn over the same to Protestant Octavio D. Velasco.

ISSUE:

 Whether the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion for disregarding its own rules regarding promulgation of a decision in election protest cases.

RULING:

No.  

Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel. It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.  It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court.

The rule referred to in this case is Section 20 of Rule 35 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which provides: "Sec. 20.  Promulgation and Finality of Decision.  - The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties.  It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation.  No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained."

The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation.  Hence, we do not agree with petitioner's contention that there was no promulgation of the trial court's decision.  The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public.  From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioner himself.  Another copy was sent to private respondent.

 

A procedural lapse or error should be distinguished from lack of jurisdiction.  In the former, the proceedings are null and void if and when the error is shown to have caused harm while in the latter, the proceedings are null and void unconditionally.

Further, this case had been pending with respondent trial court for almost two (2) years where the herein petitioner had all the opportunities to be heard and was in fact heard.  Election protests are supposed to be summary in nature.  That is why the law (Art. 258 of BP 881) and the rules (Sec. 18, Rule 35, Comelec Rules of Procedure) require that every case, election protests shall be decided within six (6) months after its filing.  The proceedings should not be allowed to drag on during the term of the contested position with the result that the elected would be deprived of his right to the office and the defeated would discharge the office which he was not entitled to.

Umil vs. Ramos

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

PER CURIAM

 "In all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied."

There are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid information’s filed in court against them.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the information’s filed against them are null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ rights were violated?

RULING:

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui  thus:

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid information’s filed against them in court.

People vs. Sucro

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON SUCRO

G.R. No. 93239             March 18, 1991

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.

Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

The team intercept Macabante and appellant. The police were able to recover from appellant sticks and teabag of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabente.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

ISSUE: whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful.

RULING: YES

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.

The fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.

The SC earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.

As the Solicitor General has pointed out:

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.  

What law was enacted today?

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.

WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens;

WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said Constitution took effect;

WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and

WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: 1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may require Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.

The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree.

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.

 (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary

People vs. Rodrigueza

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DON RODRIGUEZA

G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992

REGALADO, J.:

The purpose of buy-bust operation is to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.

A confidential informant told the police officers that there is an on-going illegal traffic of prohibited drugs therein Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct buy-bust operation.  CIC Taduran acted as poseur buyer and was able to buy 100grams of marijuana from appellant.  The CIC Taduran reported to Major Zeidem that he was able to purchase marijuana. Based on the information they have formed a team to apprehend appellant. The Officers were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused.

Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant.  During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant.

ISSUE: Was the act of the Police Officers valid?

RULING: NO.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.  Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.

In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law.

As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority.  True, in some instances, the Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;  when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant.

In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.