Gallardo vs. Tabamo

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVES, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO, AND NOEL NAVARRO VS. HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 28 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, AND PEDRO P. ROMUALDO 

G.R. No. 104848, January 29, 1993

FACTS:

 This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners would have us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus  with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit, docketed therein as Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order because the case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of the private respondent in issuing the Temporary Restraining Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465

RULING:

 Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage -- the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

 

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:

"1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

 The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure.

 

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.”

The present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission on Elections broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time.