[G.R. No. 126321. October 23, 1997]
TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.
Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra and paid by means of Check in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored. Petitioner requested that Guevarra should make good the check. Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.
The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address thru his sister-in-law by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. Respondent failed to answer of the complaint and was declared default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Respondent petition the CA for the nullification of the ex-parte judgement and claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him.
Issue:
WON the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by failure to serve summon in his person.
Held:
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.
Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law.
In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, the SC say that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriffs return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed therein.
The SC, however, has elucidated that evidence must in such a case be duly presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted service. Hence -
The private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioners separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with.
And, in Keister vs. Navarro, the Court said:
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.
The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is `in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him.
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served. Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that Irregularities of this kind substituted service might be cured by proof that the copies have actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.
The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the private respondent of his right to due process.
TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.
Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra and paid by means of Check in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored. Petitioner requested that Guevarra should make good the check. Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.
The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address thru his sister-in-law by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. Respondent failed to answer of the complaint and was declared default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Respondent petition the CA for the nullification of the ex-parte judgement and claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him.
Issue:
WON the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by failure to serve summon in his person.
Held:
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.
Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by law.
In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, the SC say that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriffs return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed therein.
The SC, however, has elucidated that evidence must in such a case be duly presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted service. Hence -
The private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioners separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with.
And, in Keister vs. Navarro, the Court said:
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.
The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is `in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him.
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served. Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that Irregularities of this kind substituted service might be cured by proof that the copies have actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.
The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the private respondent of his right to due process.
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