De Leon vs. PEA

G.R. No. 181970

BERNARDO DE LEON,

Petitioner,

-versus-

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted by the CITY OF PARAAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDO ORPILLA,

Respondents.

Petitioner Bernardo De Leon (De Leon) filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City against respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers, herein private respondents. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leons fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square meters which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises.

 The Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so that De Leons occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leons nebulous right of possession.

The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of Lot 5155.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution placing PEA in possession of the disputed property?

Held:

As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award.  The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.

However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated parties claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the improvements.

It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leons claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.

The Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance his case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context, but the same must be considered in its entirety.