catholic bishop of balanga vs. ca

G.R. No. 112519. November 14, 1996

CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA, represented by CRISPULO TORRICO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDO DE LEON, respondents.

The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land (Lot No. 1272, Balanga Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas, Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, having an area of 3,368 sq. m., more or less covered by OCT No. 14379 of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Bataan. With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by Catholic Bishop of Balanga registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975.

Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936, by virtue of the authority given him by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. 1272, the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the said church in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of 12.40 meters by 21.40 meters or 265.36 sq. m. (the subject property) of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church. Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused registration by the Register of Deeds. Six (6) years later, or in 1939, Ana de los Reyes died without issue.

Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject property to her nephew who had been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private respondent]. The latter immediately took possession of the property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon and, through the years, declared the land for taxation purposes as well as paid the taxes due thereon.

His possession of the subject property was never disturbed by anybody until plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] filed the instant complaint against him on 5 November 1985, or more than 49 years after the deed of donation was executed, alleging, among others, that: (1) during the Japanese occupation of the country, defendant-appellant [private respondent], without the knowledge and prior consent of the plaintiff-appellee [petitioner], and its predecessors-in-interest, entered and occupied the subject property, and (2) despite requests by plaintiff-appellee [petitioner], defendant-appellant [private respondent] refused to vacate the property in question. In support of the above contention, Crispulo Torrico, the sole witness and authorized representative of plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] testified, among others, that: the subject property is situated at the corner of Lot No. 1272, and defendant-appellant [private respondent] has, on the strength of the deed of donation, publicly claimed ownership and occupied the same as early as before the 2nd World War and has built his store thereon.

As his defense, defendant-appellant [private respondent] maintains that by virtue of the deed of donation of 23 August 1936 executed in favor of his predecessor-in-interest, he is the lawful owner of the subject property and the complaint states no cause of action as it was filed only to harass him.

Issue: WON the doctrine of laches apply in the case?

Held:

Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.

The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.

The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and  is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become stale, or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.

The following are the essential elements of laches:

(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of;

(2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;

(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.

On or some time before August 23, 1936, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, the parish priest and administrator of the church property in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, executed a deed of donation over a 265-square meter church lot in favor of Ana de los Reyes and her heirs in recognition of her long and satisfactory service to the church of Balanga, Bataan. For some reason or another, the said deed was refused registration by the Register of Deeds. However, she accepted the donation, indicated such acceptance in the said deed, occupied the donated property, and exercised acts of ownership thereupon.

In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had, however, given the subject property to her nephew who is the private respondent in the instant case. Upon acceptance of the gift, private respondent immediately took possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon, and thenceforth paid land taxes therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose.

The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present action is thus clearly his occupation since 1945 of the subject property in the concept of owner in continuation of the occupation of the same nature regarding the same property by the donee Ana de los Reyes starting in 1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of laches exists.

The second element also exists in this case. The second element is three-tiered: (a) knowledge of defendant’s action; (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit. Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the trial court, alleged that without its consent, private respondent entered and occupied the subject property during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore, petitioner was clearly aware of private respondent’s possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not also rebut the testimony of its own authorized representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico, that the subject property was so proximately located to the rest of petitioner’s church property as to foreclose assertion of ignorance of private respondent’s possession of the subject property, on the part of petitioner.

From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner actually commenced suit against private respondent, there was doubtlessly all the opportunity to file the appropriate action to have the donation of the subject property to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void and to demand reconveyance of said property from its present occupants.

Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40) years had to first pass by for petitioner to finally institute the appropriate court proceedings. As such, the second element of knowledge, opportunity to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is undoubtedly present in the instant controversy.

The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the record that impresses us as clear evidence of at least an inkling on the part of private respondent as to petitioners’ serious intention to revoke the donated property. There was neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any person who actually informed private respondent of petitioners’ intentions. In other words, private respondent manifestly had every reason to believe that, with the passing of almost half a century since his predecessor-in-interest accepted the donated property and without unambiguous intimation of petitioners’ non-recognition of such donation, he was secure in his possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.

In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent will suffer irreparable injury under the most unfair circumstances, were we to disregard petitioner’s inaction for more than 40 years in asserting its rights.

In applying the doctrine of laches, we had ruled that where a party allows the following number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of action, before instituting court action to enforce his claim, such action would be barred by the equitable defense of laches: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years and 67 years.

In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after 49 years had lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for the long delay in the filing by petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept for so long. Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to spring an ambush and claim title when the possessors efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. Considerable delay in asserting ones right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches from questioning private respondent’s ownership of the subject property. At any rate, petitioners right to recover the possession of the subject property from private respondent has, by the latters long period of possession and by petitioner’s inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might have given rise to an action in court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file seasonably the necessary suit.

Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that, while petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the donated property, and jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.