Petitioner,
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON,
Respondents.
Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondent made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, ruled that land devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.
In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed the following retention limits, viz 1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operation of the CARL.
DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No. 9. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents’ landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. no. 9 does not run counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.
Issue:
Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?
Held:
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms “agricultural activity” and “commercial farming” by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
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